

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGIMENT



BATTLEFIELD TOUR

8 September 2004

ANZIO

January/ February 1944

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Anzio:

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PROGRAMME FOR THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGIMENT

TOUR TO ANZIO 7 – 14 SEPTEMBER 2004

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Tue 7 Sep	0900	Coach pick-up	Leeds Rail Station
	1310	Latest reporting Stansted	
	1510	Depart Stansted	Ryanair flight FR3008
	1840 (local)	Arrive Rome Ciampino Airport	
		Coach transfer to Anzio	
	2030	Arrive hotel	Grand Hotel Dei Cesari
	2130	Dinner	
Wed 8 Sep	0800	Breakfast	
	0900	Depart hotel	
	0915	Arrive Anzio Port	
	0915 - 1300	Anzio Battle, including landing and visit to Beachead Cemetery	Lay wreath
	1300 - 1400	Picnic lunch	
	1400 - 1500	Anzio Battle and the Wadis	
	1515 - 1600	Visit Anzio War Cemetery	Lay wreath
	1615	Arrive back at hotel	
Thu 9 Sep	0800 - 0900	Breakfast	
	0915	Depart hotel	Jackets, ties, medals
	0935	Arrive Beachead Cemetery	
	1000 - 1040	Burial Ceremony of two British soldiers recently discovered within Anzio Beachead	
	1100 - 1240	Free time in Anzio town	
	1245	Assemble in the Harbour for Plaque unveiling ceremony	
	1300 - 1345	Unveiling of the DWR Memorial Plaque	
	1400	Reception in adjacent restaurant	
	1530 (approx)	Coach returns to hotel	
Fri 10 – Mon 13 Sep	Your own arrangements		
Tue 14 Sep	1130	Depart hotel for Rome Ciampino Airport	
	1300	Latest reporting time	Ryanair flight FR3009
	1500	Flight departs	
	1640 (local)	Arrive Stansted	
	2040	Coach party arrives Leeds Rail Station	

TOUR TO ANZIO, ITALY, 7-14 SEPTEMBER 2004

NOMINAL ROLE

Major General Sir Evelyn Webb-Carter, KCVO, OBE - Tour leader and speaker
Major R Heron - Tour administrator

Joining coach at Leeds:

Major and Mrs R Heron (Bob/Linda)
Major P B L Hoppe (Peter)
Dom Alberic Stacpoole (Captain) (John)
Mr and Mrs F Armitage (Fred/Rita)
Mr and Mrs G Bell (Gordon/Mary)
Mr A G Bell (Alistair)
Mr B Eastwood (Brian)
Mr K Fetch (Ken)
Mr J and Ms C Hackford (John/Christine)
Mrs P Harley (Pat)
Mrs I Mallinson (Irene)
Mr and Mrs D Hopewell (Douglas/Pat)
Mr J E Sargeant (John)
Ms J E M Gul (Janet)
Mr and Mrs G Popple (Geoffrey/Patricia) Total - 21

Joining tour at Stansted Airport:

Major General D E Isles (Donald) - departing tour AM 10 Sep
Brigadier and Mrs J B K Greenway (John/Judith)
Lieutenant Colonel W Robins (Robbie) - departing tour AM 10 Sep
Captain G Bullock (Geoffrey)
Captain and Mrs J Wilson (John/Pat)
Captain and Mrs R F Diacon (Richard/Elizabeth)
Mr and Mrs M Dowdy (Mac/Bridget)
Mr E Ellison (Eric)
Mr and Mrs K Jagger (Keith/Eveline)
Mr J and Mr G Kelly (James/Gene)
Mr and Mrs T Mallinson (Telford/Irene)
Ms H A Mallinson (Hayley)
Mr W Norman (Bill) - departing tour AM 10 Sep
Mr and Mrs P Royle (Philip/Lynne)
Mr J A Young (John) Total - 23

Joining tour in Italy:

Major General Sir Evelyn and Lady Celia Webb-Carter - departing tour PM 9 Sep
Captain and Mrs R C Wilson (Bob/Jean)
Mr and Mrs D Peckover (David/Jeanne)
Mr and Mrs R Hanson (Bob/Margaret) Total - 8

Tour Total - 52

THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND TO THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 1943 - 1945

1. The invasion of Italy on 3 September 1943 marked the start of a new phase in Allied strategy which was designed to culminate in the invasion of Germany. When the last Germans fled across the straits of Messina from Sicily the first aim of Allied strategy had been achieved: to clear the Germans from Africa and open the Mediterranean to Allied shipping.
2. The Casablanca Conference in January 1943 treated the invasion of Sicily as a continuation of the clearance of North Africa and looked no further ahead. The Trident Conference in Washington in May 1943 took a wider view. After it, on 26 May, the Combined Chiefs of Staff informed the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean of their decision that a major attack on Europe would be made from the United Kingdom probably in the early summer of 1944. He was therefore instructed to plan such operations in exploitation of the conquest of Sicily as could best be calculated "to eliminate Italy from the war and contain the maximum number of German divisions". Subsequently the Mediterranean theatre would no longer receive the first priority for resources and its operations would become preparatory and subsidiary to the D Day invasion of Normandy.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander's Instructions gave no geographical objectives, but pointed out two desirable aims: one political and the other to contain the maximum number of German divisions. It is essential that this directive be constantly borne in mind, for it continued to govern all Allied strategy in Italy up to the final surrender of German forces. In essence the campaign in Italy became a grand strategic fixing attack. The diversion of German strength to a theatre as far removed as possible from the vital point, the Channel coast, and the elimination of Italy would mean a loss to the Axis Powers of 59 divisions, amounting to some two million men. In the summer of 1943, Italy had seven divisions in southern France, and no less than 32 in the Balkans, together with anti-aircraft and coast defence units in both theatres. To replace these and at the same time to provide troops which would have to be sent to hold the line in Italy would represent a formidable commitment for Germany at a time when she was faced once more with war on two fronts.
4. To carry out the terms of the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff one course of action had obvious advantages. Italian troops could be found and fought at any point of the deeply indented northern coastline of the Mediterranean from Greece to the Pyrenees, or in the many off-lying islands, but to eliminate Italy from the war an attack on the mother country clearly offered the best solution. One alternative was to invade the Balkans. To do this, however, it would first have been necessary, for the sake of air cover, to break into the outer ring of islands from Crete to Rhodes, a difficult operation in autumn. Balkan terrain was even worse suited for offensive operations than the Italian and, it must be remembered, that the Allied amphibious resources were destined to dwindle to the advantage of the western theatre. Two further arguments against this course were first that the United States Government was most reluctant to become involved in a Balkan campaign and, second, that the Soviets were anxious to keep the Balkans for themselves post-war: so they were agitating effectively to keep the western Allies out.

5. Another possible operation considered was one against Sardinia and Corsica. German air bases there could be eliminated and the islands might act as stepping stones for an attack on the south of France. But the Allies were anxious not to attract any more German forces into France but rather away from it. There was also no guarantee that such a campaign would contain many German forces, nor was there any guarantee that such an operation would eliminate Italy from the war. The latter argument also applied to operations in the Balkans.

6. It was, therefore, the opinion of the Allied Command that an invasion of Italy was by far the best means of carrying out the first part of the Chiefs of Staff's directive, namely the elimination of Italy from the war, and that it also offered the best chances of achieving the second strategic objective; the containment of as many German forces as possible. The Germans would have to commit a strong force of good quality troops or risk losing Italy, resulting in Anglo-American armies appearing on the southern frontier of Germany and allowing the Allies use of the airfields in Italy from which their strategic Air Forces could develop attacks against the Fatherland.

7. It was also clear, gazing at the relief map of southern Italy, that it would be necessary to progress up the 'leg' of Italy quickly and, preferably, to commence the invasion as far north as possible. But the limits were constrained by the availability of air cover which was limited to the area running from the island of Capri, just south of Salerno, across the peninsula to about 15 miles short of Taranto. In this area there were no major strategic targets but there were two great prizes just outside the range of fighter cover – the naval base at Taranto to the east and the port of Naples to the north. A direct assault on either of these heavily defended, however, would be sufficiently hazardous even with maximum air support and quite impossible without it.

8. Following the announcement on Radio Roma on the 25th July of the fall of Mussolini there was a conference at Carthage, on 26th July, attended by General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham, Air Marshal Tedder and General Alexander. Salerno was selected as the site for the invasion.

9. The Salerno beaches were undoubtedly the best for an assault on the whole west coast of Italy; sea approaches are good and offshore gradients vary between one in eight and one in four, allowing landing craft to come close inshore. The coastal defences in the area were not impressive and conditions for an assault were ideal, but the trouble lay in expanding the bridgehead beyond the beaches. The coastal plain is overlooked by mountains and the rocky spur of the Picentini Mountains, which run down into the Sorrento peninsula, makes a formidable obstacle blocking the way to Naples. Towering sheer above Salerno, this wall of bare mountain is pierced by only two passes running through narrow gorges, offering admirable defensive positions. For all these advantages, however, there was one decisive factor in the choice of Salerno: it was the furthest north and nearest to Naples that the Allies could strike without losing fighter cover.

10. While the Allies had been planning the assault on Europe during the spring and summer of 1943, the Germans had been planning its defence. Their first reaction to the catastrophe in Tunisia was to reinforce the Balkans, where their forces increased from seven to 19 divisions by the end of August. One and a half divisions were sent to Sardinia and Corsica and, by the 3rd of September, there were 16 divisions in Italy. Two were near Rome and two more were in Calabria. Two had moved to the Naples area to refit and 16th

Panzer Division was covering the Gulf of Salerno. These eight divisions were under Headquarters, German 10th Army (Colonel-General von Vietinghoff). Rommel, in northern Italy, had four divisions in the general area Genoa – Spezia. All these forces were clearly disposed to meet an Allied invasion at the points considered most threatened: Calabria, Gaeta – Naples – Salerno, the Rome area and Genoa – Spezia. These points were considered by the Germans as possible Allied objectives with the degree of probability increasing towards the north.

11. In the early hours of 3rd September 2 Brigades of 5th British Division and a Brigade of the 1st Canadian Division, the vanguard of 13th Corps, crossed the straits of Messina supported by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. On the same day the first convoys for Salerno sailed from North Africa. On the evening of the 8th they joined up off the Gulf of Salerno. As they headed towards the land, the troops learned that Italy had surrendered. On 9th September, having already landed, 13th British Corps were advancing through Calabria and were about half way up the toe, 1st British Airborne Division had occupied Taranto and 46th and 56th British Divisions, along with 36th US Division, landed on the beaches of Salerno. The Italian armed forces had received no warning of their government's intentions and the Germans moved so fast that by 10th September they had disarmed all the Italian divisions and turned without fear of interference to face the Allies at Salerno.

CHRONOLOGY

10 Jul 43	The assault of Sicily began. Syracuse captured.
25 Jul 43	Mussolini resigned.
3 Sep 43	8 th Army crossed the straits of Messina.
8 Sep 43	Italy surrendered.
9 Sep 43	5 th Army land at Salerno. 1 st Br Airborne Division captured Taranto.
10 Sep 43	Italian fleet surrendered at Malta.
27 Sep 43	Foggia captured.
1 Oct 43	Naples fell.
15 Oct 43	Volturno crossing secured.
2 Nov 43	46 th Infantry Division reached the Garigliano.
6 Nov 43	First assault of Monte Lungo failed.
8 Nov 43	River Sangro reached by 8 th Army.
15 Nov 43	5 th Army halted for regrouping in the Mignano Gap.
30 Nov 43	5 th Army assault on Winter Line began.
6 Dec 43	Monte Camino captured.
8 Dec 43	Italian forces attacked German positions on Monte Lungo.
16 Dec 43	Monte Lungo captured by 142 nd Regiment, US 36 th Division.
28 Dec 43	Ortona cleared by 8 th Army. 8 th Army offensive brought to a halt.

FIRST BATTLE OF CASSINO

17 Jan 44	10 th Corps attacked across the lower Garigliano.
22 Jan 44	Allied forces landed at Anzio (Operation Shingle).
25 Jan 44	US 34 th Division attacked across the Rapido, north of Cassino.
12 Feb 44	4 th Indian Division began take over from US 34 th Division in the hills north of Cassino.

SECOND BATTLE OF CASSINO

15 Feb 44	Monte Cassino Monastery bombed.
15-16 Feb 44	1 st Royal Sussex attacked Monte Cassino from Snakeshead Ridge.
17-18 Feb 44	4 th Indian Division attacked the Monastery.
17 Feb 44	New Zealanders attacked station via railway track.

THIRD BATTLE OF CASSINO

15 Mar 44	Cassino town bombed. New Zealanders attack the town.
16 Mar 44	1/9 th Gurkhas reached Hangman's Hill.
17 Mar 44	New Zealand troops reached the station via the town.
19 Mar 44	Armoured assault up Cavendish Road.
25 Mar 44	Troops withdrawn from Hangman's Hill.

FOURTH BATTLE OF CASSINO

11 May 44	Attacks on Gustav Line by US 2 nd , French Expeditionary, 13 th British and 2 nd Polish Corps.
12 May 44	First Polish attacks on Points 593, 575 and Albaneta Farm began.
13 May 44	Monte Maio captured.
17 May 44	2 nd Polish Corps attacked Points 593, 575 and Albaneta farm.
18 May 44	Monte Cassino Monastery occupied by 12 th Podolski Lancers.

Aftermath


23 May 44	Anzio breakout began. Canadian Corps breached Hitler Line at Pontecorvo.
25 May 44	Link up between US 2 nd Corps and 6 th Corps took place.
4 Jun 44	Rome entered by 5 th Army.
6 Jun 44	D Day landings in Normandy.

ANZIO LANDINGS

22 Jan 44	Allied landings at Anzio.
24 Jan 44	Beachhead expanded to a depth of 7 miles.
25 Jan 44	Allies capture Aprilla, "The Factory".
1 Feb 44	Anzio port fully operational.
3 Feb 44	German counter attacks against Campoleone salient.
9 Feb 44	Allies pushed out of Aprilla.
11 Feb 44	Allies counter attack Aprilla.
16 Feb 44	German assault on 4 mile front along the Campoleone salient.
5 May 44	6 th Corps breakout of Cisterna at Cori – Op Buffalo.
25 May 44	Link up with 6 th Corps.

AFTERMATH

4 Jun 44	Rome entered by 5 th Army.
6 Jun 44	D Day in Normandy.



1st BATTALION DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGIMENT
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1944

Bn HQ	CO	Lt Col	B W	Webb-Carter DSO		
	2i/c	Maj	M M	Davie		
	Adj't	Capt	B	Hindley		- Wounded
	IO	Capt	J L	Streatfeild	MC	
	RMO	Capt	A	Paterson	RAMC	
	Padre	Rev	T W	Richardson		- Wounded
HQ Coy	Comd	Maj	H T	Sills	MC	
	Sigs	Lt	S R	Turnbull		- POW
	Admin	Capt	A D	Siddall		
	QM	Lt	H L	Lyons		
Support Coy	Comd	Capt	J O	Urmson		- POW
	Mors	Lt	W R C	Miller		- Wounded
		Lt	R B	Fowler		
	Carriers	Lt	H L	Cartmell		- POW
		Lt/Capt	T E	Ludlow		
	Anti Tanks	Lt	N E	Tuckwell		- POW
		Lt/Capt	E H	Buckland		
	Pioneers	Capt		Smith		
		Sgt	J	Dodds		
A Coy	Comd	Maj	T F	Huskisson	MC	- Wounded
		Lt/Capt	E	Oliver		
	2IC	Capt	A G	Peel		
		Lt/Capt	N	Wimpenny	MC	
	PI Comds	Lt	A S	Peebles		
		Lt	H N W	Fielding		
		2Lt		Stafford		- †
		2Lt	A	Burns	GH	- Wounded
B Coy	Comd	Capt	J A	Randall		- Wounded
		Maj	C G R	Taylor		- Wounded
	2IC	Capt	E D	Macintosh		- POW
	PI Comds	Lt	D S D	Jones-Stamp		- POW
		2Lt	F N	Potts		- Wounded
		Lt	C C	Gomm	E Surreys	MC
		2Lt	J	Stilt	E Surreys	
C Coy	Comd	Maj	P P	Benson	MC	- †
	2IC	Capt	A H	Jacobsen	MC	- POW
		Capt	F A	Barbury		- POW
	PI Comds	2Lt/Capt	G H	Hall	MC	
		Lt	H	Cooper	LF	- POW
		Lt	R H	Hoyle	RWK	
		Lt	R J	Diacon		
D Coy	Comd	Maj	P R	Faulks	MC	- Wounded
		Capt	D G	Redfern		- †
	2IC	Capt	E W	Sutcliffe		- POW
	PI Comds	2Lt	R J	Corke		- POW
		Lt		Ancliffe		- Wounded
		Lt	J W	Taylor		- †
		Lt	H	Thompson		- Wounded



Some Officers of the 1st Battalion - March / April 1944

Standing: Lts RB Fowler, RH Hoyle, ?, N Wimpenny, Capt A Peterson (RAMC), Lt RJ Diacon, ?, ?, Capts JL Streatfeild, PR Druce, AO Siddall

On Chairs: Maj MM Dawie, Lt Col BW Webb-Carter, Maj HT Sills

Sitting: ?, Lts AL Lyons, RA Smith, ?, ?.

ANZIO

The landings at Anzio in the small hours of 22nd January 1944 achieved complete surprise. They demonstrated, however, not for the first time, that although a great logistic and organisational effort is necessary to place a force ashore in an amphibious operation, it is equally necessary that the High Command have unequivocal views on what that force is to achieve once landed and ensure that it has sufficient strength for the task. At Anzio this was not so. The operation produced certain limited strategic benefits, but at high costs and not to the extent envisaged.

VI (US) Corps landed astride the little port of Anzio – 3rd (US) Division on the right and 1st (British) Division on the left – and advanced inland with no opposition to a prescribed line, giving a Beach-head of some seven miles in depth, and a corps front of about twenty-six miles. The operation was intended as part of a successful offensive breaking through at Cassino, whereas that offensive was already failing. In these circumstances the troops in or operating from Anzio Beach-head were bound to be isolated until a reversal of fortune sixty miles further south. It was clear, too, that German concentration against the beach head would only be disturbed if there were rapid and successful operations on the main Fifth Army front, whereas these were now likely to be slow and painful. On the other side of the coin the High Command hoped to assist Fifth Army's operations by threatening the rear of the Germans in the Gustav Line. This, by definition, required aggressive action from Anzio. Alexander told Clark on 12th January that the object was "to cut enemy communications and threaten the rear of XIV Corps". Clark, on the other hand – with more ambiguity, but more realism – told Lucas to secure a Beach-head, and then advance "on" the Alban Hills – the high ground twenty-five miles from Anzio and immediately south-east of Rome over which ran the Appian and Casilinan Ways, lifelines of the German front.

Matters were, therefore, left very much to Lucas as to how far to go, whether and when. He has been much criticised for failing to seize his initial opportunities to advance – when opposition did not exist – and thereby allowing his force to be sealed in a bridgehead and counter-attacked at leisure with great ferocity. It may be that VI Corps should have advanced some way deeper initially, and secured more defensible ground whose possession might have posed more of a threat to the enemy – the judgement is tactical. But on the main point, of whether a great operational opportunity was missed, there can be little just criticism. To occupy a blocking position astride the German north-south communications, and simultaneously to protect corps rearward communications to Anzio would have needed a far larger force than Lucas commanded or than could be supplied. Alexander wrote to Brooke after the event that it would have needed six divisions: "What we were aiming at was to get astride the enemy's L

of C.” Kesselring reckoned that an Allied force of four divisions might have been landed – and that such was quite inadequate to do more than hold a Beach-head. Admiral Sir John Cunningham (Naval Commander-in-Chief) pessimistically assessed that it was impossible to supply a force of four divisions, let alone more¹. In all these circumstances it appears that Lucas had been placed by his superiors, whatever their afterthoughts, in what would now be described as a “no-win situation”. It is difficult to believe that, had he undertaken a major advance, he would not have suffered a major disaster. But shore of a major advance – Alexander’s concept – it is equally difficult to justify SHINGLE at all. Alexander and Clark both visited the Beach-head from time to time, and periodically complained of Lucas’s lack of enterprise. He may not have been an inspiring or lucid commander, but it is far from clear what he could have done, or indeed what Alexander and Clark wanted him to do, given the forces they allotted him; equally it is unclear why, if they were dissatisfied, they did not give unequivocal orders.

In the event, the advances of the first day were unopposed, and the British troops saw in the distance commanding ground which appeared theirs for the taking. The German response was swift. Kesselring and his superiors assessed that this was the invasion of Western Europe, rather than a subsidiary operation of Fifth Army. Reinforcements, according to an existing contingency plan, were hurried towards Italy from France and Germany. Within Italy Kesselring placed the Commander of Fourteenth Army, General von Mackensen, in command of the whole area north and south of Rome, and moved towards the battle every unit or group within range. By excellent Staff work these were assembled sorted into coherent commands and concentrating against the Allied Beach-head in a remarkably short time. The Allies were quickly contained. The framework of two German divisions was in the area by the evening of the first day, and by 28th January some four divisions, each of a different size and shape, were confronting Lucas’s Corps, with more to come: a total of thirty-three battalions, a tank regiment and over two hundred and forty pieces of artillery. This was a formidable array, and to command it tactically Kesselring moved from the east the experienced LXXVI Panzer Corps Headquarters (General Herr) which on 4th February became responsible for the sector, with five divisions, including 2nd Panzer Division.

Meanwhile Lucas spent the early days digging a defensive position and authorised a number of limited attacks which, although skilful and successful, could never seriously threaten the enemy now concentrating against him. In response to pressure by Alexander and Clark to make a limited advance to Cisterna and Campoleone – ostensibly to strengthen his defensive position, although also to extend it – Lucas ordered an attack on 30th January. On the left 1st Division advanced to the railway at Campoleone, passing one brigade

¹ VI Corps was reinforced to a strength of four divisions within a week and ultimately to seven.


through another, with 1st (US) Armoured Division moving forwards on the left flank. The movement created a salient. It also had the merit of upsetting German preparations for the major counter-attack which was thought inevitable.

With Mackensen now reinforced and ordered to push the Allies into the sea, there began a series of battles as bitter as any in the Italian campaign. The Allied Beach-head, too, was reinforced. Two American divisions – 45th Infantry and 1st Armoured – had already arrived and been in action, and, on 12th February, 56th (British) Division was withdrawn from X Corps on the Garigliano and shipped to Anzio where it took over responsibility for part of the line, while 1st Division was brought into corps reserve. Already, however, Mackensen had begun his move.

On 3rd February the forward positions of 1st Division in the salient were attacked, and although the assault was beaten off the forward brigade was withdrawn. On the evening of 7th February, Aprilia, held by the right-hand battalion of 1st Division's left-hand brigade, was attacked by ten battalions, while another German infantry division thrust towards Carroceto from the west. The attack on Aprilia was again repelled, but next day was resumed by twelve battalions. Two days later, on the night of 10th February, yet another heavy attack was launched from the west towards Carroceto Station. In all these battles German infantry greatly outnumbered the defenders, pressed their attacks as hard as ever, and were driven back. 1st Division lost many men but little ground.

The main attack was delivered by LXXVI Panzer Corps on 16th February, driving south down the Via Anziante with five divisions, including two Panzer Grenadier and one Panzer, and with a battalion each of the formidable Tiger and the new Panther² tanks. The main thrust hit 45th (US) Division, but was entirely and brilliantly defeated after several days of fierce fighting. West of the Via Anziante the German attack struck 56th (British) Division with equal lack of success. On 19th February the German Panzer troops penetrated the front to a depth of a mile – but were then stopped by the determination of the defence and the accuracy of the artillery fire. Mackensen's attack had failed. A final German attempt on 29th February met with no success. The German Fourteenth Army was exhausted. The Anzio Beach-head was no longer threatened. Some reliefs of formations took place, and the Anzio Front remained static, dangerous and disagreeable, as positional warfare took over until May. The attempt to destroy the Allies had cost the Germans dear, and in terms of attrition the Allied operation had played its part.

² Like the Tiger the Panther was very heavily armoured, with a long 75 millimetre gun.



CITATIONS for IMMEDIATE AWARDS to 1st Bn in ITALY

BAR TO THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER.

T/LT.-COLONEL BRIAN WOLSELEY WEBB-CARTER, D.S.O.

This officer has commanded his Battalion with great gallantry and outstanding devotion to duty from the initial landing in the Anzio Beach-head on the 22nd January, 1944, to the present date.

On the 30th January the – Infantry Brigade attacked the high ground immediately south of Campoleone station with the D.W.R., commanded by this officer, on the left. After crossing the start line strong enemy resistance was encountered but was ultimately overcome and the final objective later captured. The successful completion of this operation was brought about by the skilful handling of the Battalion by this officer. Throughout the operation this officer's cool determination was an example and inspiration to all ranks in his Battalion.

After this attack the Brigade held the position for five days and nights, well in advance of the remainder of the Division. This officer never spared himself in his sound planning of the defence of the Battalion locality, with the result that the many attempts by the enemy at penetration were successfully thrown back.

On the 4th February his Battalion was ordered to withdraw in broad daylight and whilst in close contact with the enemy on all sides. This was accomplished despite the repeated efforts of the enemy. Its success was largely due to the forethought and planning on the part of the commanding officer.

On the 10th February and under the most difficult conditions this officer's Battalion was ordered to carry out the relief of a hard-pressed and numerically weak battalion of the Division in the Carroceto area. The Battalion occupied this position against great odds and held it successfully against all enemy attacks. When a partial success was gained by the enemy the prompt action by this officer in the launching of a deliberate counter-attack with the minimum delay completely restored the position.

From the 25th February to the 6th March, 1944, the Battalion was holding positions in the difficult wadi country at the left of the Divisional sector of the Beach-head. Despite the most appalling conditions at the time, this officer's cheerfulness and determination maintained the spirits of his troops at a high level. There is no doubt that this Battalion held its position against heavy enemy pressure as a direct result of the encouragement and fine example set by this officer.

Throughout all the period since the landing in the Anzio Beach-head on the 22nd January, this officer has served with outstanding distinction and devotion to duty.

MILITARY CROSS.

MAJOR P. P. BENSON (killed in action February, 1944).

Major Benson is a rifle company commander in this Battalion. During the bitter fighting in the Anzio Beach-head from 30th January to 4th February he set a high example of personal courage and real leadership. He led his company to its objective on the attack of 31st January and in the face of particularly fierce opposition he gained it. This position had subsequently to be abandoned to allow our medium artillery to engage enemy strong points in its vicinity. After the barrage had subsided, Major Benson observed enemy movement on the feature opposite him and, accompanied by his batman, went forward to investigate it. He found an enemy armoured car on the feature to which two German officers were retiring with their kit. Major Benson at once engaged these officers and shot them both dead with his revolver,

despite the proximity of the armoured car, which immediately opened heavy M.G. fire on him. Major Benson then retired to his own company positions, where *morale* was much raised by this incident. This officer, who was wounded in the course of the Tunisian campaign, has always shown high qualities of leadership and gallantry.

CAPTAIN CHARLES CHRISTOPHER GOMM.

For great gallantry and outstanding leadership in the Anzio Beach-head from 9th February to date. This officer joined the Battalion as a reinforcement on 9th February. Within a few days he was in action with a company consisting almost entirely of reinforcements who had never heard a shot fired. Capt. Gomm showed consistently a very high standard of leadership in its best sense. On 20th February he personally lead a platoon on a strong enemy M.G. nest which was a source of considerable embarrassment to the communications of the Battalion. Recklessly exposing himself, he led an assault which was entirely successful and ended in the elimination of the enemy post and capture of a prisoner. His skilful dispositions and minor tactics enabled the operation to be carried out at the loss to us of one man wounded. On 26th February his company commander became a casualty, as did the C.S.M. of the company, and Capt. Gomm assumed command. The losses the company had suffered had shaken the inexperienced troops and Capt. Gomm at once set out to work to restore confidence. By his energy and resource he soon improved matters to a remarkable degree. On 27th February he selected an O.P. and, taking a sniper's rifle, he there shot three Germans who had been sniping at his company. He so inspired his men with fighting spirit that there was keen competition as to who should next man the exposed position of the O.P. and take his turn at sniping. By 6th March, when his company was relieved in the line, Capt. Gomm's command were in full control of their sector. Enemy activity by day had ceased owing to skilful sniping and his patrolling at night was much curtailed and carried out with obvious caution.

LIEUTENANT G. H. HALL (now CAPTAIN).

In the Anzio Beach-head from 30th January to 5th February Lt. Hall was continuously in action. During the whole of that period this officer was most conspicuous for his reckless bravery and powers of leadership. In the initial attack of 30th January Lt. Hall inspired his platoon and, indeed, the whole company to which he belonged by his cool disregard of danger. He led his platoon in the face of very heavy enemy shell and M.G. fire to its objective and by constant exposure of himself under fire inculcated a feeling of confidence in his men under very trying conditions during the subsequent defensive period. Finally he had to take over command of his company as all other officers became casualties and numbers were seriously reduced. During this exacting time Lt. Hall again proved to be a tower of strength. On several occasions he joined a section shaken by a near miss and by manning the Bren gun himself and causing casualties to the enemy instantly restored confidence. On one occasion when a German L.M.G. engaged his company from a flank at a distance of about 400 yards, Lt. Hall manned a 2in. mortar himself and put it out of action with his first shot. These actions had a tonic effect on his men who emerged from a telling ordeal in fine heart.

MAJOR T. F. HUSKISSON.

This officer is a rifle company commander. During the fighting in the Anzio Beach-head from 30th January to 4th February his conduct was beyond praise. He led the right forward company in the assault on features overlooking the Rome railway on 31st January and by his inspiring leadership and skilful handling of his company achieved his objective in the face of

shattering shellfire and intense M.G. fire. The Battalion held these positions for six days of increasing enemy pressure and encirclement and under almost incessant shell and mortar fire. Major Huskisson's conduct during this difficult period was exemplary. He was moving from platoon locality to platoon locality – often under fire – almost ceaselessly and was a powerful factor in keeping up the *morale* of his company in particularly trying circumstances. On 4th February the Battalion was in close contact with enemy infantry and armour when it was ordered to withdraw. The success of getting a reasonable part of the Battalion away can be ascribed to a degree to the part played by Major Huskisson's company. Under his skilful direction his company afforded covering fire for the preliminary withdrawal of two other companies. The appearance of enemy armour failed to dislodge his company until his task was fulfilled. Major Huskisson's conduct throughout was of the highest order, and his direction of artillery D.F. tasks and 3in. mortar shoots was a large factor in the successful defence of the Battalion sector.

LIEUTENANT JOHN LEWIS STREATFEILD

For gallantry and untiring devotion to duty in the Anzio Beach-head from 23rd January to 25th March. This officer is intelligence officer of the Battalion. On 30th January, when the Battalion was leading Battalion of the Brigade attack on Campoleone, the adjutant became a casualty, as did the understudy. Lt. Streatfeild was detailed to carry out the duties of adjutant in addition to his own, and this he did with the utmost efficiency and devotion. Under consistently heavy fire, this officer manned the 22 set and ensured the maintenance of communications. On 4th February the Battalion was ordered to retire. It was at the time almost completely surrounded and menaced by a number of enemy tanks. Lt. Streatfeild, with Battalion H.Q., saw all companies leave their positions and then accompanied the C.O.'s carrier when it moved off. The carrier – having to leave the usual route owing to heavy enemy fire – became bogged. Manning a Bren gun, Lt. Streatfeild took up a position and engaged the enemy while the driver endeavoured to extricate the carrier. For over three-quarters of an hour this officer was under heavy fire but continued to keep the enemy at bay – determined to do all that was possible to get the carrier with its load of the 22 set and various documents, etc., away to safety. Finally, realising the hopelessness of the task, Lt. Streatfeild sent the driver on and remained behind to destroy all codes, etc., with the enemy in some strength within 80 yards of him. He accomplished this task and still bearing his Bren gun regained our own lines.

This officer was severely wounded in Tunisia in April, 1943, and only rejoined the Battalion last November. He has always shown a striking standard of gallantry and devotion which is an inspiration to his brother officers.

LIEUTENANT N. WIMPENNY (now CAPTAIN).

This officer is second-in-command of a rifle company. Throughout the attack and subsequent defensive action by this Battalion in the Anzio Beach-head, Lt. Wimpenny showed high qualities of courage and leadership. In the attack of 30th January he was always to the fore and was of great assistance to his company commander in reaching the objective. The period from 31st January to 4th February was one of particular trial as the Battalion was in close touch with the enemy and sustained several attacks. Lt. Wimpenny – throughout this time – moved almost without ceasing from platoon to platoon in his company. Everywhere he was a source of increased *morale*. Frequently he manned L.M.G.s in platoon areas and despite heavy enemy artillery fire engaged the enemy to good purpose. Finally, when circumstances forced the withdrawal of the Brigade, Lt. Wimpenny organised the movements of the covering platoon of his company and by his inspiring leadership ensured the safety of

the bulk of his company. Throughout the whole action this officer's conduct was above praise.

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

No. 4611239 C.S.M. McNEA, E. (died from wounds 1st March, 1944).

On 4th February, 1944, "B" Company was holding a position on the left flank of the Battalion in the left sector of the Anzio Beach-head. From 0300 hours until 1630 hours the enemy put in continued attacks on this company's position. These attacks were successfully repulsed until finally No. 4 Platoon was overrun with the loss of the platoon commander. This enemy success opened to them the company's position, and if not dealt with promptly would have allowed them to dominate another rifle company and Battalion H.Q., with possibly very serious effect.

At this time the O.C. "B" Company was engaged with the enemy away from his H.Q. and no other officer remained with the company. C.S.M. McNea appreciated the gravity of the threat and immediately organised a counter-attack, drawing the personnel from his own company H.Q., a much depleted platoon of his own company, and men from other units in the vicinity. He personally led the attack, which he conducted with skill and great determination, finally driving the enemy from their recently won position, inflicting severe losses upon them.

Later, the Battalion was ordered to withdraw, and had it not been for this action by C.S.M. McNea, the ability of two rifle companies and Battalion H.Q. to do so may have been rendered impossible by the presence of the enemy behind them.

By his initiative, coolness and high personal courage, C.S.M. McNea inspired his men and undoubtedly prevented an enemy success which might have had serious and far-reaching results.

MILITARY MEDAL

No. 4618307 PTE J. BAKER.

This soldier was a stretcher bearer attached to "C" Company during the advance of 30th January, 1944. He showed the utmost coolness in leading the company stretcher bearers to wounded men lying in the open although the ground was still being heavily shelled and machine gunned. He was always in the lead and walked to the R.A.P. unceasingly with stretcher cases and then back for more. Likewise, when the company was being attacked on 4th February again he was in the lead to render first aid to wounded men, although all the company positions were under L.M.G. and mortar fire and he worked tirelessly throughout the day and night to give all aid possible; it was a magnificent display of coolness and nerve which materially assisted the company as a whole to maintain its fighting qualities to the end.

No. 6101363 Pte. E. PAULL (missing February, 1944).

Pte. Paull was a platoon runner on the 4th February, 1944, and was wounded in three places in the leg during a critical phase of the battle. In spite of his wounds he continued to carry out his duties as runner and to relay urgent messages from his company headquarters to his platoon. He made four or five journeys by crawling on his stomach before finally he

allowed himself to be evacuated. Throughout this time he was in great pain. But for his high sense of duty in delivering these messages it is possible that the enemy might have succeeded in penetrating the company position.

4626167 SERGEANT A. J. SELWAY.

On 28th February, 1944, while his company were occupying a sector of the line in the Anzio Beach-head, Sgt. Selway was in command of a rifle platoon. During one of the numerous periods when the company's positions were being heavily shelled, the C.S.M. was very severely wounded in both legs. No stretcher bearers were left in the company, so Selway, hearing the cries of the wounded man, came to attend to him although heavy shelling continued. After working for some 25 minutes in the open, Selway organised a stretcher party and himself helped to carry the C.S.M. over 600 yards of open and exposed ground in full daylight, to the R.A.P. After attention here, he assisted in carrying the C.S.M. back to an A.D.S. again in full daylight, over an exposed road. On returning to his company area, Selway then organised and personally conducted the evacuation of his company commander who had previously been wounded. Thereafter, during the night 28th-29th February, Selway acted as guide to various parties over difficult and dangerous ground without thought for himself.

Selway's coolness and devotion to duty were an inspiration to all ranks, and by his courage and leadership undoubtedly ensured that his company received supplies and reinforcements, and guided another company safely to a new area in very difficult circumstances.

Mentioned in Despatches

Lt. (temp. Captain) THE Duke of Wellington (56864) (killed in action).

"At Dragone Hill on 13th September, 1943, a critical situation developed and the enemy was pressing forward and threatening to encircle the right of our position. Under heavy mortar and machine guns fire Captain The Duke of Wellington led his troop forward to the counter-attack and after close hand-to-hand fighting succeeded in repelling the enemy. This counter-attack was the turning point in the action, and Captain The Duke of Wellington's personal leadership and disregard of danger contributed materially to its success."

"At Piccolette on the evening of 15th September, 1943, he commanded the left half of the Commando in a night advance, the two in charge having been killed. Again his leadership, determination and energy were conspicuous, infusing the greatest confidence in his men, and ensuring the success of the advance in which a large number of prisoners were taken."

"Captain The Duke of Wellington had always shown the highest devotion to duty in action, placing himself in the most exposed positions in order to inspire confidence in his men, and 'proved himself to be a gallant leader and a fearless officer'."

(Missing, believed killed, 16th September, 1943).

BAR TO THE MILITARY CROSS.

MAJOR T. F. HUSKISSON, MC.

For conspicuous gallantry and outstanding qualities of leadership in the Anzio Beach-head. On the 22nd May the – Battalion was ordered to attack the Pantoni feature which was a German prepared position of considerable strength. Major Huskisson, who had recently returned to the Battalion from being wounded in February, was in command of the left forward company. The considerable artillery support failed to silence the German machine guns and Major Huskisson's company came early under a heavy volume of fire. Taking the lead, this officer gained the first objective with his company. This was the ruins of Pantoni itself, which was by-passed by the left platoon of the company and although covered by our troops still contained a dug-in machine gun post surrounded by "S" mines. Keeping this machine gun post engaged with his right platoon, Major Huskisson pushed his left platoon on to the second objective of the company. This was gained at the point of the bayonet and the platoon then withdrew according to plan.

Major Huskisson then proceeded to organise rapidly his company and consolidate the ground won. Walking about under fire, this officer established a co-ordinating defensive position, got his men dug in and the position wired. By vigorous offensive fire the German occupation of the Pantoni ruins was rendered impossible and dawn saw the company in complete domination of the feature.

Major Huskisson's conduct throughout was of the highest order and an inspiration to his men.

MILITARY CROSS

LT. F. P. FROUDE.

For gallantry and cool leadership in the Anzio Beach-head. Lt. Froude commanded a forward platoon of his company during the attack on the Pantoni feature on 22nd May. He led his men with such dash in the early stages of the assault that he had to halt his command for several minutes to allow our artillery to lift. He then led his platoon forward under heavy M.G. fire and by-passing the first objective according to order, passed on to the final objective of his company. Though prevented by a minefield from actually entering the enemy positions at this point, Lt. Froude so directed the fire of his platoon that the enemy had to evacuate their trenches. He personally engaged one post of three Germans with hand grenades, killing all the occupants, while the fire of his automatics engaged the remainder. For 45 minutes until darkness fell, this officer held his ground, recklessly exposing himself to encourage his men. He then crawled back under heavy fire to company H.Q. for instructions, returned, and led his platoon to its final objective, where it consolidated. Later he was instrumental in getting a number of our wounded from in front of his position and next morning went forward to our wire to secure four prisoners. The courage and utter disregard for his own safety shown by this young officer and the leadership he showed in this, his first action, were an inspiration to his platoon.

MILITARY MEDAL

No. 6098248 PTE. S. BOURNER.

For gallantry in the Anzio Beach-head. Pte. Bourner is a company stretcher bearer. During the attack of 22nd May he evacuated five wounded men of his company under heavy

M.G. fire. He was himself hit in the thigh early in the operation but despite this he continued to tend the wounded, exposing himself without any regard to his own safety. Finally, weak through loss of blood, he was ordered to proceed to the A.D.S., but having received treatment, this soldier avoided evacuation and, reporting back to his company for duty, insisted on carrying on with his duty. Pte. Bourner was instrumental in saving the life of several of his comrades and his gallantry in this, as in all other actions in the Beach-head, was an inspiration to his comrades.

No. 46222882 PTE. R. C. LONG.

For conspicuous gallantry and outstanding devotion to duty in the Anzio Beach-head. Pte. Long is the driver of the Jeep which is used for the evacuation of the wounded in the forward area. He has carried out evacuation under heavy fire and sometimes in circumstances of extreme danger to himself since early February. This devotion reached a climax on the night 22nd-23rd May when after the attack on the Pantoni feature, Pte. Long repeatedly drove his vehicle up a machine gun swept track to evacuate wounded. His complete coolness and his care of patients has been an inspiration to the wounded, and the certainty that evacuation will be carried out regardless of the risk involved to himself has been a considerable source of confidence to the fighting troops. The officers of the field ambulance find themselves unable to speak highly enough of the valuable and devoted service of Pte. Long.

No. 14646135 PTE. H. E. MARSHALL.

For gallantry in the Anzio Beach-head. Pte. Marshall is a rifleman in his section. During the attack on the Pantoni area on the 22nd May this private soldier showed great courage and determination. When his section was held up by an enemy anti-personnel mine field just short of the objective, he stood up against the enemy wire and engaged the enemy garrison of the M.G. post behind it. Under heavy fire, he threw grenades, killing several enemy and forcing the remainder to abandon their M.G. and leave the post. Later, during consolidation, Pte. Marshall repeatedly went forward of our positions to find our wounded, reassured them that stretcher bearers were on their way, and on their arrival assisted in their evacuation under fire. A gallant young soldier whose conduct was a pattern to his comrades.

No. 5049885 L/SGT. T. SPODE.

For courage and outstanding leadership in the Anzio Beach-head. On the 22nd May, during the attack on the Pantoni feature, Cpl. Spode was a section commander. Early in the assault both his platoon commander and platoon sergeant became casualties. Cpl. Spode immediately took command and, running forward, led his platoon in a desperate assault on Green Bush Hill, which was heavily defended. Forcing his way through the wire, Cpl. Spode fired his T.M.C. into the enemy and succeeded in entering the German trench. Most of his platoon becoming casualties, the Corporal was compelled to withdraw, but he rapidly re-organised the survivors and consolidated a position about 20 yards from the enemy. Here he held his ground until ordered to withdraw. Cpl. Spode's initiative and gallantry were an inspiration to his men.

ANZIO BEACH HEAD WAR CEMETERY

Italy

Location: Anzio is a coastal town 70 kilometres south of Rome. To reach Anzio take the No.148 Superstrada Motorway which runs between Rome and Latina. Turn off the Superstrada at the No.207. Follow the signs towards Anzio. The Cemetery lies 5 kilometre north of Anzio town on the No.207 and Commission signs are visible 150 metres from the Cemetery. There is a small parking area at the main entrance.

Visiting Information: The cemetery is permanently open and may be visited anytime.

Historical Information: On 3 September 1943 the Allies invaded the Italian mainland, the invasion coinciding with an armistice made with the Italians who then re-entered the war on the Allied side. Progress through southern Italy was rapid despite stiff resistance, but by the end of October, the Allies were facing the German winter defensive position known as the Gustav Line, which stretched from the river Garigliano in the west to the Sangro in the east. Initial attempts to breach the western end of the line were unsuccessful. Operations in January 1944 landed troops behind the German lines at Anzio, but defences were well organised, and a breakthrough was not actually achieved until May. The site of the cemetery originally lay close to a casualty clearing station. Burials were made direct from the battlefield after the landings at Anzio and later, after the Army had moved forward, many graves were brought in from the surrounding country. Beach Head War Cemetery contains 2,312 Commonwealth burials of the Second World War, 291 of them unidentified. There is also one First World War burial which was brought to the cemetery from Chiete Communal Cemetery near Rome.

Roll of Honour:

Pte Albert Allen	Cpl Albert Cross	Pte John Hall	Pte Edward Rose
Pte Kenneth Andrews	Pte Frederick Cummings	Pte Robert Hanson	Pte George Scaife
Pte Thomas Ashford	Pte Edward Davies	Pte John Henn	LCpl James Smorthit
Pte James Beavon	Pte Frederick Deller	Pte Dennis Howe	Cpl Haydn Stradling
Maj Philip Benson	Sgt Alfred Emmerson	Pte William Howkins	Pte Charles Taylor
Pte David Bentley	Pte Keith Emmerson	Pte Leslie Hughes	Pte Frank Taylor
Pte Alfred Bilborough	Pte Charles Field	Cpl Walter Ives	Cpl Sydney Thomas
Pte John Blackburn	Pte John Fishwick	Pte Fred Jackson	Pte Frank Townson
Pte James Blampey	Pte Charles Foulds	Pte Charles Laws	Pte Harold Walsh
LSgt Eric Broadbent	Pte Stanley Fullard	Pte Arthur Mann	Pte James Walters
Pte Walter Burman	LCpl Hubert Gardner	Pte James McNally	Pte William Watts
Pte Ernest Burton	Pte Harold Gelder	CSM Ernest McNea DCM	Pte Cecil Weatherlake
Pte Thomas Buttress	Pte Herbert Gerrard	Pte George Newby	Pte Clifford Whittaker
Pte James Cole	Pte John Gilfoyle	Pte James Pankhurst	Pte Albert Wood
Pte Edward Coleman	Pte Benjamine Gudgeon	Pte Ronald Priestley	Pte Joseph Wood
LCpl Ronald Crisp	Pte Harry Hall	Pte Clarence Raybould	Cpl Thomas Woods
			Cpl Jonathan Wright

ANZIO WAR CEMETERY

Italy

Location: Anzio is a coastal town 70 kilometres south of Rome. To reach Anzio take the No.148 Superstrada Motorway which runs between Rome and Latina. Take the exit for Anzio and follow the signs towards Anzio along the No.207. The Cemetery lies 1 kilometre north of Anzio town just off the No.207. As the No.207 approaches Anzio an Italian Communal Cemetery is visible on a small rise to the left of the road. Turn left and drive up a small rise to a parking area in front of the cemetery entrance. Commission signs are visible. Anzio War Cemetery should not be confused with Beach Head Cemetery which is also close to Anzio town

Visiting Information: The cemetery is permanently open and may be visited anytime.

Historical Information: On 3 September 1943 the Allies invaded the Italian mainland, the invasion coinciding with an armistice made with the Italians who then re-entered the war on the Allied side. Allied objectives were to draw German troops from the Russian front and more particularly from France, where an offensive was planned for the following year. Progress through southern Italy was rapid despite stiff resistance, but by the end of October, the Allies were facing the German winter defensive position known as the Gustav Line, which stretched from the river Garigliano in the west to the Sangro in the east. Initial attempts to breach the western end of the line were unsuccessful. Operations in January 1944 landed troops behind the German lines at Anzio, but defences were well organised, and a breakthrough was not actually achieved until May. The site for this cemetery was selected not long after the landings at Anzio and the burials here date from the period immediately following the landings. Anzio War Cemetery contains 1,056 Commonwealth burials of the Second World War.

Roll of Honour:

Cpl Edgar Ashton	Pte Stanley Dovey	Pte John Kemp	Pte Charles Schofield
Pte Ronald Attwood	Cpl Richard Duggan	Cpl William Knight	Pte George Seal
Pte William Beddard	LSgt John Dutton	Pte George Lanning	Pte Albert Stokes
Pte John Bowles	Pte Norman Etchells	LSgt Manning	Pte James Taylor
Pte Clarence Box	Pte Walter Feasby	LCpl Joseph Mays	Pte Tom Teal
Pte Tom Brown	Lt Harry Fielding	Pte Patrick McMullen	Pte Colin Thompson
Pte William Brown	Pte Frank Fletcher	Cpl Jack Murgatroyd	Pte George Titterington
Pte George Burgess	Pte Ernest Giggall	Pte John Needham	Cpl Eric Tomlinson
Pte Aubre Butler	Sgt James Graham	Pte Charles Norris	Pte Ernest Tonks
Pte Fred Candy	Pte Norman Guy	Pte Albert Pearce	Pte James Walker
Pte Thomas Carmody	LSgt Alfred Haywood MM	Pte Thomas Porter	Pte Albert Wardle
Pte Arthur Chapman	Sgt Reuben Hickling	Pte Robert Reay	Pte William Whittaker
LCpl George Corbridge	Pte Maurice Hipkiss	Pte Harry Rhodes	Pte George Williams
Pte Charles Croney	Pte John Hunt	Pte Leonard Rhodes	Cpl Christopher Wilson
Pte William Davies	Pte Phillip Hunt	LCpl Norman Riley	LCpl Victor Wood
Pte George Dewhurst	Pte Kenneth Johnson	Pte Broughton Roberts	LCpl Stanley Wright

