

3rd BATTALION THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT
(DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S)
BATTLEGROUP



Operation HERRICK 16 (2012)
Combined Force Nahr-e Saraj (South)

Compiled by Terry Butterworth





■ Colonel-in-Chief: *His Royal Highness the Duke of York KG*



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

As Colonel-In-Chief of The Yorkshire Regiment I would wish to begin this foreword by offering my deepest admiration for the efforts and sacrifices made during 2012, which saw the deployment of both the 1st and 3rd Battalions, as well as elements from our 2nd and 4th Battalions.

Any operational tour, however, comes with inherent risks. These risks will remain evident far into the future with those who are currently recovering from their wounds and above all with the families and friends of those who are no longer with us. Those ten men who gave their lives so others may live are testament to the character of those serving within the 3rd Battalion and the wider Regiment today. We will never forget their sacrifices.

This book commemorates the achievements of the 3rd Battalion and attached Arms on Operation HERRICK 16. As you will see, the tour provided this Battalion with many challenges, not least of which was to develop sustainable Afghan led security within Nahr-e Saraj and to expand the relationships with our Afghan partners to build the greatest chance of success.

Facing them every day were circumstances that required the best values of a British Army soldier; a soldier who is proud, honest and tough. The Yorkshire soldier delivered this. This generation has represented itself with immense fortitude and courage. They have upheld the traditions of those who have gone before in the Battalion's history at the heights of the Alma, on the ridges of Corunna, in the mud of the Somme, the jungles of Burma and on bare slopes of the Hook.

As the Yorkshire Regiment looks to the future this book encapsulates the unique contribution of The Third Battalion to the Regimental History that has spanned to over 300 years and which we rightly must be proud of.





■ Deputy Colonel-in-Chief: Brigadier His Grace
the Duke of Wellington KG LVO OBE MC BA DL



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



■ *Dr. Jan Telensky, Bc.h.c, FloD*

For the last four years **Dr Jan Telensky Bc.h.c, FloD** has been a generous supporter and loyal friend of the **3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's)**

Jan's story is one of rags to riches. Born in communist Czechoslovakia, he fled to England during the Soviet invasion of 1968, evading a death penalty placed on his head for his resistance to the occupation. Jan was 21, had no money and was unable to speak English. Initially, on arrival in England, he slept in a graveyard in Dunstable.

Jan seized his new opportunity, working hard, having two and sometimes three jobs at the same time. He studied English until he mastered the language, started his first business and worked his way through university. He now speaks several languages and has many business interests.

Jan became a millionaire by the time he was 29. When communism collapsed in 1989, he returned home and expanded his business operations into what is now The Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Throughout all his successful business ventures Jan has never forgotten, and will always be grateful for, the opportunities available to him upon arrival in England. To express his gratitude he has supported numerous charities over many years.

In 2007, after reading a newspaper article on how certain elements of society disrespected members of our military forces, he sought a way to support our injured service personnel from the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. In 2008 Jan created Holidays4Heroes, paying all expenses for selected seriously injured individuals, accompanied by their immediate family, to stay and use the facilities of his award winning, luxury Spa hotel *AquaCity*, in Poprad, Slovakia.



Acknowledgements

In May 2009, Jan took a particular interest in the 'Dukes' via Maj (Ret'd) Terry Butterworth (a former 'Dukes' Officer who manages the Holidays4Heroes project). In October 2009, Jan commissioned 5,000 hardback copies of the *Concise History and Digest of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment*, which was made available, free of charge, to all 'Dukes', past and present, on request. Since then, Jan has supported many 'Dukes' projects, including Battlefield Study Tours and Fund Raising events, culminating in the publication of this book to commemorate the 'Dukes' final operational tour, Afghanistan 2012.

Dr Telensky has requested that all members of the 3 YORKS Battlegroup who served in Operation HERRICK 16, between February and October 2012, be presented with a hardback copy of this book in recognition of their achievements and sacrifice.

I would like to thank all the members of the Battlegroup who have contributed articles for this book, Capt Chris Ibbotson for his high quality photographs and Capt Ian Martin for his proficiency when confirming and correcting abbreviations and other specifics for the book.

I would also like to thank Buk Pandula for utilising all his expertise when designing the layout for the book. Last but not least, my foremost thanks are reserved for two former 'Dukes', Mr Scott Flaving, for spending his free time proof reading and keeping the project on track, and Mr Richard Harvey, whose help and support has been invaluable in compiling the finished product.

Terry Butterworth

Project Coordinator

July 2013



A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 3rd BATTALION, THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT (DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S)

The Duke of Wellington's Regiment was originally formed in 1702 as Huntingdon's Regiment. As regiments at that time took the name of the Colonel taking it over it became: Henry Leigh's Regiment; then Robert Duncanson's Regiment and George Wade's Regiment. It was disbanded on 25 May 1714 following service in Spain.



It was officially registered as the 33rd Regiment of Foot in January 1715 and was re-raised on 25 March 1715, as George Wade's Regiment; then Henry Hawley's Regiment; Robert Dalzell's Regiment and John Johnson's Regiment. In 1751 all Regiments were given numbers instead of names, according to their seniority, and 'Johnson's Jolly Dogs' became the 33rd Regiment of Foot. The Regiment served in Austria, France, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, America, Canada, Germany and India and the Indian Ocean islands, as part of a Royal Navy Raiding Squadron.



Owing to its links with the Duke of Wellington, the title 'The Duke of Wellington's Regiment' was granted to the 33rd Regiment on 18 June 1853, on the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo in the year following Wellington's death. Subsequently, the Regiment was presented with a new stand of Regulation Colours, on 28 February 1854, emblazoned with its new distinctions of the name of the Duke of Wellington, his crest and motto, by the then Colonel of the Regiment, Lieutenant General Sir Henry D'Oyley. The Regiment departed for the Crimea the following day.



The 76th Regiment was originally raised, by Simon Harcourt, as Lord Harcourt's Regiment on 17 November 1745 and disbanded in June 1746. Following the loss of Minorca, to the French, it was re-raised in November 1756, as the 61st Regiment, but renumbered to 76th, by General Order in 1758 and again disbanded in 1763. A second battalion raised by that Regiment in October 1758, for service in Africa, was renumbered as the 86th Regiment and also disbanded in 1763. On 25 December 1777, the 76th was again re-raised, as the 76th Regiment of Foot (Macdonald's Highlanders), by Colonel John MacDonell of Lochgarry, in the West of Scotland and Western Isles, as a Scottish Light Infantry Regiment. It was disbanded at Stirling Castle in March 1784. The Regiment was once more raised for service in India with the Honourable East India Company in 1787.

Brief History of the 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's)

In 1881 the 76th Regiment, which had shared the same Depot in Halifax as the 33rd since September 1877, was linked to the 33rd, under the Cardwell Reforms, to become the 2nd Battalion. Although re-titled as the Halifax Regiment (Duke of Wellington's) this title only lasted six months until it was changed, on 30 June 1881, in a revised appendix to General order 41, to:- The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment), or 'W Rid R' for short. In January 1921 it was again re-titled to The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding), or 'DWR', for short. The Regiment fought with distinction in many campaigns and conflicts, being awarded some 120 battle honours, the latest being a theatre honour for Iraq.



On 6 June 2006, The 'Dukes' were amalgamated with the Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire and The Green Howards, all Yorkshire-based regiments in the King's Division, to form The Yorkshire Regiment.



THE COMMANDING OFFICER'S PREFACE





■ *Lt Col Zac Stenning assumes command*

For many in the United Kingdom, the summer of 2012 will be remembered for the London Olympics. But for the 780 men and women of the 3 YORKS Battlegroup, the 'Olympic' summer was spent in Nahr-e Saraj, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Over the course of nearly seven months, the Combined Force of Alma, Burma, Corunna, Somme, Hook, A Company 3 Rifles and the Prince of Wales's Company Welsh Guards toiled in hot, dusty and extremely dangerous conditions. The force was very fortunate to be following great units who had served in the valley before us, including 2 PARA, 1 Royal Gurkha Rifles, 1 and 5 Rifles. They had achieved a great deal and laid superb foundations for 3 YORKS to build upon.

Through partnering with our Afghan Forces, the 3 YORKS Combined Force achieved its mission of suppressing the insurgency and transitioning the lead

for security within Nahr-e Saraj South to the Afghan National Security Forces. As you can see from the essays that follow, each Company and sub-unit provided an inordinate effect within their geographical or specialist area.

Our gains were sadly not without considerable cost. 10 of our brothers-in-arms were killed in action: Sergeant Nigel Coupe, Sergeant Gareth Thursby, Corporal Jake Hartley, Private Daniel Wade, Private Daniel Wilford, Private Gregg Stone, Private Thomas Wroe, Private Anthony Frampton, Private Christopher Kershaw and Kingsman Ryan Ward. 16 others were seriously wounded. We will never forget them, or their families, who have sacrificed so much on behalf of this Regiment, the Army and our country. I know that for many, the emotional and physical scars of last summer will take time to heal and for some they will never go away. As a unit and as



■ *The CO and Cpl Taylor drying off*

individuals, we must continue to support those who bear these burdens in the same way as we did on operations. Knowing the soldiers and Officers of the Battlegroup well, I have utter confidence this selfless ethos will always continue.


Every single soldier in the Battlegroup can be rightly proud of what they achieved. As I said to each Company, as they arrived back in Camp Bastion at the end of the tour, your individual and collective contributions made a tremendous difference to the campaign. I know that

many of you will have taken considerable risks and shown great courage over the summer of 2012. Some of this will have been recognised but as ever, some of it may have been missed. What matters is you know what you did. As your Commanding Officer, I am immensely proud and grateful for what you did for the team. Our success was not the work of one individual, or even a few, but the sum of many peoples' efforts. It was a true 'Team of Teams.' Thank you.

Lieutenant Colonel Z R Stenning OBE



■ *A map of Afghanistan*



■ *The Nahr-e Saraj area of operations*

EXPERIENCES AND REFLECTIONS FROM MISSION-SPECIFIC TRAINING

by Cpl Murphy



The 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment conducted Mission-Specific Training (MST) in preparation for deploying to Helmand Province, Afghanistan on HERRICK 16. Training for Alma Company commenced soon after summer leave which began with the All Ranks Brief (ARB). This was conducted over two days and was delivered by the Operational Training Advisory Group (OPTAG) and several attachments with operational knowledge. The briefs covered a variety of subjects including the culture of Afghanistan, several medical lessons, language training, Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs) and how these practices have evolved over previous Operation HERRICKs. The briefs were to take the best part of a day. Listening to the experiences of others who had previously deployed and gained 'ground truth' gave me a good insight of the environment we were deploying to. Of particular interest were visits from the Afghan Uniformed police (AUP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) commanders informing us of their roles and how ISAF presence has changed from their point of view. A Pakistani Army officer, also in attendance, gave us a brief on how they have had to battle against the insurgent along the borders of their country. All those with any form of command were in attendance the

following day for the Commander's Course. The intent was to brief to the commanders what would be expected of us in command positions in theatre. This included the completion and reporting of 9 (CASEVAC) and 10 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) liners, Op Barma (route clearance) and Op KALA (compound clearance), which are essential tools when out on patrol. After the briefs we attended several stands on Mission-Specific equipment and other important basic lessons that privates had been introduced to earlier that day. These included lessons on GOLDIE, VALLON and HORN (IED detection equipment), Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) and Ground Sign Awareness (GSA). Finally, we had the opportunity to observe the 9 and 10 liners being demonstrated with the use of an instructor and demo troop. In my opinion, the delivery of each lesson was very professional and to a high standard. Since the instructors who conduct these briefs have served in Afghanistan before, they put their knowledge and past experience into the lessons, delivered in a way that every person in attendance understood. This gave me, as a commander and an individual, a greater understanding of what was to follow as we progressed into MST and indeed what to expect when we arrived in Afghanistan.



■ Soldiers practice Op Barma on exercise on Salisbury Plain



■ *Soldiers approach a Close Quarter Battle (CQB) training compound*

The intention after the Commanders' Course is that the training is then cascaded down to every rank through the officers, senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO's) and the junior Non-Commissioned Officers (JNCO's) within the unit. This included more HORN, VALLON, GOLDIE and GSA training. The Company conducted Physical Training (PT) which consisted of weighted runs and marches with different weights and distance, over varying terrain, wearing our Personal Protected Equipment (PPE). As a Company, we conducted exercises on the training area - these were Mission-Specific and put us in the mindset of how to operate in Afghanistan. This was tough at times with early mornings, late nights and meeting the challenges that were set on a daily basis. All the internal training was beneficial and put us in good stead for what was to follow; our confirmatory exercise in Thetford.

The Confirmatory Field Exercise (CFX) was conducted late in the year in 2011, and with the tour now looming it was crucial that we passed the

CFX in order to progress further into MST and be ready for deployment. We arrived at Thetford and immediately attended a weapons demonstration and battle simulation demonstration. This was interesting as we were shown how to judge distance from hearing the crack and thump from a weapon, thus giving us an aid into judging distance. We heard what a controlled explosion sounds like as this was what we were going to be hearing plenty of on the CFX. Once this was conducted we deployed to the main Patrol Base (PB) where we were issued vital equipment and, most importantly, shown where we were going to be staying and operating from. We were separated into different checkpoint locations on the training area.

The checkpoints were very realistic, with all the equipment we were to find in Afghanistan. They came equipped with Base Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) so we had good line of sight around the Check Points (CP) and the PB. Also in the PB was a fully-working Operations room which we manned 24 hours a day. Each CP

and the PB came with fully-established sangars which were manned 24 hours a day. During the first phase of the CFX, the serials varied from patrols to incidents in the CPs and PB, where we would have to deal with casualties and detainees, all the while engaging with the Local Nationals. Each time our drills and skills were constantly watched and debriefed accordingly with work on points. Upon completion of the serials, the Company in its entirety moved back to the PB for the next phase of the CFX, in which we were to become the Operations Company. During this phase we had to man the sangars in the PB and conduct several patrols; both mounted and dismounted. This included the dreaded Green Zone. Many people would have heard the stories of how hard and muddy the Green Zone on CFX is and they are right. The clearance is a constant four-hour fight with the enemy which creates casualties and is made all the more realistic by battle simulations. Upon completion of the Green Zone, you feel a massive sense of achievement.

The exercise as a whole is one of the best exercises any soldier could attend as the OPTAG team add so

much realism to the exercise it feels like you have been deployed. Many resources are used in this training such as of helicopters and the equipment we were to find in theatre, all adding to the excellent training value it has to offer. The debriefs I felt were useful to us as they gave good points to work on but also, crucially, information on what they themselves had experienced recently in theatre. The serials we encountered were manufactured based on actual incidents that have happened in Afghanistan on previous HERRICKs, which gave me assurance that we were receiving the most relevant training possible.

The Combined Arms Live Firing Exercise (CALFEX) is a live firing package which takes place at Castlemartin Ranges in South Wales. This is not run by the OPTAG team, however the team that were there set the atmosphere to the same high standard. Upon arrival we were issued all of our equipment including the dreaded heavy Osprey body armour plates to fit into our body armour. The realism was now beginning to sink in as we were carrying something closer to the weight we would in theatre.



■ Soldiers practicing the 9 liner with a simulated casualty



■ *A soldier watches his arcs on a replica Afghan compound wall*

The ranges, including a CasEvac range, compound clearance, patrol lanes, and Forward Operating Base (FOB) shoots, were conducted really well and they were Afghanistan-specific. Range staff themselves tended not to get involved as they were only there to oversee the safety. This makes sense as out in theatre there is no safety staff. This gave us the freedom to operate more realistically and establish our TTPs, developing how we were to operate in months to come. The intention of the CALFEX was to add realism to the training with live firing, giving the Company a chance to wear the equipment we were going to be

using and act accordingly to casualties, detainees, and clearing of a compound, all with a mixture of battle simulation.

I felt the CALFEX was an important part of the training as it gave us the freedom to move with live rounds and weapons. Similar in approach to CFX, a lot of the serials are what have happened on previous Operation HERRICKS. The professionalism and the administration that goes into CALFEX is the best I have seen and puts each person into the right frame of mind for deployment. After the CALFEX our

deployment to Afghanistan was now looming and all that remained was the Field Training Exercise (FTX). The exercise was crucial to our deployment for Op HERRICK 16; all we had learned and the TTPs we had established were now to be tested on a grand scale.

The FTX was conducted on Salisbury Plain Training Area. At the start of the exercise we were processed through a Movement Control Check Point (MCCP) as a practise run for deployment. Plenty of time, resources and planning are put into the exercise, including fast air assets and foreign forces to act as Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). All of our TTPs were tested including PB defence, safe lane marking, vehicle tasks, night patrolling and engaging with the Local Nationals, with OPTAG creating little interference but instead offering guidance. Again, like at every other stage of MST, after each serial there was a valid debrief with work on points. The exercise was

also our final chance to ask questions of the OPTAG team and hear about their personal experiences.

The FTX was based on the worst case scenario and was challenging in a lot of areas. However, the Company met the challenge head on and accordingly received a pass. Afterwards, our unit was ready for deployment. At that stage it was important to maintain and, indeed, fine polish our skills and drills.

In my opinion, MST is the most important training I have undergone in my Army career. The training given is to the highest of standards and we were put through our paces with the scenarios. The debriefs were the best I have received and very relevant to the serials that were conducted. It gave us, as the deploying unit, a great deal of knowledge and confidence on how to tackle everyday life in Afghanistan.



■ Soldiers giving covering fire

ALMA COMPANY

by Maj F Bibby





■ *Alma Spartans tattoo*

Alma Company arrived in the Nahr-e Saraj (NES) region of Helmand in April 2012. The Company was deployed to the Patrol Base 1 (PB1) Area of Operations (AO) where they took over from A Company, 5 RIFLES, who had a successful winter in this traditionally troubled area of Afghanistan.

In terms of the ground, the PB1 area was split between the sparsely populated desert Bowri in the north and the heavily cultivated and more densely populated Green Zone (GZ) in the south. The area was dominated by three significant water features which fed a complex network of irrigation ditches that kept the GZ fertile. The Nahr-e Bughra (NEB) canal bisected the area flowing east to west with the Abpashak Wadi, which formed our

eastern boundary, flowing north to south and the River Helmand, which formed part of our southern boundary, flowing east to west. The area was dominated by a ridge line to our south from where Observation Post (OP) Sterga was positioned. Route Neptune was the main road which followed the NEB canal and connected the population of Malgir to Gereshk and Lashkar Gar. Coming south from Route Neptune was Route Cronos, a hard topped road which led to the gates of PB1. Other than these two roads, only dirt tracks existed ensuring that the primary means of manoeuvre would be on foot. Even on foot the going was difficult, with densely cultivated fields surrounded by deep irrigation ditches making the carriage of heavy weight extremely hard work.

The local population in the PB1 area inhabited approximately 13 villages in the GZ and one large village in the Bowri. There existed a network of village elders who represented their people and wielded significant influence. Of these village elders, Hamid Khan of Nikazai, was the most prominent by dint of his experiences as a local Mujahadeen leader in the 1990s. The village elders and the local people were largely supportive of Alma Company and their local Afghan security forces. The main concerns of the people no longer centred around security but instead on schooling and local infrastructure. Their everyday lives consisted of tending their fields and getting their goods to market in Gereschk.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the area were reasonably well established when the Company

arrived. The Afghan National Army (ANA) was represented by the 2nd Tolay and their commander, Toran Shaffiq, who were well trained and capable of conducting operations with very little support from the Company. They were well positioned north on the Nahr e Bugra in the Bowri, protecting Route Neptune and disrupting the insurgents in that area. The Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) had three Check Points (CPs) in the area, namely CP Abpashak East which was partnered by Sgt Lynch's Multiple and CP Lamar and CP Kingshill which were independent. The most prominent AUP commander was Juma Khan whose men were well respected and effective even though they were poorly resourced. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) in the area were established in three CPs. The most established and effective was CP Nikazai, which consisted of 15 local men commanded by the uncompromising Nimah Tullah, the son of village elder



■ Maj Bibby takes over responsibility from Maj Forde at PB1



■ *Whilst the water provided relief from the heat, it was also an obstacle*

Hamid Khan. The two other ALP CPs, CP Shkar and CP Tora, had been established just weeks before the Company arrived and consisted of extremely keen but untrained local men under the command of Mullah Maboob. These CPs were to be partnered by Lt Appleyard's Multiple in CP Shkar and Capt Sparks's Multiple in CP Tora.

The insurgents had been marginalized in the PB1 area due to the hard work of 5 RIFLES before us and 1 RIFLES before them. They had been forced out of the GZ to their nearest safe haven in the Bowri. However, there still remained a significant threat from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the GZ and IEDs and small arms fire (SAF) in the Bowri. Low level fighters were, on occasions, able to infiltrate the area, lay IEDs or conduct a grenade attack and then leave. During the tour the number of significant acts against us was down dramatically

compared to the summer before but the threat remained, as highlighted by SAF attacks in the Bowri and IED finds and strikes across the AO. We also experienced grenade attacks on patrols.

The Company was divided between four bases across the area. PB1 itself was home to the Company HQ and 2 Platoon, under the command of Lt Arnold. Attached to us in PB1 was a mortar section, a Counter-IED team, an Electronic Warfare team, a Royal Military Policeman, a Military Stabilisation Team member, a Fire Support Team and a Base Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) team, who operated the extensive balloon and mast-mounted camera systems that were able to observe the immediate area. There was also a fleet of vehicles consisting of two Huskies and two Mastiffs. The three outlying partnered CPs



■ *Bdr Thirkell from the PB1 FST patrols back from the Interim Community Shura at CP Lamar*

were Multiple plus (approximately 18 men) in size and typically consisted attachments of a medic, a Fire Support Individual and a Base ISTAR operator. Our flanking forces consisted of Burma Company to our west in Patrol Base 2, US Forces to our east in Parchow, which in time would become our responsibility and Brigade Battle Space to our north and south.

Alma Company's mission was to enable the ANSF to protect the local national population and to deny the insurgents the PB1 area. We were to hand over partnered CPs to the ALP during the tour and we would continue to support from a distance in PB1. We were also to assume Parchow midway through the tour by establishing over-watch into our neighbouring area and providing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The Main Effort was to be the development of the newly established ALP. We were to achieve our mission, through partnering at the Multiple level in CP Shkar and CP Tora, by developing the ALP so that in time they could operate alone. At the Company level the focus would be to link the AUP and the ALP so that they trained and operated together,

creating a joint security force that could be effective once we had gone.

On taking over PB1 it was clear from meeting the local people and the local security forces that the mission we had been given would be achievable. Fortunately, the insurgent was no longer dominant in the GZ and the will of the people was towards peace and supporting their local police force. We were helped immensely on the day of handover when a Brigade level strike to the north of our area killed 12 insurgents, 6 of whom were mid-level commanders who would likely have operated in the PB1 area. The Company followed this up with a strike operation of our own in the Bowri, targeting a machine gun team who had engaged our patrols early in the tour. The operation was a success, leading to the death of three insurgents and the recovery of two PKM machine guns. The combination of these strikes subdued the insurgents long enough to allow us the space and time to concentrate on our main effort of developing the ALP and linking them to the AUP.



■ Maj Bibby and WO2 Wyeth celebrate the Company's first strike on insurgents in the Bowri with cigars



■ LCpl Wider on a cordon in the Bowri

Partnering the ALP and the AUP at the Multiple level was going to be the greatest challenge to the Company. It was critical that the CP commanders and their men were able to quickly build a relationship with their Afghan counterparts so that progress could be made. They did this superbly and the rapport that was established, especially between the influential commander Mullah Maboob and Lt Appleyard, allowed great advances to be made. Partnering required the men to do everything with their Afghan counterparts. They trained together, patrolled together, were on sentry duty together, cleaned weapons together, as well as eating together and watching films together. It was important that we set the example in everything we did as these were the standards that

the Afghans would try to meet. It became clear that our approach was working as the ALP would mirror all our actions, taking great pride in their skills. Our aim was to be “brilliant in the basics” and under the tutelage of our excellent Junior Non-Commissioned Officers (JNCOs) and soldiers the ALP soon became extremely competent.

At the commander level, Lt Appleyard, Lt Sparks and Sgt Lynch worked hard to mentor and develop the Afghan commanders. Many hours were spent drinking chai and making small talk to gain each other’s confidence so that guidance would be accepted and the correct courses of action followed. Partnered patrols were conducted most days and nights. Early in the tour the patrols



■ Lt Sage-Passant sits with a local child on patrol in Char Kutsa



■ Group photo following the PB1 police training day

were completely integrated with the policemen, never moving more than a few metres from the Alma soldiers. However, as confidence grew through training and the trust that had been established, very soon the Afghan police were conducting patrols with an Alma patrol standing-off in depth to provide support if required. What is more, in time we managed to empower the police to plan their own patrols, selecting routes and establishing a patrol matrix. As we approached the time when we would hand over the partnered CPs the ALP accepted greater responsibility and conducted more independent patrols supported only by a QRF that remained in the CPs.

At Company level, joint security shuras were conducted, comprising all the ANSF commanders and some of the village elders. The aim was to discuss security issues,

any new intelligence that existed and to agree on future operations. Although consensus was rarely met by the commanders, they all agreed on a common goal of protecting the people and the shuras ensured everyone was aware of their responsibilities. It was very clear that the AUP and ALP were capable of training and operating together and that the ANA would prefer to operate alone. This allowed for harmony as the ANA established CPs in the Bowri to protect Route Neptune and disrupt the insurgents and the AUP and ALP worked together amongst the population in the GZ. The ANA, with assistance from the Tolay Advisory Team of Capt Reaney, were quickly able to conduct independent operations with only support during planning and reassurance through a QRF.



■ Pte Katende and LCpl Collins relax with Mel, the Company BEEK dog

In order to bring the AUP and ALP closer together, joint training days were conducted in PB1 and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Price. These training days consisted of lessons and exercises in patrolling, first aid, vehicle and person searching, shooting competitions and concluded with a lunch. This worked to link the two police forces socially and professionally, creating a powerful combination in the PB1 area. The effects of the joint training days could be seen instantly at the CPs where joint ALP and AUP patrols became common place, often followed by chai and sharing of information. Strong friendships at the police commander level ensured that the cooperation would endure.

Although there was significant progress in developing and linking the ANSF in the PB1 area and transition looked to be achievable, there were still significant challenges

during the tour. In Abpashak East, Sgt Lynch and his team patrolled the Bowri under constant threat from small arms fire and grenade attacks from the insurgents in their last stronghold. The team also discovered a number of IEDs that were laid to target the military convoys that crossed the Bowri. In CP Shkar, Lt Appleyard and his Multiple worked hard to ensure that Mullah Maboob, the ALP commander, survived attacks on his life and Cpl Hunter's Multiple was involved in a grenade attack that represented the constant danger that patrols moving through the villages faced. In CP Tora 2Lt Cameron, who took over from Capt Sparks, patrolled the remote and unfriendly Naqil peninsula, gaining success when Sgt Thursby detained a known IED employer. From the same CP Cpl Johnson's Multiple experienced an IED strike which miraculously resulted in no injuries. 2 Platoon in PB 1 regularly patrolled Enezy and

Akhonzada, an area that was heavily seeded with IEDs. Both Sgt Burrows' and Lt Arnold's Multiples were tasked at short notice for a number of CF and Brigade level Operations which took them all over the Task Force Helmand (TFH) area of operations.

Eight weeks from the end of the tour and exactly on schedule CP Shkar was handed over to Maboob and his ALP. The physical handover was relatively straightforward as the CP was fortified, well-equipped and the ALP were well-trained and capable of defending themselves and protecting the local population. The psychological handover of responsibility was more challenging, as the ALP were emotional and nervous as we parted after such close partnering for the last five months. Reassuring the ALP was critical in the days following the handover of CP Shkar, with regular visits and QRF demonstrations to put the police at ease.

However, just 10 days before the handover of CP Tora events took a violent turn for the worse. In CP Tora, a rogue ALP trooper, pretending injury shot three Alma soldiers, killing Sgt Thursby and Pte Wroe and severely wounding Pte Forkuo. This devastating incident robbed the Company of two brave and committed soldiers who had worked tirelessly to bring security to this small part of Afghanistan. There was a strong feeling of betrayal that a policeman that we had worked and lived alongside

for five months could do this. However, it is to the great credit of Lt Cameron and his Multiple that they were able to maintain a relationship with the ALP strong enough to hand over the CP four weeks before the end of the tour.

The last few weeks saw the Company located in PB1 with Multiples patrolling to the CPs regularly to advise and mentor the police who were now taking the lead in security. This presented new challenges as our understanding of the area and the police decreased with our reduced time spent with them. It was in this posture that we handed over PB1 to C Coy, 40 Commando Royal Marines.

Alma's legacy in Afghanistan will be the Afghan Forces that were trained and developed to take over the responsibility for security in the PB1 area. The hard work and sacrifice of Alma soldiers during the summer of 2012 gave Afghans the hope of a lasting security that will allow them to lead safe and prosperous lives. Losing two soldiers in the course of achieving our mission and one soon after returning from operations understandably hit the Company hard. Sergeant Gareth Thursby, Private Thomas Wroe and Kingsman Ryan Ward died with honour, serving their country and helping others. The Company is incredibly proud of their achievements and we will remember them.



■ Soldiers relax in the PB1 TV room



NOMINAL ROLL - ALMA COMPANY

Rank	Name	Location
<i>Maj</i>	<i>Bibby</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Flecchia</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Sparks</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Reaney</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Woods</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Wilkinson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Flt Lt</i>	<i>Bell</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Appleyard</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Arnold</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Sage-Passant</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>2 Lt</i>	<i>Cameron</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>2 Lt</i>	<i>Lloyd-George</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>WO2</i>	<i>Wyeth</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>WO2</i>	<i>Watson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>CSgt</i>	<i>Harrison</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>CSgt</i>	<i>Simpson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Burrows</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Humphreys</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Laye</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Lilley</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Lilliman</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Lynch</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Smith</i>	<i>PB1/ABE</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Thursby</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Bevu</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Anderson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Clews</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Elliot</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Foster</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Greenwood</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Horsfield</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Hunter</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Johnson</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Johnston</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Murphy</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Bdr</i>	<i>Neill</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>O-Hara</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Padgett</i>	<i>Bastion</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Robinson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Rowlands</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Unwin</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Walden</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Williams</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Windle</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Allmark</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>

Rank	Name	Location
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Barrett</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Brogan</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Bustin</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Byrne</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Clark</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Collins</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Dbali</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Dooley</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Drinkwater</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Evans</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Farrell</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Flanagan</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Frere</i>	<i>PB1/ABE</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Grayson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Gurung</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Hastie</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Hollands</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Hollman</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Hughes</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Jackson</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Johnson</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Macaca</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Malcolm</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Malloch</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Marlow</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Maxwell</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>McLaughlin</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Myall</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Pearce</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Pibworth</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Pritchard</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Reynolds</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Roberts</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Rokovusolo</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Salababa</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Swindells</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Tune</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Wallace</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Whitelegg</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Wider</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Young</i>	<i>ABE/SHK</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Youngs</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>SAC(T)</i>	<i>Wickerson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Adeniyi</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Allen</i>	<i>PB1</i>



Rank	Name	Location
<i>Tpr</i>	<i>Anderson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Beck</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Beevers</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Bennett</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Bennett</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Bentley</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Bishop</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Spr</i>	<i>Black</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Bradley</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Brown</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Cartlidge</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Cartwright</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Challoner</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Charles</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Clay</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Corke</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Coulthread</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Coyne</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Daley</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Daniel</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Davy</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Dorain</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Driscoll</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Earnshaw</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Edwards</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Evans</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Evans</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Fletcher</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Froggatt</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Gilmartin</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Goggs</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Gnr</i>	<i>Grieg</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Harper</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Cfn</i>	<i>Hemming</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Hern</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Hewitt</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Hudson</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Hughes</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Jones 16</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Jones 60</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Karim</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Katende</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Katende</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Koboah</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Lee</i>	<i>PB1</i>

Rank	Name	Location
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Lonsdale</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Lumb</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Spr</i>	<i>Lynes</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Maddison</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Martin</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Mather</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Matthews</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Mazeika</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Mcguiness</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Miller</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Nanovu</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Needham</i>	<i>PB1/ABE</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Noble</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Orton</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Owusu-Akyaw</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Kgn</i>	<i>Pass</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Robinson</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Robinson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Rogers</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Rokosau</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Sarr</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Saunders</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Shipston</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Smith</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Smyth</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Spr</i>	<i>Stewart</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Stockton</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Stoney</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Sutton</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Tavaga</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Thompson</i>	<i>CP Shkar</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Tomkinson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Tomlinson</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Tomlinson</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Tuite</i>	<i>CP Abpashak E</i>
<i>Spr</i>	<i>Walton</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Kgn</i>	<i>Ward</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Ward</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Williams</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Wright</i>	<i>PB1</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Yates</i>	<i>CP Tora</i>

BURMA COMPANY

by Maj R J Singleton





■ *Burma Company advance on an early morning partnered Operation*

After over 6 months of Mission-Specific Training (MST), Burma Company deployed to the Malgir area of Nahr-e Saraj (NES (S)), on Op HERRICK 16 in April 2012. Deploying as a ground holding Company we found ourselves responsible for 28 square kilometres of the River Helmand valley including Patrol Base (PB) 2 and two Check Points (CPs) located deep in the Green Zone. After an excellent handover from A Company 2 RIFLES, part of the 5 RIFLES Battlegroup (BG), the Company acclimatised quickly and began Company level partnered operations with a strike into the desert to our north, with the Afghan Army, inserted by US Marine Corps Osprey helicopters. This sort of Company level operation was relatively frequent in the first half of the tour but increasingly, in the second half of the tour, the Company adopted more of an advisory role, encouraging a sustainable Afghan approach to counter insurgency.

UK counter insurgency doctrine states that 'in counter insurgency presence matters. The population must be secured where it lives, and must be secured on a permanent basis'. Burma Company easily met the advised ratio of 20 counter-insurgents per 1000 head of population and the Afghan partners added to this force density. What did this mean? Within the rural areas and population centres the insurgent did not have freedom of movement. He was forced to be transient and could rarely even bed-down within boundaries for fear of arrest. The security provided to the locals was appreciated and increasingly taken for granted; this presents its own challenge as locals began to fear transition as they doubted the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). To counter this perception every effort was made to draw the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) into the rural areas and build their relationship with locals. Every opportunity was seized; iftaar or fast breaking meals during Ramadan

were sponsored by the AUP (enabled by Burma Company) and targeted poor and needy families. This enhanced AUP credibility and joint and independent AUP patrols were another obvious example of Burma's efforts to raise the police profile in areas previously dominated by ISAF.

The three platoons in the Company were deployed separately. 4 Platoon were located in PB2, alongside both Battlegroup and Company Headquarters. Led by Capt Rob Townsend and Sgt Pears, they made huge inroads with the AUP whose development quickly became the Company main effort. Equipped with four Jackal vehicles, 4 Platoon routinely partnered and visited the AUP CPs and also provided a Jackal Quick Reaction Force (QRF). In addition, they had a Section detached, commanded by Cpl Cousins, to provide force protection to the Afghan National Army (ANA) Tolay Advisory and Training Team (TATT), whose role it was to mentor and develop the ANA. 4 Platoon's work was unglamorous but decisive. Hours of lessons, talking, rehearsing and executing joint operations developed the AUP's capability and the bond of trust

between ISAF and the AUP. Before 4 Platoon started work, each AUP CP had no defined area of operations and patrolled areas relatively haphazardly; agreeing boundaries was painstaking but critical, ensuring all areas of the AUP area were patrolled equitably. This began to happen, with 4 Platoon mentoring, by mid-tour and was a considerable achievement. Some AUP CPs were better than others and patience remained a key attribute!

5 Platoon were based in CP Perkha and 6 Platoon in CP Shaparak. Both these CPs are based in the deep Green Zone, which is the term used to describe the highly irrigated and densely vegetated fields that lie south of the Nahr-e Bughra (NEB) Canal and north of the River Helmand itself. The land is heavily farmed and an understanding of crop cycles is hugely important. The environment changed significantly throughout the tour with poppy fields being harvested on our arrival, a month later the wheat matured and, after a brief respite, the fields were quickly re-planted with maize which grew to over 12 feet before being harvested in mid-October, during the last few days



■ 4 Platoon



■ 5 Platoon at CP Perkha

of our tour. The Local Nationals in the area were overwhelmingly Barakzai and so tribal differences were few and far between. Each village, or kalay, had several village elders who represented their people. They are on the whole simple, devout people who crave security so they can farm their land in peace. They are overwhelmingly pro-ISAF, but some remain indifferent or sympathetic to the insurgency.

Lt Carter and Sgt McConnell took over CP Perkha in April 2012 and transformed it over the next five months. The CP was small but well-sited along a key route which allowed significant amount of local engagement. 5 Platoon were fortunate to have two excellent interpreters. Both were liked and respected by the locals and this was a huge asset in gathering low-level intelligence. The Platoon soon knew every compound and most of the individuals in Hadezai –

the village that surrounded them. The Platoon was also charged with developing the AUP in nearby CP Bagh. Towards the end of the tour 5 Platoon handed over CP Perkha to the AUP, which was a considerable achievement. This drew the AUP into the Green Zone and ensured that the Afghans took control of security for their own village. This achievement should not be underestimated and in the days that followed 5 Platoon surged back into the area to reassure both the AUP and the locals that ISAF would continue to support them.

Whilst both 4 and 5 Platoons were developing the AUP and drawing them into the Green Zone (which was main effort activity), linking them to the fledgling Afghan Local Police (ALP), partnered with 6 Platoon in CP Shaparak, was a key task. 6 Platoon had a real challenge; the ALP had not even been recruited at the start of the tour, yet we had the task of receiving them,



■ Lt Jamie Carter and friends

developing them, and getting them to the stage where they were almost ready to be left to independently hold the rural kalays. As ever, the men of 6 Platoon did not let the team down. Lt Ed Arnold, the battle casualty replacement Platoon Commander, supported by Sgt Marshall partnered the Afghan Local Police who had been trained in part by Cpl Shaw. The initial ALP were removed from post after Afghan local politics made their position untenable but the new ALP team, under Saifullah, were enthusiastic and generally very capable. Hours of investment, patience and cultural sensitivity paid off and by the end of the tour the ALP were conducting limited independent patrolling enabled by an ISAF security 'wrap' – a considerable achievement of which 6 Platoon are rightfully proud.

Tactics and drills, as ever, are hugely important. Throughout the tour both conventional 'Brecon' taught skills and more specialist jungle and counter insurgency drills were routinely employed by Multiples in the Green Zone. Notably, these included hand signals, silent patrolling, the use of dog-legs and snap ambushes, and crucially using satellite call-signs to retain a foot on the ground. We also owned the night and conducted both overt and covert activity to reassure the locals and disrupt the insurgents respectively. Burma Company's silent patrolling was unique in the Battlegroup but paid dividends. It also occasionally surprised the locals; on one occasion a local, in the dead of night went into a field to answer a call of nature, only to be surprised in the act as he found himself urinating on a surprisingly inanimate

Yorkshire man who was laid silently in a covert lurk! On the whole though, by far the most important activity has been interaction and engagement with the locals – good relationships saved lives and drinking chai with the locals was never time wasted. Locals informed Burma of numerous Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) which had been placed near CPs. Each one was removed and exploited and the only cost to the Company was the time it took to sit, talk and drink chai.

The Bowri, the desert to the north, was where the insurgents felt safest. As previously explained, the Green Zone was dominated by ISAF and ANSF and the locals were broadly supportive. In the desert the insurgent retained relative freedom of movement but enemy tactics could be understood from hours of

target development and weekly deliberate, partnered disruption operations were mounted to prevent the insurgent from gaining the confidence to re-infiltrate the Green Zone. Successful strikes set the insurgent back several weeks and severely impeded his command and control. This disruptive effect set the conditions for the ANSF to develop and keep the population centres and the Green Zone free from insurgent malign influence. Operating in the more open Bowri allowed more conventional tactics to be employed. Usually three to four Multiples, partnered with the Afghan Army, would advance under a dismounted Company tactical headquarters - normally just the OC, Fire Support Team (FST) Commander and signaller who would attach themselves to one of the Multiples. On occasion, to demonstrate a more persistent presence, a compound or two could be taken over to establish



■ First helicopter assault into the Bowri



■ *Burma Company strike at first light in the Bowri*



■ *A Burma Company Jackal in the Bowri*

a temporary CP before continuing the advance at first light. The Company's main headquarters would remain in the PB2 operations room and control the various technical feeds and any supporting aerial assets. A mounted Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was ready, on immediate notice to move, should it be required. Once troops pushed through the enemy scouting screen, contacts with the enemy were likely but they were rarely sustained, as attack helicopters were never too far away if needed. More likely though, was our ability to track the insurgents and then exploit their weapons caches, which impaired their offensive capability.

Despite this success, there were terrible moments. 3rd July 2012, was one of those awful days. Insurgents in Dactran, near CP Shaparak, took an off duty AUP officer hostage. Burma – and the wider Combined Force – reacted quickly and tracked the insurgents taking the hostage across the river. Burma, supported by CF assets, interdicted the insurgents and freed the AUP hostage but in the ensuing fire fight, and despite the very best medical support, Pte Gregg Stone was killed in action. Lt Luke Mason, the Multiple Commander was also seriously wounded, but somehow he still managed to command his Multiple. Pte James and Pte Fisher had lucky escapes, as they were hit

but unharmed due to their body armour and helmet respectively. Unconfirmed reports later stated that two insurgents had been killed and the relationship with the AUP was cemented because of this brave and courageous action. This did little to compensate for the loss of Pte Stone, which was a terrible price to pay. The thoughts and prayers of Burma Company will always be with his wife, Samantha, and their child who, sadly, Gregg did not have the chance to meet. Gregg was an outstanding young man – a wonderful husband, loving son and brother, genuine friend and a bright young soldier. He will be sorely missed. As he went out on patrol, from CP Shaparak, he always



■ Joint 6 Platoon and ALP patrol in the T-Shaped village



■ Maj Singleton with ALP Commanders Saifullah and Mi

glanced at the last lines from the poem *Invictus* – translated as ‘Unconquered’ – which he had written on the wall in his accommodation – ‘I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul’.

Later in the tour, Capt Townsend’s C32A Multiple were supporting the AUP in the Bowri desert when their Jackal vehicle struck an IED. Capt Townsend, LCpl Bettison and Pte Jackson were injured – albeit not too seriously – but Lt Andy Ledger and Najib, and AUP officer, who were in the back of the vehicle, suffered serious leg injuries. Lt Ledger – who was

due to takeover from Capt Townsend – broke his leg and shattered his ankle and was CasEvac’d to the hospital at Camp Bastion and from there, after a few days, was MedEvac’d to Selly Oak Hospital in Birmingham. The immediate medical treatment by Cpl Bishop was outstanding and Lt Ledger’s positive attitude throughout both the incident and in the days afterwards was humbling.

Being a close-knit team enabled Burma to continue delivering the mission despite setbacks. Burma Company consisted of not only 3 YORKS manpower

but many attachments. Indeed, over the tour, a total of 167 soldiers have been a part of the Burma Company Group. Everyone pulled together under the same ethos, the team spirit and commitment was magnificent. Of note, the Company was bolstered on MST and deployed with eleven members of the TA, all from 4 YORKS, who were, to a man, exceptional. After a few weeks they could not be differentiated from their regular counterparts and they completed a wide range of duties from working in Company HQ to being HORN (IED detection device) operators or even Multiple second-in-commands. Burma was also fortunate to have other attachments. Lt Wood fitted in perfectly as the Company Operations Officer and the FST were a real asset too; they knew what the enemy would do before they did it! Commanded by Capt Clarke RA, ably assisted by Cpl Mallinson

and LBdr Campbell, the team controlled the various Operations Room feeds from cameras, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), plus aviation and fast jets. Their professionalism, dedication and long hours provided much-needed early indications and warnings of enemy activity and gave force protection for the troops patrolling on the ground.

In the Company Intelligence Cell, LCpl Bellas provided insightful Intelligence Corps expertise under the watchful eye of the experienced Sgt Marsh. The Company's medics were excellent. LCpl Fisher in CP Shaparak and LCpl Burnside in CP Perkha probably patrolled more than anyone else and were cheerful and uncomplaining throughout. They were nothing short of magnificent. In addition the base surveillance camera operators kept the PB and CPs



■ LCpl Nakia takes aim



secure, Sig Whitham manned the Company radio net and provided the Operation Room with much needed morale, and the chefs provided sustenance with minimal equipment in some of the most horrendously hot conditions. Finally, we were fortunate to receive excellent battle casualty replacements from 2 LANCS for our injured. They slipped into the team seamlessly, in often very trying circumstances.

In summary, there is no doubt that the Company has made significant progress, often in the face of adversity. Statistics often belie the amount of activity that takes place. For Burma, high levels of engagement with the local population reduced kinetic engagements and increased our ability to find enemy IEDs or weapons systems and remove them from the battlefield. Of 17 IEDs in the Company area on Op HERRICK 16, 13 IEDs were found and exploited forensically and four detonated. In addition five enemy caches were found and exploited, with three enemy machine guns and one Lee Enfield rifle recovered, plus several grenades, magazines and ammunition. Small arms contacts were swiftly dealt with but, on the whole, violence in the Green Zone was kept to a minimum and the locals were hugely grateful for the stability we and our partners brought. The AUP, ALP and the Afghan Army are much improved due to the efforts of the men and women of Burma Company. The Yorkshire soldier has proved that he can be ferocious in combat but, more importantly, he is confident in other aspects of counter insurgency. Notably, the ability of young soldiers to talk and, crucially, listen, to both locals and the Afghan security forces alike has resulted in the development of bonds of friendship which not only saved lives but took the campaign forward. They were a credit to the Regiment.

Rank	Name	Location
<i>Maj</i>	<i>Singleton</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Clarke</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Lewis</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Rai</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Arnold</i>	<i>CP Shaprack</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Carter</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Mason</i>	<i>CP Shaprack</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Townsend</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Wood</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>WO2</i>	<i>Seviour</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>CSgt</i>	<i>Anderson</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>CSjt</i>	<i>George</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Bowen</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Leeson</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Mallison</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Marsh</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Marshall</i>	<i>CP Shaprack</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Mcconnell</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Pears</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Bishop</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Blondin</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Exley</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Kerrigan</i>	<i>Bastion</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Mccurdy</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Payne</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Pugh</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Shaw</i>	<i>CP Shaprack</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Swindells</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Watson</i>	<i>CP Shaprack</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Whiting</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Cousins</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Radley</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Balch</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Bellas</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Bettison</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Brien</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Burnside</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Campbell</i>	<i>PB2</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Dillon</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Fleetwood</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Higgins</i>	<i>CP Shaprack</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Kelly</i>	
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Kilner</i>	<i>CP Perkha</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Leadbeater</i>	<i>Bastion</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Levitt</i>	<i>PB2</i>



NOMINAL ROLL - BURMA COMPANY

Rank	Name	Location
LCpl	Naulu	Rear Ops
LCpl	Readman	CP Shaprack
LBdr	Reilly	CP Shaprack
LCpl	Willie	CP Perkha
LCpl	Wilson	PB2
LCpl	Wyer	CP Shaprack
Pte	Abbey	PB2
Pte	Adams	PB2
Pte	Allen	CP Perkha
Kgn	Andersen	CP Shaprack
Pte	Austin	PB2
Pte	Bainimoli	CP Perkha
Pte	Binks	PB2
Pte	Bolton	PB2
Pte	Brame	PB2
Pte	Brown	PB2
Pte	Broxham	PB2
Pte	Buckley	CP Perkha
Pte	Burke	PB2
Pte	Charlesworth	PB2
Pte	Craft	PB2
Pte	Davison	PB2
Pte	Dean	CP Shaprack
Pte	Dods	CP Shaprack
Pte	Doi	CP Shaprack
Gnr	Edwards	CP Perkha
Pte	Edwardson	PB2
Pte	Elsdon	CP Shaprack
Pte	Evans	PB2
Pte	Fisher	CP Shaprack
Pte	Fletcher	CP Perkha
Pte	Gordon	PB2
Pte	Greiff	CP Perkha
Pte	Harrison	CP Perkha
Pte	Healey	PB2
Pte	Henchcliffe	CP Shaprack
Pte	Hirst	PB2
Pte	Holland	PB2
Pte	Hopewell	CP Perkha
Pte	Howard	CP Shaprack
Pte	Hughes	PB2
Pte	Hutchinson	CP Shaprack
Pte	Iwuoha	CP Shaprack
Pte	Jackson	PB2
Pte	James	CP Shaprack

Rank	Name	Location
Pte	Jones 38	CP Perkha
Pte	Jones 55	PB2
Pte	Knapton	PB2
Pte	Lumsdon	PB2
Pte	Mason	CP Shaprack
Pte	Matthews	CP Shaprack
Pte	Mcarthur	CP Perkha
Pte	Mclaren	PB2
Pte	Millward	CP Perkha
Pte	Milner	PB2
Pte	Mitchell 85	CP Perkha
Pte	Mitchell 91	CP Perkha
Pte	Murgatroyd	PB2
Pte	Murphy	CP Shaprack
Pte	Nakia	PB2
Pte	Palmer	PB2
Pte	Quick	PB2
Pte	Raloka	CP Perkha
Pte	Ramsden	CP Shaprack
Pte	Shaw	PB2
Pte	Simpson	CP Perkha
Pte	Smith	CP Perkha
Pte	Stone	CP Shaprack
Kgn	Swarbrick	CP Shaprack
Pte	Taylor	PB2
Pte	Themistocleous	CP Shaprack
Pte	Tomlinson	PB2
Gnr	Webster	CP Shaprack
Kgn	Wheatcroft	CP Shaprack
Pte	Wilson	CP Shaprack
Pte	Winter	PB2
Pte	Wootton	PB2

CORUNNA COMPANY

by Lt D Brennan





■ *Lt Brennan and Cpl Marshall in Nad-e Ali*

Corunna Company had a unique experience in Helmand. The main body deployed on the 14 February 2012 on a cold winter evening, several weeks earlier than the remainder of the Battalion. As the coaches carrying the 136 soldiers filed out of the front gate at Battlesbury Barracks, Pte Blyth, the youngest soldier in the Company, lit a candle that would remain alight until the last member of the 3 YORKS Battlegroup (BG) returned safely to the UK; a poignant yet strangely reassuring ritual.

The sense of excitement was palpable and many were relieved that the gruelling Mission-Specific Training (MST) period was over and we were finally deploying to Afghanistan. MINHAD, in the UAE, was the only

calling point before Camp Bastion and the Company enjoyed a night in relative luxury; the majority sat up late playing cards and smoking.

An RAF Globemaster ferried Corunna Company on the final leg of the journey into Helmand. The Officers and soldiers were expecting, or perhaps hoping, for some fine weather to greet them. However, all were disappointed. Hollow squares, lashing rain and biting cold, we may as well have been in Imber Village on The Salisbury Plain!

Reception Staging Onward Integration (RSOI) provided an opportunity for everyone to familiarise themselves with the sodden, near-frozen Afghan earth.


It rained on virtually everyday that Corunna were on RSOI, however, despite this, some valuable training was conducted which further cemented the soldiers' drills and skills in their muscle memory. RSOI proved a useful confidence boost to the platoons and to Company HQ in general, consequently every man in Corunna was eager to begin the work they had been sent to do. On Sunday 26 February the main body of Corunna Company deployed forward into various dispersed locations in the north eastern extremity of British Helmand.

The initial force lay-down saw 7 Platoon in Patrol Base (PB) Lashkar Gah Durai (LGD) complete with Company HQ and a Protected Mobility (PM) Platoon from the Queen's Royal Hussars. LGD was the eastern-most British PB in Helmand on the British-American boundary at the strategically important junction of Route 601, which extends west out of

Lashkar Gar District Centre and Highway 1, which is the main road in Afghanistan, linking Kabul with all major cities in the outlying provinces.

8 Platoon were working with Combined Force (CF) Burma, initially to 3 MERCIAN, and subsequently 2 ROYAL WELSH BG. They were located in Check Point (CP) Barcha which was a small CP on the western side of Reggi kalay on the Dashte (Pashtu for desert)/Green Zone (GZ) interface, approximately 3 km south of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Oulette (OUL). OUL, which was the initial home of 9 Platoon, sits on Route 611, which runs from Highway 1 up to FOB Robinson (ROB) and then on to Sangin.

Although it was not ideal having to split the Company down after training for so long together, it was necessary in order to spread the capability of Warrior (WR). On the flip side it made it difficult for any one



■ Map depicting the two separate locations of Corunna Company



■ *Pte Dixon, Cpl Hartley, Sgt Watts and LCpl Huntley take a break in Wazira Manda*

Platoon to dominate and manoeuvre in depth, as they would have wished and been able to do as a formed Company.

Across the board the Company found their feet quickly and immediately began tuning in to their new and hostile surroundings. Each Platoon conducted extensive framework patrolling and settled into a routine. 8 Platoon were working flat out to man CP Barcha as well as Observation Post (OP) Tegha whilst simultaneously projecting force into the kalays that straddled the Dashte/GZ interface. In OUL 9 Platoon also found themselves conducting Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), Overwatch and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) tasks for 3 MERCIAN BG. Company HQ and 7 Platoon quickly deployed on an operation in the NES Dashte with the aim of restricting insurgent movement south of the River

Helmand. The operation was not only a success but it also tested Company Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in an operational environment for the first time. Needless to say there was a certain amount of 'tweaking' that needed to be done in order to maximise efficiency, particularly when working with indigenous forces.

Working with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) was at times interesting! The Afghan culture and history meant the ANSF did things differently to us and it took time to get used to their practices. Despite their peculiarities and unique SOPs, ISAF and the ANSF paths were to become more and more intertwined as the months went on in order to better facilitate transition across Task Force Helmand (TFH). Corunna, however, would follow a different path, one of minimal partnering and reduced interaction



■ *Memorial to Corunna's fallen*

with our Afghan brothers, not out of choice, but due to a change in the way Armoured Infantry was to be employed in theatre.

One day in particular would test our mettle and nothing could have prepared the men of Corunna for what was to come. At approximately 1830 hrs (local time) on Tuesday 6 March 2012, in the corner of a farmer's field near a kalay called Kamparak, an IED exploded. It resulted in the single largest loss of life as a result of enemy action inflicted on British Forces in Afghanistan and it pushed the UK death toll in the conflict over the 400 mark. This incident suddenly had strategic implications for British Forces in Helmand and it was discussed at length in the House of Commons, the national press and news channels.

The six heroes that we lost that night will never be forgotten. It would be inappropriate to discuss the exact events of that night here; all that can be said is that those who were there did all that was humanly possible to rescue their friends first, without regard for their own safety, and second, once all hope had been extinguished, with dignity.

On Thursday 8 March 2012, a vigil was held, with all personnel based in LGD present. The focal point was a monument that the Company had built complete with a picket fence and six small hand-made crosses. The service began at dusk with hymns from the Fijian choir and Padre King from the QRH led the service. The work he did in those few days after the incident for the Company, and in particular the soldiers from 7 Platoon, gave great strength. Once the service was over, six illumination rounds were fired at ten-second intervals from the mortar line. It was an extremely moving sight to witness each one of the rounds arc towards the ground and one by one disappear out of view behind an accommodation block.

This terrible event took its toll on the Company but all remained resolute throughout. In keeping with the great traditions of Corunna, dating back to 1809, the men turned their attentions to the task in hand. The words of Charles Wolfe in the aftermath of Sir John Moore's burial at the citadel in Corunna remain relevant over 200 years later:

*Few and short were the prayers we said,
And we spoke not a word of sorrow;
But we steadfastly gazed on the face that was dead,
And we bitterly thought of the morrow.*

Within 36 hours of the explosion 7 Platoon were back on the ground visiting AUP CPs along Route 601 and plans were being drawn up to bring 9 Platoon down from OUL to LGD. 8 Platoon would also move from CP Barcha to OUL and become the manoeuvre unit for CF Burma. The manner in which the Company rebounded from such a devastating blow was humbling to witness; every man worked hard for the man next to him and extremely tight bonds were formed between all within the Company. Sadly, nobody from 7 Platoon was able to attend the ramp ceremony because of operational commitments; the Company were dug in on an exposed hillside to the north of Popolzai and Alokozai, two highly kinetic areas, enduring an horrendous sandstorm which brought visibility down to less than 10m. Everyone was bitterly disappointed not to be a part of the repatriation service, however, 1 YORKS did a fantastic job in sending our boys home.

The arrival of 9 Platoon in LGD on Saturday 10 March greatly increased the capability of the Company. Arguably it was from this moment on that the Company began to be employed as a Manoeuvre Group and our ground holding commitments to CF LKG became of secondary importance. Transition was well underway in the AO and it was subsequently renamed TSU (Transition Support Unit) LKG. As a result of this the Company reduced the number of CP visits and partnered patrols and, as part of transition, handed over the security of Route 601 to the AUP who were stationed at regular intervals along the road into LKG. The benefits of the transfer of lead security authority (TLSA) were two-fold; first it gave greater autonomy to the AUP on Route 601 and, second, it allowed Corunna to focus on outmanoeuvring and unhinging the insurgents in order to strike him in areas previously believed to be insurgent strongholds.

8 Platoon had a gruelling patrol and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) rotation that included a 0300 hrs QRF handover. They had an especially difficult role, not only because they were removed from the main Company group, putting extra strain on the G4 chain



■ *Contested obstacle crossing*

as well as the moral component, but because CF Burma was particularly kinetic and the Indirect Fire (IDF) and IED threat was substantial. IDF attacks onto OUL were regularly conducted by a well trained, motivated and battle hardened insurgent grouping who were able to bring IDF down quickly and accurately onto static call signs using base plate locations in the GZ. 8 Platoon were involved in almost every CasEvac conducted by CF Burma because WR was the only vehicle that could get to casualties quickly and safely. Their work no doubt saved lives and was much praised by the CF Burma HQ. As the months rolled by the capability offered by WR came to the fore. It is by far

the best mobility platform in theatre as it is a complete fighting system. It affords reach, sustainability, protection and firepower. However, the greatest assets that WR has are the soldiers that are sat in the back. The complete system allowed an Armoured Infantry (AI) Multiple to carry out any task on the counter insurgency (COIN) spectrum from find, feel and understand to destroy. In fact the platform was so good and the men so confident in its employment that from June 2012 until the end of the tour Corunna was allocated tasks that previously had been reserved for the Brigade Reconnaissance Force.

Corunna conducted deliberate operations in every AO in TFH and worked alongside many other nations, notably the Americans, Danes and Estonians. This ensured that the Company enjoyed a varied tour, going from dismounted patrolling in the GZ to strikes in the Dashte and everything in between. However, it also meant that every man had to remain alert and flexible at all times as there was no time to adjust or acclimatise to the local atmospherics and often little to no intelligence about the areas we were operating in. As a consequence, the men of Corunna did not develop the same ties with the Local Nationals as those in a ground holding role who saw the same people every day. Nevertheless, the Company worked hard to improve the conditions facing the people in every district of Helmand by taking the fight to the insurgent in his so-called safe areas.

The Company was fortunate to be re-united with 3 YORKS BG to conduct an out of area strike with the

aim of disrupting the insurgents in the Arghandab River Valley (ARV), a known hotbed of enemy activity and a facilitation route. Corunna again proved its worth as a manoeuvre unit, as the WR vehicles were the only asset available to the BG that could cross the ARV due to the salt flats and rocky outcrops that littered the valley floor. Without the ability to cross the valley and navigate the Talaw Dashte (the most difficult terrain the Company encountered all tour and somewhere the Russians never managed to take armour!) the operation would not have been so successful in outmanoeuvring the insurgents who were trying to fix us with IEDs, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and Small Arms Fire (SAF).

7 and 9 Platoon conducted several dynamic strikes on Compounds of Interest from the high ground to the south of the ARV, resulting in the All Arms Search Team (AAST) making some very significant finds. These included a Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED)



■ CO's TAC moves past Corunna Warriors during Op DAAS 2C



■ *Pte Warris flies the flag*

(with an estimated 200 kilogrammes of Home Made Explosives (HME) inside), four directional fragmentation charges, 100 kilogrammes of bagged HME, a stash of 7.62 ammunition and several other items used to make IEDs. Over the course of Corunna's tour the AAST found one third of all the HME found on Op HERRICK 16. Actions such as this severely disrupted the Insurgent supply chain as well as his ability to project force and also dislocated vital insurgent safe havens and Command and Control nodes.

On Wednesday 5 September Corunna recovered to the UK. Every soldier, without exception, can look back with pride at what they achieved but also at what they endured and lost. The Company suffered six Killed In

Action (KIA) and five Wounded In Action (WIA). It is testament to the entire Company that we were able to bounce back from a terrible tragedy that happened only eleven days after deploying forward and achieve what we did. In many ways it is possible to draw links between the experiences of our Regimental ancestors at Corunna in 1809 and the experiences of the Company in Afghanistan in 2012. In 1809 a strategic victory was snatched from the jaws of almost certain tactical defeat by immense physical and mental courage during the retreat to Corunna. The same dogged determination to make the best of a terrible situation was more than evident in the soldiers of Corunna in 2012. Without the 'spirit of Corunna', which still exists and will endure, our time in Afghanistan could have been very different.

Our tour will always be remembered for our tragic loss, and rightly so, however we can be justly proud of what we achieved. The Company transformed the way AI is employed in theatre, conducting 28 deliberate operations across every region of TFH. We covered more track mileage and fired more 30mm and 7.62mm coax than the previous three AI Companies combined. Corunna took the fight to the enemy; we endured 68 direct fire contacts, and numerous indirect fire incidents as well as suffering seven IED strikes and one Directional Fragmentation Charge (DFC) strike. The

Afghan people up and down Helmand province were positively affected by Corunna's time in Afghanistan; security was improved, the insurgents were weakened and the ANSF developed. However, perhaps the greatest achievement of Corunna Company in Afghanistan was demonstrating the value, at both the tactical and operational level, of the Warrior Armoured Vehicle. Corunna's tour was about making those before us proud and those after us safer; I think we can rest easy.



■ Sgt Moore and Pte Maddison take a moment



NOMINAL ROLL - CORUNNA COMPANY

Rank	Name	Location
<i>Maj</i>	<i>Colver</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Castello</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Pringle</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Ross</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Becher</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Kume-Davy</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Brennan</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>WO2</i>	<i>Hutty</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>WO2</i>	<i>Whitehouse</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>CSgt</i>	<i>Kitridge</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>SSgt</i>	<i>Thornton</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Coupe</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Bidski</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Cooper</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Daniel</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Dixon</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Greenwood MC</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Lemon</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Moore</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Moore</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Reid</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Smith</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Watts</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Fulton</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Bingley</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Bruce</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Gibbs</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Halliwell</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Hartley</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Irving</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Jones</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Bdr</i>	<i>Lampton</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Leleavono</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Maguire</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Marshall</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Mercer</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Bdr</i>	<i>Needham</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Ogrady</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Oldham</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Sanderson</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Sbarkey</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Shields</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Spence</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Tomkins</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Metcalf</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>

Rank	Name	Location
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Balekinasiga</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Beard</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Bolatagne</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Carton</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Clark</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Doran</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Ellis</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Grimes</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Harland</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Huntley</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Jacobs</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Kittle</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Middlemiss</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Seru</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Sikivou</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Skidmore</i>	<i>MOB Bastion</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Slavin</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Smith</i>	<i>MWD</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Smith</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Vulagirua</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Welbourne</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Wilkinson</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Ackroyd</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Akuffo</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Akunda</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Alderson</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Appiah</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Bainbridge</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Barker</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Cfn</i>	<i>Bluck</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Blyth</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Bosman</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Bullock</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Burford</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Butler</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Charlesworth</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Charlton</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Kgn</i>	<i>Clark</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Corns</i>	<i>FOB Oulette</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Cotter</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Dalby</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Darboe</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Daunavutia</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Sig</i>	<i>Dilger</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Dinsley</i>	<i>PB Durai</i>



■ *Operations Platoon on patrol at sunrise*

As the Officers and men of Somme Company prepared for deployment on Op HERRICK 16, it was unclear as to what their actual roles would be. British forces lay-down and roles were quickly changing, in keeping with the political requirements. Whilst the Rifle Companies had a clearer idea of their roles and locations, Support Company had to remain flexible to see where their specialist skills would be best used. As Mission-Specific Training drew to a close, the locations and jobs became finalised. Mortars would be operating two mortar lines, at opposite ends of the valley in Patrol Base (PB) 1 and PB 5. Half of Fire Support Group (FSG) would man the Mastiff and Wolfhound vehicles which made up the Immediate Resupply Group (IRG). Based out of Main Operating Base (MOB) PRICE, and under the

command of Capt Wildey and WO2 Egbury, the IRG were responsible for the majority of the logistic resupply of the patrol bases, on both sides of the River Helmand. The other half of FSG and the Reconnaissance Platoon merged to form the Operations (Ops) Platoon.

Based out of Observation Post (OP) Sterga and under the watchful eye of CSM Burke, the Ops Platoon were responsible for security on the southern bank of the River Helmand. The overt OP also provided a crucial southern view into the valley, complementing the fixed Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) technology in the Patrol Bases. As a last minute adjustment, Sergeant Holbrooke-Woodthorpe and his Multiple were detached from the



■ Maj Holloway and Capt Ali being hosted by the AUP

Ops Platoon and bolstered the ranks of A Coy 3 RIFLES in their difficult and contested area of operations (AO). The Rifles were glad for the expertise of the Somme Multiple when Private Flather claimed the honour of finding the first IED of tour. The Snipers started off their tour in PB 2. A key asset in the Combined Force's (CF's) front footed approach to hunting the insurgent, the Snipers were set to have a busy six months. The Officers were also to have different roles than expected. The OC, Maj Hinchliffe, worked out of CF HQ in PB 2 as SO2 (Maj's staff role) ISTAR, making sure that the Combined Force (CF) had the best coverage possible from their surveillance technology. He was kept Company in PB 2 by Capt Taylor, who assisted the CF's targeting team, and Capt Hammond who was the CF's Battle Capt, a demanding and highly pressurised job. Capt Hammond

was responsible for controlling the day to day activities of the Battlegroup from the Joint Operations Cell in PB 2. Capt Martin, assisted by Sjt Gibbons (RIFLES), was given the job of co-ordinating the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in NES(S). As a relatively new concept, the ALP were recruited from Malgir and the surrounding areas as a militia to help combat the insurgency and protect their own villages. A difficult job, the NES(S) ALP ended up as the envy of Task Force Helmand (TFH).

It was clear from the off that Somme Company were to have a disparate and diverse tour. Op HERRICK 16 got off to a deceptively quiet start. An excellent hand over from our predecessors in 5 RIFLES set us up well. A poor poppy harvest and a timely airstrike in April, which removed a significant proportion of the local



■ **Work hard, play harder**

insurgent middle ranking leadership, bought the CF some breathing space to settle into the tour. The quiet start was not to last, and May saw Burma Coy, the Operations Platoon and CF HQ combine to help rescue an Afghan Uniformed Policeman who had been kidnapped by the insurgents. Triggered by a local tip off, ISTAR picked up the insurgents and their hostage. Lieutenant Mason's Burma Company Multiple from CP Shaprack crashed out to give chase to the fleeing insurgents. They managed to get across the river with the hostage but were unable to go any further due to the Ops Platoon who had deployed in their Jackals to block the southern escape route. Pinned between Burma and the Ops Platoon, the ensuing fight saw the tragic death of Private Stone but the successful rescue of a terrified Afghan policeman. The brave actions of the troops on both sides of the river won the respect

of the Afghan police who were in awe of the soldiers who would go to such lengths to rescue one of their Afghan partners.

Even with the poppy harvest down, the insurgent activity seemed relatively low. It would appear that the force density of ISAF troops in the valley, working closely with our Afghan partners was proving a tough and unappetising nut for the insurgents to crack. The ALP were growing in numbers, trained and overseen by Capt Martin. They certainly proved their worth at the start of HERRICK 16. As the summer progressed, the Brigade turned their attention to getting on the front foot against the insurgency and disrupting them in depth. Named Operation DAAS 2C, the hope was to disrupt the Insurgent facilitation of lethal aid in their



■ Temporary Check Point 'Lost Boys'

supposed safe haven of the Arghandhab River valley, spiritual home of Mullah Omar, a prominent insurgent. As a complex and ambitious manoeuvre operation this would see the first time that the Warriors of Corunna Company were reunited with the rest of the Battalion. A ground reconnaissance was required of the river valley in order to give a more accurate picture to the planning team. A composite Multiple was pulled together from the Ops Platoon, bolstered by a pair of Snipers. Under Capt Taylor and Sergeant Barnes, the Recce Multiple planned and executed a night time reconnaissance mission, assisted by support helicopters. A physically demanding operation, the recce was a success, providing a clearer picture of what lay in the Arghandhab valley,

and a clear reminder that the Recce Platoon could still do their primary function. The job was only half done for the Ops Platoon though, as they were key to the concept of operations. The Jackals from OP Sterga had the job of leading a bolstered IRG through the Red Desert. It took all the perseverance and experience of this combined Somme effort to bring the crucial resupply to the other sub units through this demanding terrain.

After a challenging week in the Arghandhab Valley, it was a relief to get back to the relative comfort of the Malgir Valley. After having proven that manoeuvre on this scale could be achieved, everyone was aware that it was when, not if, another deep manoeuvre operation



Rank	Name	Location
Pte	Dixon	PB Durai
Pte	Durbridge	PB Durai
Pte	Dymek	PB Durai
Pte	Edwards	FOB Oulette
Pte	Frampton	PB Durai
Kgn	Gebel	PB Durai
Pte	Gibbons	PB Durai
Kgn	Griffiths	PB Durai
Kgn	Hamilton	FOB Oulette
Pte	Hannon	FOB Oulette
Pte	Hardwick	PB Durai
Pte	Henchliffe	PB Durai
Pte	Horne	PB Durai
Pte	Jere	PB Durai
Pte	Johnston	PB Durai
Kgn	Kenyon	PB Durai
Pte	Kerr	PB Durai
Pte	Kershaw	PB Durai
Pte	Louth	FOB Oulette
Pte	Lowe	PB Durai
Pte	Lythall	PB Durai
Pte	Maddison	PB Durai
Pte	Makin	PB Durai
Cfn	Mattock	FOB Oulette
Pte	Mcnichol	PB Durai
Pte	Middleton	PB Durai
Pte	Midgley	FOB Oulette
Pte	Mills	PB Durai
Pte	Mole	PB Durai
Cfn	Murphy	FOB Oulette
Cfn	Nelson	PB Durai
Pte	Nimako	PB Durai
Pte	Okoeguale	PB Durai
Pte	Owen	PB Durai
Pte	Peacock	PB Durai
Pte	Peebles	PB Durai
Pte	Phillips	FOB Oulette
Pte	Piggot	PB Durai
Pte	Reynolds	PB Durai
Pte	Rokovunicagi	FOB Oulette
Pte	Rutherford	FOB Oulette
Pte	Samuel	FOB Oulette
Kgn	Sewart	PB Durai
Gnr	Shawcroft	PB Durai
Pte	Simnett	FOB Oulette

Rank	Name	Location
Pte	Standing	PB Durai
Pte	Stones	PB Durai
Pte	Sutcliffe	MOB Bastion
Pte	Taylor 29	PB Durai
Pte	Taylor 69	PB Durai
Pte	Teale	PB Durai
Pte	Tinker-Harper	FOB Oulette
Kgn	Travis	PB Durai
Pte	Tubuoh	FOB Oulette
Pte	Vosalagi	FOB Oulette
Pte	Vunivasa	PB Durai
Pte	Waddington	PB Durai
Pte	Wade	PB Durai
Pte	Walker	PB Durai
Pte	Ward 05	PB Durai
Pte	Ward 09	PB Durai
Pte	Warriss	PB Durai
Pte	Wayper	PB Durai
Pte	Webb	PB Durai
Pte	Whittingham	FOB Oulette
Pte	Widdop	FOB Oulette
Pte	Wilford	PB Durai

SOMME COMPANY

by Maj J Hinchliffe



would be conducted. The end of Op DAAS 2C also saw a change of command for Somme, with Maj Hinchliffe bidding a sad farewell and Maj Holloway assuming command. Maj Holloway had been Operations Officer for the first half of the tour and was undoubtedly one of the busiest men in the CF. He showed all the flexibility necessary for working in Somme when he arrived back from R&R to find that he had picked up the job of the Afghan Uniformed Police Liaison Officer based out of the nearby Pain Kalay Police Station. With his pedigree in working with indigenous forces on HERRICK 9 and his expeditionary outlook, Maj Holloway was the ideal candidate to ensure that the CFs excellent relationship with the charismatic and crucial chief of police, Mohammad Wali, continued. Capt Hammond also used a mid-tour break to escape from the pressure

cooker that was the CF Ops Room. Although only for an afternoon, he jumped onto the IRG to go and visit his Mortar Platoon at either end of the valley. He found that despite how busy they had been, firing illumination rounds almost every night, they had found time to build a pool in PB 1 to cool off in and, rather more bizarrely, a cardboard ship in PB 5. True to form, Mortar Platoon were keeping their morale up in their own way.

August saw the IRG hit two IEDs on the south side of the river whilst working hard to resupply their fellow Somme men in OP Sterga. On both occasions a shaken but resolute Private Martinez emerged from the wreckage, looking forward to telling his tales in the MOB Price coffee shops to the female Danish soldiers.



■ *Patrolling did not always involve the Green Zone*



■ *Last patrol at OP Sterga*

Corunna Company had deployed in February and were now coming to the end of their tour in August. With another Brigade Operation on the horizon, it was important to settle the new Armoured Infantry Company in as soon as possible. To that end, a one day operation to disrupt the insurgent stronghold to the south was planned as a pre-cursor to a larger Brigade level operation. Again this required ground reconnaissance and again a composite Multiple was formed, this time with Sergeant Hamer and Sergeant Brennan joining Sergeant Barnes and Capt Taylor. The one night recce confirmed that the Warrior vehicles would not be crossing the canal. It did however, confirm the importance of securing and marking the crossing points for the dismounted troops and, with that in mind, the Ops Platoon were tasked to clear and over watch two critical crossing areas. The original intention was to stay out for 36 hrs to provide constant over watch. An unfortunate slip on the infiltration by the medic led to a painful cracked pelvis for her and an

almost as painful two km casualty extraction in order not to compromise the Operation. A despondent Ops Platoon re-cocked back at OP Sterga and went back in the following night to confirm and hold the crossing points. Even though the mission did not go entirely to plan, it was a valuable experience and gave many a chance for the only catch up of the tour with the Corunna boys.



■ *OP Sterga patrol at dawn*

All were aware that this last Op was going to be big. It came in the shape of Op QALB 8, a Brigade Operation that was planned in the area of the insurgent stronghold of Yackchal and Popalzai. It was to be an Afghan-led operation with the ISAF troops (including Danish tanks) providing the security wrap. Once again a ground reconnaissance was to prove the viability of potential crossing points over the NES Dashte Canal. This time, Capt Taylor, Sergeant Hamer and Corporal Pritchard headed up a small Multiple who were to conduct three consecutive night time reconnaissance patrols, operating out of PB LASH Durai. It was an intense and demanding period which challenged the Recce Multiple hugely. The close proximity of the local national villages

which were believed to have notable sympathies to the insurgency made it a very difficult and challenging task.

With the ground reconnaissance complete, it was over to the IRG for the operation, who tirelessly resupplied the large CF contingent. The Snipers were also busy on the western side of the operation as they provided badly needed support for the Prince of Wales's Company. Again the Snipers delivered in spades and with some quite brilliant shooting managed to take the fight to the insurgents. As a long week in Yackchal drew to a close, there was a shift in mindset as the CF started to focus more and more on handing over the AO to our successors.



■ Posing after returning from patrol



Whilst the Rifle Companies handed over their respective AOs, it was important that they were given as much breathing space as possible. The insurgents have traditionally used the handover period to increase their efforts and put pressure on the incoming units. The River Helmand was fordable at several places now and it was apparent that the insurgents were often 'commuting' into the valley from the ungoverned space to the south of the River. To that end, the CF were keen to try and disrupt as much Insurgent movement as possible. The Ops Platoon was tasked with providing night time standing patrols to help disrupt this insurgent movement. In total the Platoon conducted almost two weeks of night time activity to the south of the River. This included several deliberate operations into the renowned village of Jungle, including a temporary check point referred to by the Ops Platoon who occupied it as TCP 'Lost Boys'. Sergeant Barnes' OCD kept the Check Point in excellent order and Sergeant Brennan kept morale up with fresh supplies from OP Sterga every 48 hours. CSM Burke came out for the final resupply and had the honour of extracting the Ops Multiple back from the TCP to Sterga, the last foot patrol of 3 YORKS soldiers on HERRICK 16, just hours before the flag changing ceremony. It was with relief and a sense of a job well done that the majority of Somme Company regrouped back in Camp Bastion. After a tight victory of touch rugby over the Grenadier Guards, where Privates Miller and Woodward maintained the 'Dukes' fine rugby tradition, it was home via Cyprus where the Ops Platoon boys were only too keen to show off their newly found volleyball skills, honed on the court in OP Sterga.

Homecoming gave the Somme boys the chance to meet up with Private Frampton's family. Private Frampton was an FSG soldier of the highest calibre who deployed with Corunna Company. He was killed on 6th March when the Warrior vehicle he was in hit an IED and his death was hard for the Company to take. With his caring nature and ready smile, he was one of the most popular men in the Company and it only increased the anxiety felt for all our soldiers who had been detached during the tour. It was with great relief that the Company all met up again back in Warminster and a poignant moment when we were able to meet Private Frampton's family on the day of the medals parade.

Rank	Name	Location
Maj	Hinchliffe	PB2
Maj	Holloway	PB2/PKL Police St.
Capt	Hammond	PB2
Capt	Martin	PB2/MOB PRICE
Capt	Taylor	PB2/OP Sterga
WO2	Egbury	MOB PRICE
CSgt	Mckie	PB2
Sgt	Ayre	OP Sterga
Sgt	Carty	CP PRRANG
Sgt	Denton	MOB PRICE
Sgt	Hamer	OP Sterga
Sgt	Holbrook- Woodthorpe	CP Shin
Sgt	Humphreys	PB2
Sgt	Leeson	PB2
Sgt	Lilley	PB1
Sgt	Mcconnel	BURMA COY
Sgt	Smith	CORUNNA COY
Cpl	Barnes	CO's Tac
Cpl	Blondin	PB1
Cpl	Charlmange	Bastion
Cpl	Dillon	PB5
Cpl	Elliot	PB1
Cpl	Harrison	MOB PRICE
Cpl	Hillery	OP Sterga
Cpl	Johnstone	MOB PRICE
Cpl	Lane	MOB PRICE
Cpl	Leleavono	CORUNNA COY
Cpl	Martin	OP Sterga
Cpl	Philpott	OP Sterga
Cpl	Pritchard	OP Sterga
Cpl	Tibbitts	OP Sterga
Cpl	Tomkins	CORUNNA COY
Cpl	White	PB5
Cpl	Williamson	PB5
Cpl	Windle	PB1
LCpl	Baker	PB5
LCpl	Bettison	PB2
LCpl	Bolatagne	CORUNNA COY
LCpl	Boot	PB5
LCpl	Brown	MOB PRICE
LCpl	Brown	CP Shin
LCpl	Cakau	MOB PRICE
LCpl	Clews	PB5
LCpl	Jones	OP Sterga



NOMINAL ROLL - SOMME COMPANY

Rank	Name	Location
LCpl	Hastie	OP Sterga
LCpl	Hodge	PB2
LCpl	Kelly	CO's Tac
LCpl	King	PB5
LCpl	Malcolm	PB1
LCpl	Maxwell	ALMA COY
LCpl	Mclaughlin	PB1
LCpl	Kilner	CP Perkba
LCpl	Naita	OP Sterga
LCpl	Nunn	OP Sterga
LCpl	Rogers	PB1
LCpl	Saumalua	OP Sterga
LCpl	Seru	CORUNNA COY
LCpl	Shaw	PB5
LCpl	Symons	OP Sterga
LCpl	Swindels	ALMA COY
LCpl	Tune	ALMA COY
LCpl	Wilkinson	CORUNNA COY
Pte	Atkinson	MOB PRICE
Pte	Bate	MOB PRICE
Pte	Barker	OP Sterga
Pte	Barker	MOB PRICE
Pte	Banks	OP Sterga
Pte	Beavers	PB1
Pte	Booker	CP Shin
Pte	Bolton	PB2
Pte	Brown	CO's Tac
Pte	Bullock	CORUNNA COY
Pte	Cochrane	OP Sterga
Pte	Daniel	PB1
Pte	Darboe	CORUNNA COY
Pte	Davies	OP Sterga
Pte	Dadzie	Bastion
Pte	Dyer	MOB PRICE
Pte	Emmett	OP Sterga
Pte	Flatther	CP Shin
Pte	Fletcher	ALMA COY
Pte	Fofana	Bastion
Pte	Gebel	CORUNNA COY
Pte	Holland	PB2
Pte	Hopewell	CP Perkba
Pte	Hirst	PB5
Pte	Hughes	OP Sterga
Pte	Karim	PB1
Pte	Kirby	OP Sterga

Rank	Name	Location
Pte	Knapton	PB2
Pte	Leadbeater	OP Sterga
Pte	Machin	OP Sterga
Pte	Martin	PB1
Pte	Martinez	MOB PRICE
Pte	Mazeika	PB1
Pte	Miller	OP Sterga
Pte	Miller	PB1
Pte	Moeletsi	CORUNNA COY
Pte	Murphy	PB2
Pte	Nanovu	PB5
Pte	Napier	CP Shin
Pte	Noel	OP Sterga
Pte	Norris	CP Shin
Pte	Nuku	PB1
Pte	Patterson	CP Shin
Pte	Richards	PB5
Pte	Smart	CO's Tac
Pte	Stones	CORUNNA COY
Pte	Taylor	PB2
Pte	Thomas	BCR OP Sterga
Pte	Tomlinson	CP ABPOSHAK E
Pte	Waddington	CORUNNA COY
Pte	Waper	CORUNNA COY
Pte	Watkinson	PB5
Pte	Wetherill	BCR
Pte	Whaites	PB5
Pte	White	PB1
Pte	Woodward	OP Sterga

BATTLEGROUP HEADQUARTERS AND HOOK COMPANY

by Maj S Cain





■ **Padre Duncan giving a sermon in PB2**

Patrol Base 2 (PB2) was the home of Battlegroup (BG) Headquarters throughout the deployment on Op HERRICK 16. Upon arrival the camp was taken over by Maj Cain and CSgt Baker, with the role of PB Company Sergeant Major going to WO2 Hind.

At the heart of the PB was the “citadel” where the Headquarters team coordinated the activity of the 3 YORKS BG. This consisted of the Operations Room, the Plans Tent and the G2 Cell (intelligence tent). The Operations Room (Ops Room) was a hive of activity, with Capt Alec Hammond at the helm as Battle Captain, assisted by WO2 Roper. Both did a fantastic job in maintaining overall control of the Combined Force (CF) in difficult and often very busy times, when neither of them saw much light of day. They and their team were responsible for calling in the necessary air support, fire support and casualty evacuations. OC Recce, Capt Rob Taylor, made early morning starts as he tirelessly sat and watched the locals going about their business,

monitoring the screens in front of him as he diligently familiarised himself with the everyday patterns of life, which paid dividends on occasions, when vital and timely information was passed down to the troops on the ground when habitual patterns changed.

The Citadel was also used, sadly, for services by Padre Duncan which were conducted when we suffered casualties. He was outstanding in his delivery of these Field Services and was always there to lend a helping hand. He regularly went around the Check Points (CPs) and PBs visiting and supporting the blokes, offering a constant source of morale and encouragement as well as just being there for people. Always willing to listen and proffer appropriate advice, he made a massive contribution to the tour.

The Signals (CIS) platoon provided the bulk of the manpower within the Ops Room, working in three shifts providing 24 hr cover. The CIS were bolstered in



■ **The Officers Mess in PB2**

numbers by the Royal Signals Infantry Support Team (RSIST) and the specialist skills they brought were extremely useful. Of worthy note was LCpl Bain, whose IT skills were continually put to the test, as was Cpl Coleman's satellite communications expertise. Also, amongst the RSIST team, Signaller Symons stood out as an exceptional operator; her work throughout the tour was second to none.

The Plans Tent was the nerve centre of the PB, with the Chief of Staff (COS) Maj Rob Driver leading the team in his own inimitable style. Staff Officers were often seen scurrying for cover or volunteering for a spell in the Super Sanger to escape his clutches. The Plans Tent was where everything that the CF planned to do, based on the Commanding Officers direction, was formulated before being put into action.

The G2 cell, led by Capt Tony Ross, with help from Lieutenant Rowlands, CSgt Rudd and CSgt Roberts,

fed the BG with vital intelligence feeds. They were responsible for collating information, assessing it and disseminating any relevant intelligence gained. Capt Ross and his team did a very good job in a highly fluid environment against a well trained and established enemy. The picture they painted of what we were facing led to many of the subsequent successful operations that we conducted.

During the deployment the HQ tried to improve the quality of life within the PB. Backing up all events and feeding the inhabitants of the PB was down to Sgt Dinnage and her team of chefs. They did an excellent job in keeping us going throughout the long summer. This included several 'Warriors' Dinner Nights' between ISAF and ANSF forces, used as a tool to strengthen the bond between them.

The HQ was not confined to the PB and deployed forward on several occasions to control the large scale

Battlegroup level operations throughout our area of operations and even further afield. These operations often stretched the Company but the Yorkshire spirit always shone through. Life in the PB was always busy, with everyone conducting their “day” jobs as well as contributing to the daily running of the PB.

BG HQ had an exciting, varied and rewarding deployment. It was filled with lots of hard work and limited down-time but it paid off in the end as it helped to contribute to the overall success of the tour.

Quartermasters Dept. Capt Nick Wilson

Quite fittingly, you will find this article somewhere near the back of this book and, in time honoured tradition, the supporting element to Operations plays second fiddle to the fight, and quite rightly so. Perhaps the difference on this deployment was that, from the outset, we knew that our patch of Afghanistan would be subject to huge and sweeping change over our tenure. Whilst the Commanding Officer and team managed the ground effect and fallout of that change on the local population, the Quartermaster's (QM's) team, based in Camp Bastion, managed the complexity of drawing down an area and merging it with NES (North). This is not quite as simple as it sounds and after the ongoing saga of Operation Brockdale (drawdown of Iraq) plenty of high level operators took a keen interest. In essence this would mean an immediate strip-out of all unnecessary items, which would create austere living conditions that would gradually worsen as the tour went on, all the while maintaining operational effectiveness. Before the strip-out it was important to re-align the accounts and to make good the damage done by successive Battlegroups that had gone through NES South over the past five years. This damage meant that nine million pounds worth of kit was missing. The start point was clear – to find it!

We managed to re-write the equipment table, which had not been touched properly for some time, and this allowed us to understand what was where and where we could take risk. In the first month we removed two thousand items from the line at little detriment to the lads and this policy continued up until the last day. By the end of the tour we had proved a system that is now the practice in Afghanistan and is the template for the withdrawal in 2014. We shifted 1000 items to the UK,

working on the formula of; does it cost more to fly it back than it is worth, and will it endure with the Afghans as a useful item. In the end we left over sixty thousand pounds worth of tentage and flooring to help the Afghan forces. We also removed 18 ISO containers filled with ammunition that had been left by previous Battlegroups. Sgt Good oversaw this and was truly impressive in his approach, achieving great results through tireless work. It is also noteworthy that over 16 of our vehicles were hit by IEDs and that much-needed replacements were often found quickly on the basis of a good working relationship with the right people in Camp Bastion. Eventually we managed the closure of twelve locations and disposed of some 35 unneeded vehicles. Mail had to be sorted in and out, the notifying system back to the UK of any casualties had to be manned 24 hrs a day and our camp had to be guarded.

Aside from this activity there was the tough task of processing the casualties which were brought in from the ground. We met the casualties, just over 100 in total, at the helicopter landing point, of which 40 AeroMed evacuations took place. This resulted in over 400 visits to the Role 3 Hospital in Camp Bastion, with whom we built a fantastic relationship that proved so important when we received lads that had sadly been killed-in-action.

A quick look at the stats below helps to paint the picture of our day to day activity:

- **286 under slung loads delivered by helicopter (over 429 tons of life saving supplies).**
- **200 shipping ISO containers removed from the forward line.**
- **36 contract road moves sent supplying over half a million litres of water and rations.**
- **14 logistic patrols sent to PB locations (over 4 ISOs of combat supplies on each patrol).**
- **64 loads sent by Immediate Resupply Group (IRG), including 192 ISOs of supplies (IRG – unit created logistic patrols).**
- **1 emergency lift of ammunition by helicopter to troops in contact on the ground.**
- **As well as Logistics and Equipment Care inspections.**



■ **Cobra 82A – truly the last operational patrol of the 'Dukes'!**

All in all it was a busy but productive time for the QM's department who served the forward line well. From my biweekly visits to the Patrol Bases it was clear that things were getting through and that conditions were being understood. Allowances were made for the drawdown, which had little impact on the ability to maintain Operations to the highest level.

I am truly proud of my teams' efforts in Afghanistan. Speaking as a former Sniper and Rifle Company man all of my Army life, I was shown how the other half works, and I was educated and humbled by a team of really knowledgeable professionals who are generally misunderstood. Special thanks must also go to the Company rear links, without which the forward locations would have run dry. Finally, to Sergeant Sargent whose efforts were enormous and Corporal Lawton, who ran the Flight Pro, don't worry Verge, it's all over now.



NOMINAL ROLL - BATTLEGROUP HEADQUARTERS AND HOOK COMPANY

Rank	Name	Location
Lt Col	Stenning	PB2
Maj	Caine	PB2
Maj	Driver	PB2
Maj	Duncan	PB2
Maj	Terry	PB2
Maj	Walker	PB2
Capt	Ali	PB2
Capt	Cary	PB2
Capt	Davies	PB2
Capt	Hammond	PB2
Capt	Holloway	PB2
Capt	Ibbotson	PB2
Capt	Martin	PB2
Capt	Ross	PB2
Capt	Taylor	PB2
Capt	Wade-Smith	PB2
Capt	Wilson	Camp Bastion
Lt	Morgan	PB2
Lt	Rowlands	PB2
Lt	Sinnott	PB2
WO1	Szymanski	PB2
WO2	Connell	Camp Bastion
WO2	Hind	PB2
WO2	Roper	PB2
WO2	Simms	Camp Bastion
CSgt	Baker	PB2
CSgt	Devanny	PB2
CSgt	Mcconnell	Camp Bastion
CSgt	Rudd	PB2
CSgt	Roberts	PB2
CSgt	Mckie	PB2
SSgt	Girvin	PB2
SSgt	Maccarron	PB2
SSgt	Gallagher	PB2
Sgt	Cartwright	PB2
Sgt	Claydon	Camp Bastion
Sgt	Curran	PB2
Sgt	Dangerfield	Camp Bastion
Sgt	Dinnage	PB2
Sgt	Fitzgibbon	Camp Bastion
Sgt	Gibbons	PB2
Sgt	Gillard	PB2
Sgt	Good	Camp Bastion
Sgt	Horricks	Camp Bastion
Sgt	Mcann	PB2

Rank	Name	Location
Sgt	Ryall	PB2
Sgt	Sargent	Camp Bastion
Sgt	Sutcliffe	PB2
Sgt	West	PB2
Cpl	Bingley	PB2
Cpl	Cheeseman	Camp Bastion
Cpl	Coleman	PB2
Cpl	Hird	PB2
Cpl	Kerrigan	Camp Bastion
Cpl	Lawton	Camp Bastion
Cpl	Loghmani	PB2
Cpl	Padget	Camp Bastion
Cpl	Poyner	PB2
Cpl	Taylor	PB2
Cpl	Wall	PB2
Cpl	Wallis	PB2
LCpl	Armstrong	PB2
LCpl	Bain	PB2
LCpl	Barnes	PB2
LCpl	Buchan	PB2
LCpl	Burnside	PB2
LCpl	Dick	PB2
LCpl	Graham	PB2
LCpl	Kelly	PB2
LCpl	Leadbeater	Camp Bastion
LCpl	Palmer	PB2
LCpl	Pritchard	PB2
LCpl	Staham	PB2
LCpl	Stokes	Camp Bastion
Pte	Bond	Camp Bastion
Pte	Campbell	Camp Bastion
Pte	Cater	PB2
Pte	Gitau	PB2
Pte	Glover	PB2
Pte	Hepptonstall	PB2
Cfn	Jones	PB2
Pte	Rabini	PB2
Pte	Simpson	PB2
Pte	Symons	PB2
Pte	Ward	PB2

THE PRINCE OF WALES'S COMPANY WELSH GUARDS

by Maj E Lauanders





Operation HERRICK 16 saw The Prince of Wales's Company return to Afghanistan for their second tour of duty, a refreshed relationship with The 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (3 YORKS) that has become a feature of recent Company history. The Company had previously deployed to Helmand on Operation HERRICK 10 in 2009, during which time it had established the initial hold of the township of Char-e-Anjir as part of Operation Panther's Claw. In the summer of 2012 the Company was to be based just 10 kilometres away in Patrol Base 5 (PB5) to conduct a very different role against the backdrop of a fundamentally altered security landscape, and a more mature and advanced campaign.

Some five months before deployment the Company received confirmation that they were to be subordinated to 3 YORKS. This was to return echoes from 2005, when the Company was attached to the then 1st Battalion, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment for Op TELIC 5, based in the Old State Buildings in Basra. A number of members of 3 YORKS had also served with the Company as battle casualty replacements during the latter stages of Op HERRICK 10. Corporately, therefore, the stage was set for this relationship to flourish again. Mutual understanding and trust was built during the winter months that preceded the tour, through joint training, social activities and numerous road trips between Hounslow and Warminster.

The Company finally deployed in April 2012 to be the Nahr-e Saraj (South) (NES(S)) Operations Company. This was a role that had by no means been certain throughout pre-deployment training. At seven months out the Company was set to deploy as part of the Police Mentoring and Advisory Group under the command of their parent battalion. Between September 2011 and January 2012 a number of different potential roles and locations were mooted before the final assignment was confirmed three months out. Once confirmed, the Operations Company role was warmly welcomed. By April the team was well established, and had for the most part been together for some time. The notable exception was 4 Platoon, Grenadier Guards, who joined the Order of Battle very late in the pre-deployment phase to boost the Company from two to three rifle platoons. Under the command of Lieutenant J Hathaway-White, they were to remain with the Company for the first two months of the tour.

In broad terms the job was straightforward. The Operations Company provided the Combined Force (CF) Commanding Officer with a largely uncommitted second echelon force, which he could employ predominantly in the deep battle, to maintain the initiative and momentum to succeed in the close battle; the transition to Afghan led security within the population centres. During the preceding winter, 5 RIFLES had built upon the work of their predecessors creating a security environment that was ripe for progression towards an Afghan lead. The focus for security within NES(S) was the more densely populated Green Zone (GZ), where the centres of governance, agriculture and security infrastructure lie. At the start of the summer the security lay-down of both Afghan and NATO forces was reaching its zenith, and the area was largely uncontested. Insurgent hinterlands had taken root to the north across the Nahr-e Bughra Canal, in the Bowri Dashte (desert), and to the south across the River Helmand in the NES Dashte. These more sparsely populated areas, which were beyond the reach of formal governance and which lacked any permanent security footprint, were key terrain to the insurgents for whom it provided safe havens, re-supply routes and an economic base in the form of a booming poppy industry. Although the Company were to conduct operations across the whole of the NES(S) area of operations, it was the Bowri and the NES Dashte that were to be the focus for the majority of their work.

PB 5 was to be the station for The Prince of Wales's Company throughout Op HERRICK 16. The incongruously named base sat on the 'PB line' between PB 3 and PB 4. The naming irregularity resulted from its late addition to the PB line; its neighbours having been established during Operation Panther's Claw in 2009. It sat on the edge of the large village of Rahim kalay and, despite its position in the heart of the previously hotly contested GZ, the base itself had never been directly attacked. In many ways it was far from ideal as an Operations Company base. As the only occupants, the Company was required to guard it first and foremost, and therefore basing there limited the number of troops available for tasking. More often than not, it did not provide the optimum location from which to launch operations. In most instances the Company became used to forward mounting from other locations. Spending nights roughing it on 'the dust bowl' in Main Operating Base (MOB) Price became a standard routine.



■ 2Lt Marsden leads his men across the River Helmand

PB5 did however have tactical significance at Brigade level. It sat in the heart of the tri-boundary area, where the borders of Lashkar Ghar, Nad-e-Ali and Nahr-e Saraj districts meet, and at the furthest extent of active governance for the local people. As the ISAF security footprint in the area reduced as the tour progressed, so the importance of PB5 grew.

Throughout the tour it provided a comfortable and functional home for the Company and a growing fleet of protective mobility vehicles. The Guardsmen enjoyed a welfare package that far out-stripped anything that those veterans had been used to on previous tours of

Afghanistan. Good tents, wireless internet, Sky TV, hot showers and, crucially, three fresh meals a day meant that, when not deployed, the Company had an excellent environment in which to rest and re-set. Daily 'swabbing' jobs each morning were not popular, but ensured that living standards remained high.

On arrival in PB 5 in late April, the base was shared with the Afghan National Army 4th Tolay, 2nd Kandak, 3/215 Brigade. Under command of the highly experienced Capt Saakhi, the tolay had framework security responsibilities in the local area, and as such were roommates, but not operational partners in the truest sense of the word.



■ Roadside checks

Early in the tour it became obvious that there was both a deficiency and an opportunity to be seized. The Prince of Wales's Company had no formal partnering relationship with any Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) elements, and this was immediately identified as an important gap. Whereas ground holding companies existed directly to enable the development of the ANSF in the GZ, the Operations Company role was different; in essence to enable this ANSF development through the conduct of deep operations. To conduct these operations unilaterally would have been a mistake in that it would not maximise bespoke ANSF skills, and it would not present the important narrative to

the people in those outlying areas that this was a joint venture. To both enable the Operations Company to conduct partnered operations, and to develop the 2nd Kandak's confidence and ability to conduct operations in depth, the Commanding Officer 2nd Kandak agreed that a 'Commando' platoon would be established from 4th Tolay. This platoon was to be developed and train alongside The Prince of Wales's Company, and provide the partnered force for deep and reactive operations.

Capt Saakhi was an excellent man to lead this initiative. His experience as a warrior was considerable. A member of the Red Army and product of staff college in Moscow



■ Gdsm Davies 77 with Company TAC



■ Company TAC manoeuvre as dawn breaks



■ Guardsmen Jones 23, Jackson 35 and Reynolds clean weapons in PB5

in the eighties, Saakhi subsequently fought for the Mujahedeen until the end of the Soviet occupation. He went into exile during the Taliban regime, and returned to Afghanistan a passionate proponent of freedom. He was an evangelist for the new Afghanistan, and his persuasive performances in shuras with village elders were lessons in military influence, and he proved an excellent man to lead joint operations. The 4th Tolay began to develop a quick reaction mind-set, and began a process of more honed training under the guidance of their 3 RIFLES mentors, Capt M Bartlett and Serjeant Foxton.

A number of partnered operations were conducted during the initial two months of the tour, and on a couple of these occasions they proved that they were able to react at very short notice to good effect, albeit often relying on ISAF vehicles to access more dangerous areas. On the evening of 14 May 2012, the 4th Tolay 'Commando' platoon deployed with the Company to arrest a suspected

Taliban commander, based on a reliable intelligence source. Within 40 minutes of the initial warning order, the Company departed PB5 with Saakhi's men, and headed towards the target compound in the middle of the Bowri. Light was fading as the Company Group dismounted from vehicles some kilometres from the target. By the time the target was reached, it was pitch-black. Taliban iCom intercepts indicated a degree of panic and confusion. It was clear that targets were close. The 4th Tolay proved confident and adept, conducting decent searches and successfully arresting two insurgent suspects. For both sets of men, the operation highlighted the difficulties of operating in the dark, unable to read the ground-sign or fully orientate to the situation. As the troops extracted back to the vehicles, the iCom traffic exploded with promise of immediate attacks. Nothing materialised, but the Company was left with the impression of a very real and present threat.



■ The Prince of Wales's Company, with an Afghan Tiger Team, deploy into the Arghandab River Valley

For all ensuing joint operations, the 4th Tolay were to take point, and lead on all searches and local national interaction, increasing in both confidence and effectiveness on each occasion, at one point demonstrating an instinctive understanding of influence operations by attending a local mosque in the previously heavily contested village of Noor Mohammed kalay in the east of the AO. But the relationship was to be curtailed two months into the tour, as 4th Tolay were moved out of PB5 to reinforce changing ANA priorities on the Nahr-e Bughra Canal. This came at a time when the 'Commando' concept was just beginning to take hold, and meant that for the remainder of the tour, the Company were to get used to working with a variety of different ANSF partners on an ad hoc basis.

As the BG's uncommitted reserve force, the Operations Company was routinely called upon to reinforce the ground holding Companies in NES(S). This routine began before the Company even deployed forward to PB5 at the start of the tour. Number 2 Platoon, led by Lieutenant F J Wright and Sergeant D T Hughes 39, initially deployed to CP Midan Bazi, under the command of A Company, 3 RIFLES (A Coy 3 RIFLES), where they were to be based for the initial two weeks of the tour. This was to establish a relationship with A Coy 3 RIFLES which endured throughout the tour, with Sergeant Hughes 39 in particular becoming an accustomed expert in the A Coy 3 RIFLES AO. A Multiple from Number 1 Platoon, under the command of Lieutenant the Hon F O Lloyd George, reinforced Alma Company 3 YORKS (A Coy 3 YORKS) for a six week period from early May.



■ **The Company Commander issuing quick battle orders**

In this role they found themselves immersed in the daily business of Afghan Police development, including the enigmatic Afghan Local Police (ALP). The experiences of both platoons working alongside other Companies in another role proved invaluable in the conduct of future operations.

The principal focus for the Company throughout the tour was on the conduct of deliberate operations. During the six month deployment, the Company conducted more than 30 manoeuvre operations, sometimes as part of a larger BG, and sometimes independently. Four operations were conducted beyond NES(S) boundaries as part of the Task Force Helmand deep battle, or to reinforce neighbouring forces. Operations could last anything from a handful of hours up to ten days at their

longest. Longer operations would normally mean living in austere conditions, operating from temporary CPs in commandeered Afghan compounds, eating 24 hour rations and drinking purified well water; by contrast, short strike operations could be completed in time for a hot breakfast in PB5. Planning timelines extended from just 30 minutes at one end of the spectrum out to days or even weeks for other missions.

It is worth noting that of these 30 plus operations, around 20 of them took place without any significant action, or direct evidence of enemy activity. This not only reflected the positive security landscape within NES(S), but also demonstrated the benefits of the concentration of force. Deep operations were for the most part designed to disable the insurgent's ability to challenge security progress, and to cause attrition to their capability. Intelligence-led operations would always be the best way to do this, but high definition intelligence could be hard to come by. At times, a good option was to use ground manoeuvre to force the insurgent to un-mask himself.

This proved particularly effective on Operation QALB 4, on 15th and 16th June 2013. This two-day operation was designed to do just that; a targeted strike against a suspect compound in the Bowri was mounted at the crack of dawn on 15th June. Although an insurgent presence was not likely, it was hoped that the action would provoke activity that would be spotted by one of the many sensors that provided the eyes and ears of CF NES(S) headquarters. It worked. Shortly after midday, a surveillance camera spotted the movement of a weapon two kilometres to the south. A rapid follow-up in Mastiff led to the successful recovery of a single-shot rifle. The insurgent activity 'spiked' also provided the Company with start points for day 2 of the operation. On 16th June once again the Company's manoeuvre instigated insurgent activity that was monitored at CF level. The Company manoeuvred south through the Bowri, knowing well that insurgents had been seen, and seeking to un-mask their positions. Shortly after 9 o'clock in the morning the Company came under fire from the first burst of heavy automatic fire. The pursuit continued, until finally the insurgent un-masked fully. Lieutenant Hathaway-White's Multiple had been caught in open ground, and having their interpreter shot in the leg, were forced to conduct a difficult and dangerous evacuation under fire. But the insurgent fire positions could now



■ **'Jamboys' relax on the eve on Operation DAAS 2C**

be seen. Two fighters were removed by airstrikes, and a further gunman was likely removed as the Company Mastiff group manoeuvred forward under the control of Capt G C F Charles-Jones, the Second-in-Command.

This operation provided the most potent engagement that the Company had experienced to date. Most of all it reinforced two key lessons that would go on to yield considerable fruit. First was the reminder that, when combined with ground manoeuvre, the CF's exploitation of the network of cameras and surveillance systems could have significant effect. Second was the lesson that manoeuvring in Mastiffs could and would provide an

excellent advantage in the semi-arid landscape of the Bowri. In the weeks that followed, the Company came to increasingly rely on the Mastiff as the best means of manoeuvring for reactive operations, outstripping helicopters in many instances. Not only could the Company deploy quicker, but it was found to be more flexible and offered an excellent degree of support once on the ground.

CF NES(S) continued to adopt the formula of mounting reactive operations on the back of spotting insurgent movement on camera systems. On a number of occasions the Prince of Wales's Company were deployed

at no notice, at times supported by the CF Mobility Group and personnel from Burma Company 3 YORKS (B Coy 3 YORKS). This was to yield six prestigious PKM machine guns and a range of other weapons and ammunition during the course of the tour. The single biggest haul came on 11th August, as the Company crashed out to search a suspect compound. As the Mastiffs rolled close, four insurgents escaped in a car packed with weaponry. Eventually two of the insurgents were to be captured, and the weapons, including a large quantity of IED components, were successfully recovered. During the operation Sergeant Hughes 39 gave valiant, if unsuccessful, chase to a fleeing insurgent over open ground.

It was when operating out of area, as part of the Brigade deep battle, that the Company was to experience the

most tenacious and determined enemy. Two operations of note were to test all ranks to the limit. At the end of July the Company forward mounted to Lashkar Ghar Durai Junction to form part of 3 YORKS BG for Op DAAS 2C. The bespoke BG, which had the look and feel of a conventional Combined Arms organisation, was to conduct strike operations deep in the insurgent heartlands of the Arghandab River Valley. Corunna Company 3 YORKS (C Coy 3 YORKS) in Warrior fighting vehicles, along with a US Marine Corps armoured bridge and Danish Leopard tanks, presented a potent force. The Prince of Wales's Company, mounted in Mastiff, would struggle to keep up. Nonetheless the Company formed one of two strike groups, and successfully projected into some of the most unreachable communities in southern Afghanistan. The operation will be remembered for the attrition of the Company vehicle fleet. Without any



■ Sgt Scarf contemplates a difficult moment



■ *Prince of Wales's Company Mastiffs deploying at dawn*

enemy action, the terrain and searing heat proved tough. In the space of five days, the Company conducted more than 25 vehicle recoveries. Notably Sergeant C D Scarf and Lance Corporal C Brown proved their worth time and again in getting vehicles moving once more. But it was the employment of the IED fight that demonstrated that there existed a particularly cunning and skilled opponent. The Company experienced three IED strikes in three days; their first of the tour. The final strike occurred as the Company was tasked to move to secure a bridge crossing to enable C Coy 3 YORKS Warriors to extract.

In September the Company was once again to take their place in a bespoke 3 YORKS manoeuvre BG. This time the aim was to support an Afghan National Army (ANA) led clearance of the insurgent stronghold of Yakchal. This time the BG was to have a real Foot Guards feel. The Queen's Company, Grenadier Guards was to deploy

by helicopter to guard the south west flank; Left Flank, Scots Guards, equipped with Warrior, would hold the south flank. The Prince of Wales's Company, in Mastiff, were to guard the eastern flank. In particular the job was to seal a number of canal crossings, and to prevent fighters escaping before the ANA advance. Within half an hour of arriving in Yakchal the insurgents indicated their intent. Sporadic small arms engagements began, and would continue on and off for the next five days. Once again the enemy proved adept at spotting gaps in our surveillance, and littering the areas with IEDs. Five Prince of Wales's vehicles struck IEDs during the operation, making wheeled manoeuvre extremely challenging. Both Number 1 and 2 Platoons found themselves in vicious scraps. But throughout the insurgents had not been able to escape Yakchal, and so testing was the ground, the Company took six hours to cover just two kilometres.

Notes on Op HERRICK 16 would not be complete without mention of Observation Post (OP) 'Jamboy 1'. The OP was established on the ridge to the south of the River Helmand. It commanded superb views over the NES(S) GZ, and was designed to both deter insurgents from mounting attacks in the south west corner of NES(S) and to prevent them from exploiting low water crossing-points on the River Helmand to move weapons and explosives. Perhaps most importantly it stood as a significant psychological marker to the ANSF and to the local people that they were well supported. The Afghan fortress mentality is well established, and Jamboy 1 was a mini fortress high on the ridge line. Established on 2nd August, originally titled OP Sterga 2, it was re-christened by Commanding Officer 3 YORKS in recognition of the Prince of Wales's Company nickname.

Number 1 Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Lloyd George established it and ran it for six weeks, supported by Sergeant Scarf and Lance Sergeant K Vuvueika. The platoon became experts in the villages of Jungle and Jan

Mohammed kalay, which had experienced little ISAF footprint in the past.

The Operations Company role does not carry definable targets, and the sum total of individual successes cannot necessarily be added together to demonstrate progress towards a goal or objectives. There were, however, some important and tangible outcomes that the Company should feel extremely proud of. Firstly, and happily, the Company can feel hugely blessed and fortunate to not have suffered any fatalities or significant injuries. Much of this is attributable to luck, and the excellent quality of protective mobility vehicles. Secondly, and crucially, NES(S) did not experience a serious spike in summer insurgent activity. Some localised areas remain problem spots, but a Taliban summer offensive simply did not materialise. The operations of The Prince of Wales's Company can only have contributed to this success. All said, Op HERRICK 16 was a testing and hugely rewarding tour, and for the 'Jamboys' it was a great honour and pleasure working alongside 3 YORKS.



■ LCpl Small savours the moment on the final flight out of PB5



NOMINAL ROLL - THE PRINCE OF WALES'S COMPANY

Rank	Name
<i>Maj</i>	<i>Launders</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Bartlett</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Charles-Jones</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Foster</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Godfree</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Young</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Hathaway-White</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Lloyd-George</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Wright</i>
<i>2Lt</i>	<i>Marsden</i>
<i>WO2</i>	<i>Ryan</i>
<i>CSgt</i>	<i>Roberts</i>
<i>CSgt</i>	<i>Moore</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Dollimore</i>
<i>Sjt</i>	<i>Foxton</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Hughes</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Jackson</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Jones</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>O'Brien</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Robinson</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Scarf</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Senior</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Cue</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Dillon</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Greenman</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Hance</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Hayman</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Hurst</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Jackson</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Jones</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Lawrence</i>
<i>Bdr</i>	<i>Mackay</i>
<i>Bdr</i>	<i>Mccambley</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Rowlands</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Shields</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Skitt</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Smith</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Stott</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Syme</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Thompson</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Tracey</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Turner</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Vuevueika</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Williamson</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Baker</i>

Rank	Name
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Bamber</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Barrett</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Bingham</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Boot</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Brown</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Cafferey</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Cairns</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Campbell</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Clews</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Deeks</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Dent</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Dixon</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Franklin</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Grant</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Gurung</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Hayden</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Hollis</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Jones 89</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Jones 91</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Keen</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>McCarthy</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Meek</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Moffatt</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Morris</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Neil</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Pamflett</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Parry</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Prince</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Rafferty</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Rai</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Roberts</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Small</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Smith</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Taylor</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Whitty</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Youngs</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Alderidge</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Atterbury</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Batten</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Batty</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Baw</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Bilton</i>
<i>Gnr</i>	<i>Bingham</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Birch</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Brown</i>

Rank	Name
Gnr	Bryant
Gdsm	Cann
Gdsm	Carr
Gdsm	Carr
Gdsm	Charles
Gdsm	Collins
Gdsm	Constable
Gdsm	Cray
Gdsm	Dalton
Gdsm	Davies 77
Gdsm	Davies 87
Gdsm	Dunn
Gdsm	Edwards 93
Cfn	Elding
Gdsm	Evans 35
Gdsm	Evans 76
Gdsm	Evans 89
Rfn	Fedee
Pte	Fofana
Gdsm	Frederickson
Gdsm	Furneaux
Gdsm	Greenan
Gdsm	Hall
Gdsm	Harding
Pte	Harris
Gdsm	Harrison
Gdsm	Harry
Gdsm	Hayes
Rgr	Hayward
Gdsm	Henneberry
Gdsm	Hill
Pte	Hirst
Gdsm	Holmes
Gdsm	Hovarth
Gdsm	Howells
Pte	Hughes
Gdsm	Hughes 13
Gdsm	Hughes 71
Pte	Hussein
Gdsm	Hyland
Gdsm	Jackson
Gdsm	Jallow
Gdsm	Jones 60
Gdsm	Jones 16
Gdsm	Jones 20

Rank	Name
Gdsm	Jones 23
Gdsm	Kirk
Gdsm	Lambrick
Gdsm	Lloyd
Gdsm	Lord
Rfn	Lowe
Gdsm	Lunn
Gdsm	Mason
Gdsm	Mccash
Pte	Mcleod
Gdsm	Mottram
Pte	Nuku
Gdsm	Peek
Gdsm	Pickin
Gdsm	Powell 21
Gdsm	Powell 81
Gdsm	Rees
Gdsm	Rees
Gdsm	Reynolds
Pte	Richards
Pte	Robertson
Gdsm	Rosser
Gdsm	Rowlands
Gdsm	Rutledge
Gdsm	Sabo
Gdsm	Saunders
Gdsm	Sheldon
Gdsm	Singleton
Pte	Stanley
Gdsm	Sylva
Gdsm	Tavaga
Gdsm	Thorne
Gdsm	Threadgold
Gdsm	Townsend
Gdsm	Tyers
Gdsm	Ward
Gdsm	Warde
Pte	Watkinson
Pte	Whaites
Gdsm	Williams 22
Gdsm	Williams 62
Gdsm	Williams 94
Gdsm	Woodrow

A COMPANY 3 RIFLES

by Maj A Ridland





■ On patrol with the Afghan Local Police

A Company, 3 RIFLES, deployed on Op HERRICK 16 as an amalgamation of cap badges. In addition to our own 1 and 2 Platoons, we were joined by the Mortar Platoon of 1 Grenadier Guards and a Multiple from Somme Company, 3 YORKS. The Company Group were deployed in the Jeker Area of Operations (AO) and occupied five Check Points (CP). Company HQ and a Multiple were in CP Jeker, 1 Platoon were in CP Prrang, living alongside a cadre of newly recruited Afghan Local Police (ALP), as were 2 Platoon in CP Sola. The Mortar Platoon was in CP Midan Bazi for four months of the tour, before taking over Observation Post (OP) Sterga 2. 24A, the 3 YORKS Multiple, spent half the tour in CP Parachut and the other half in CP Shin.

The Company's area of responsibility was relatively small – 3 km by 5 km. It nestled up against the River Helmand to its south and was deep in what is known colloquially as the 'Green Zone'. Home to approximately 2500 people, the principal villages are Torghai, Khorgajat, Chardah and Kunjak. The terrain was rugged and the vegetation dense. It was a particularly testing area, sitting astride the 'Barakzai Belt' - an area of totemic importance to the insurgency, as the oldest site of Pashtun settlement in the District, providing dense poppy cultivation, and therefore income generation for the Taleban, and home to a large number of insurgent commanders. Traditionally, it is an area that has never been effectively governed.



■ Moving through the irrigation ditches



■ The CO and Maj Ridland watching the wrestling



■ *The Afghans giving an impressive display of sportsmanship and tradition*

As I look back on all that the Company encountered in Nahr-e Saraj (NES) last summer, I am struck by the enormity of the challenge set, the volatile and dynamic nature of the environment, the huge variety of individual adventures experienced, and the professional and empathetic nature of our dealings with the Afghan people. We achieved much in the six months we were there and, although at times our successes may have seemed small in the context of the overall Afghanistan campaign, they represented positive steps forward along the country's difficult path towards a viable and peaceful future.

For the Company, key to the operational design was suppressing insurgent activity sufficiently over the summer to create the space for Afghan Police development. This, in turn, would enable an enduring and sustainable Afghan security solution in our part of Malgir. As a result of a couple of unique, unforeseen and unavoidable events - namely the defection of Lalai

(an Afghan Local Police (ALP) Commander) to the Taliban, and the detention of an Afghan Policeman following an extra-judicial killing - the tour was one of two distinct halves. The first saw a concentration on local governance and the Afghan National Security Forces, whilst much of the second half was spent fighting and outwitting the insurgents. By the end of the tour, alongside our Afghan partners, we had fought hard and achieved significant success in driving the insurgents and their malign influence away from the people of Torghai and Kunjak. The reward for our collective efforts was an increased level of security which enabled government services, such as the new school in Khorgajat and the health clinic in Paind Kalay, to become accessible to the outlying villages. Local and commercial development activity increased, markets expanded, lines of communication improved, and with the advanced Afghan Police and Army capability, the conditions were set for Transition in Nahr-e Saraj.



■ A patrol from CP Prrang sets off in the midday heat

The significant collective achievements and progress did not come without cost. 24 members of the Company had to return back to the UK early, 10 of them battle casualties. We wish them all a swift recovery. To provide some additional context to the following photographs, it is worth reflecting that by the end of the tour the average Rifleman patrolled around 1,250 kilometres (considerably longer than the length

of the UK) and spent over 1,400 hours (58 days) on sentry duty in a sangar. The Company met the insurgents head on in over 70 IED or small arms fire incidents, the total hours patrolled was in the region of 3,600 and approximately 17,600 litres of bottled water were drunk. We will carry the memories forever.



■ *Crossing the River Helmand*



■ *Maj Ridland with a local national*



NOMINAL ROLL - A COMPANY 3 RIFLES

Rank	Name
<i>Maj</i>	<i>Ridland</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Brown</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Smith</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Yates</i>
<i>2Lt</i>	<i>Shutt</i>
<i>WO2</i>	<i>Pepper</i>
<i>WO2</i>	<i>Sugrue</i>
<i>SSgt</i>	<i>Gallagher</i>
<i>CSgt</i>	<i>Moore</i>
<i>CSjt</i>	<i>Turner</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Carty</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Farnden</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Holbrook-Woodthorpe</i>
<i>Sjt</i>	<i>Lathan</i>
<i>Sjt</i>	<i>Long</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Owen</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Robinson</i>
<i>Sjt</i>	<i>Watson</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Hurst</i>
<i>Bdr</i>	<i>Brennan</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Cook</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Davis</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Evet</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Forsyth</i>
<i>Bdr</i>	<i>Frost</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Jackson</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Jobling</i>
<i>LSgt</i>	<i>Oldham</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Pendall</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Phillips</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Robottom</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Rowe</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Taylor</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Wallace</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>York</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Bowers</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Bell</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Brown</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Brown</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Darko</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Davies</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Davies</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Duffy</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Grant</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Hopkinson</i>

Rank	Name
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Mccallie-Crook</i>
<i>LBdr</i>	<i>Nicholson</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Nicol</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Norman</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Pamflett</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Reynolds</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Reynolds</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Tokalauvere</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Vetanibua</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Wilson</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Wood</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Woolridge</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Atterbury</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Adamson</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Aitken</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Alexander</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Ball</i>
<i>Cfn</i>	<i>Barnes</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Barry</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Batty</i>
<i>Gnr</i>	<i>Beattie</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Beckham</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Birch</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Bond</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Bridgeman</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Buckles</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Buglass</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Burns</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Carr</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Clark</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Cole</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Coop</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Dent</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Dibben</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Dow</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Earnshaw</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Farrell</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Farrell</i>
<i>Pte</i>	<i>Flather</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Foley</i>
<i>Gnr</i>	<i>Forde</i>
<i>Rfn</i>	<i>Fouries</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Fowkes</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Fowkes</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Fredrickson</i>



Rank	Name
Gdsm	Furneaux
Rfn	Gallagher
Rfn	Gurung
Rfn	Haines
Gdsm	Harrison
Gdsm	Harry
Rfn	Hawkins
Gdsm	Hayes
Rfn	Hibbert
Gdsm	Hill
Rfn	Hodgson
Gdsm	Holmes
Gdsm	Hovarth
Gdsm	Husband
Rfn	Jackson
Rfn	Johnson
Rfn	Kaseta
Rfn	Lawrence
Rfn	Lennon
Gdsm	Lownds
Gdsm	Lunn
Pte	Machin
Rfn	Maidenment
Rfn	Martin
Rfn	Mason
Gdsm	Mccash
Rfn	Mccutcheon
Rfn	Mills
Pte	Napier
Rfn	Nealon
Rfn	Neville
Pte	Norris
Rfn	Omalley
Pte	Pattison
Rfn	Preyser
Gdsm	Rees
Rfn	Renowden
Rfn	Riggs
Gdsm	Robinson
Gdsm	Shears
Gdsm	Sheldon
Cfn	Sheldrake
Gdsm	Shine
Rfn	Sledge
Rfn	Smith

Rank	Name
Rfn	Somerset
Rfn	Stevenson
Pte	Steward
Rfn	Sturrock
Rfn	Thorpe
Rfn	Tomlinson
Rfn	Trowsdale
Gdsm	Waller
Gdsm	Warde
Pte	Whitton
Rfn	Wilden
Rfn	Wilkinson
Rfn	Williams
Rfn	Wright
Rfn	York

5 (GIBRALTAR) BATTERY ROYAL ARTILLERY

by Maj R Haines





■ *The Battery flying its Colours*

After re-affiliation during Hybrid Foundation Training, 5 Battery deployed its Tactical Group in support of 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment to Nahr-e Saraj (South) (NES(S)) and its Gun Group alongside 1st Battalion Royal Welsh, located in Patrol Base (PB) Oulette in Combined Force (CF) Burma. Capt Pringle, one of the Battery's Fire Support Team (FST) Commanders, moved at short notice to work with Corunna Company just prior to their advanced deployment on Op HERRICK 16. We were fortunate to have fostered an early relationship with the CF, 3 YORKS' Mortar Platoon and its Mortar Fire Controllers (MFCs) throughout Mission-Specific Training.

Given that our FSTs, individual observers, and gun/mortar lines were dispersed across central Helmand, in common with 3 YORKS, we all shared the challenge of operating and living together in what was a complex and highly challenging tactical environment. Following greater than ever constraints placed on our use of fires (indirect fire support assets) and with no scope for error, every mission risked strategic impact. This placed enormous pressure on our observers and their manoeuvre commanders. Over 2,600 rounds of illumination were employed in support of NES(S). It was also necessary to engage in a wide range of highly technical suppressive and precision fire missions with our Guns and launchers, as



■ It was not always work in PB 2

well as with air and aviation systems. Development of the Afghan National Fires capability was witnessed first hand on Operation QALB 8, with the Battery Commander (BC) in the Commanding Officer's HQ employing illumination in support of multi-national troops on the ground.

The members of the CF Joint Fires Cell in PB2 HQ, located by the end of the tour in a merged NES Fires Cell in Forward Operating Base (FOB) Price, were fully involved at every level, always finding a way to solve any issues in manning, equipment, ISTAR, battle space management and strike assets. At all times they did their utmost to support the teams on the ground. The Joint Fires strikes coordinated by the Battery and CF HQ resulted in approximately 90% of insurgent casualties in the district, all without a single civilian injured or

compound damaged, testament to the professionalism of each individual involved in the targeting chain.

Although our personnel had several near-misses at both the Gun end (with indirect fire common place into PB Oulette) and amongst our observers (the Battery fully involved in the fight alongside the Infantry brethren of CF 3 YORKS) we have left Nahr-e Saraj district in a better place. The Battery has supported 3 YORKS ground manoeuvre throughout (light role and armoured), aviation manoeuvre (UK and US), and delivered air and land fires against insurgent targets. They have employed Joint Fires with skill, confidence and conviction helping to ensure the success of 3 YORKS on Op HERRICK 16.



NOMINAL ROLL

5 (GIBRALTAR) BATTERY ROYAL ARTILLERY

Rank	Name
Maj	Haines
Capt	Burnett
Capt	Clarke
Capt	Pringle
Capt	Foster
Capt	Woods
Capt	Moore-Dutton
Flt Lt	Fowler
Lt	Durant
WO2	Daniels
WO2	Walshaw
SSgt	Porter
SSgt	Wilcox
Sgt	Dine
Sgt	Heath
Sgt	Frew
Sgt	Spriddel
Cpl	Westray
Bdr	Brennan
Bdr	Eugene
Bdr	Hoblyn
Bdr	Mccambley
Bdr	Mcdowall
Bdr	Mackay
Bdr	Kavanagh
Bdr	Victory
LBdr	Asare
LBdr	Carter
LBdr	Campbell
LBdr	Devine
LBdr	English
LBdr	Hollands
LBdr	Knight
LBdr	Maximin
LBdr	Mules
LBdr	Reilly
LBdr	Walsh
LBdr	Thirklell
Gnr	Beattie
Gnr	Bingham
Gnr	Bingham
Gnr	Bissell
Gnr	Bryant
Gnr	Carr
Gnr	Clarke

Rank	Name
Gnr	Charles
Gnr	Davies
Gnr	Dickenson
Gnr	Edwards
Gnr	Everest
Gnr	Forde
Gnr	Foreman
Gnr	Grieg
Gnr	Johnson
Gnr	Joynson
Gnr	Laval
Gnr	Lilly
Gnr	Metcalfe
Gnr	Nicholson
Gnr	Quinn
Gnr	Rai
Gnr	Samuel
Gnr	Sands
Gnr	Shakespeare
Gnr	Webster

8 ARMoured ENGINEER SQUADRON

by Capt A Holmes





■ **Capts Harmes and Docker relax in the sun**

From early 2011, 8 Armoured Engineer Squadron (8 AES) were tasked with providing close engineer support to the 3 YORKS Battlegroup (BG). Through deployments to the British Army Training Unit, Suffield, (BATUS), in both the armoured and light role support, on Mission-Specific Training (MST), to the completion of Op HERRICK 16, the Squadron provided all aspects of military engineering capacity required to enable 3 YORKS, the Combined Force (CF) and Nahr-e Saraj (NES(S)) elements to live, move and fight.

8 AES deployed to Afghanistan in early March 2012, some six weeks before the 3 YORKS BG arrived to take over responsibility of the CF and NES. During the initial stages of the tour 2 Troop, under the command of Capt Anthony Harmes, arrived at Patrol Base (PB) 2 and spent the first few weeks working alongside the outgoing soldiers from the 5 RIFLES BG. A number of tasks were immediately undertaken which allowed everyone to settle into their roles quickly. Range upgrades in PB2, culvert construction outside Check Point (CP) JEKER and the construction, by hand, of a new Sanger in CP Shkar all kept the engineer sections busy and focused for the first few weeks.

After five weeks of tough work and a steep learning curve for our Sappers, the 5 RIFLES BG handed over responsibility for CF NES(S) to the 3 YORKS BG. Engineer work continued at a high tempo throughout this period. One of the major tasks undertaken involved the move of a CP by some 800m. This involved stripping out an existing CP and the simultaneous construction of another in a previously uncontested area of ground. Infantry delivered force protection, Gunner operated ISTAR systems and Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers (REME) vehicle recovery assets all played a vital role in the successful completion of this task. The task underlined the importance of close cooperation between cap badges in the All Arms environment. This task presented several significant challenges such as vehicles becoming trapped in irrigation ditches, collapsed roads preventing delivery of stores to site, difficult local contractors and difficulty in securing Support Helicopter (SH) delivering resources, all of which were overcome by flexibility on the ground and in the CF HQ. Despite these challenges, 2 Troop remained positive and solved the problems it encountered, at one point building 200m of road by hand, in order to allow completion of the task two days ahead of schedule.



■ *Squadron HQ having just returned from patrol*

As part of the transition of authority and responsibility to the local forces, joint International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Brigade Operations were planned and executed. Though they proved challenging due to the language barrier and differing doctrinal approach, it was satisfying to see the local forces conducting large scale and complex operations almost completely independently. During this process 2 Troop provided mobility support in the shape of a US Armoured Bridge Layer, and had Multiples prepared to conduct route upgrades whilst also providing pairs of Sappers carrying explosives to deliver an Assault Breaching capability, if required.

Preparation for the handover of tactical base infrastructure formed a considerable part of our tasking. The majority

of engineer tasks undertaken were CP upgrades and handovers to ANSF force elements or closures of certain locations where they were no longer required. The Battlegroup Engineers (BGEs), Capts Tom Docker and Anthony Harmes, worked closely within CF HQ, planning the infrastructure handover to the ANSF. Ensuring each different element of the ANSF remained content with the final lay down of forces proved a particularly challenging task as certain ANSF leaders wanted different check points for different reasons, whilst occasionally changing their minds in the process. Timely liaison between the Commanding Officer and the heads of the Afghan Police and Army were conducted in order to resolve challenging issues. Despite these difficulties during Op HERRICK 16, seven CPs were handed over to the local forces or closed; a clear indication of progress in the area.

In addition to 2 Troop based in CF NES(S), extensive support was also provided to the BG by 8 AES HQ based in Camp Bastion. The successful resourcing and planning of all engineer tasks was enabled by the hard work and diligent support of the Squadron G4 (logistical element) and Comd elements. Without the timely and reliable delivery of engineer stores to the correct location when needed, the ability of the Sappers in PB2 to conduct tasks would have been severely limited.

Op HERRICK 16 tested and challenged 8 AES to its limits. During our time in PB2 we managed the construction of three roads by local contractors, built elevated expeditionary sangers, installed Hesco force protection measures, constructed shooting ranges, upgraded or built new check points, dug and emptied burns pits, dismantled sangers, installed an impressive shower system in PB2 for Maj Caine, fabricated new toilets and a NAAFI social area, provided mobility support and explosive breaching capability, whilst ensuring all locations were as safe and comfortable as possible. From planning, synchronising, co-ordinating, delivering and executing a plan, challenges covering the whole spectrum of military engineering were encountered and overcome.

Throughout the tour the soldiers from all elements of CF NES(S) provided exceptional levels of protection and support on the ground, allowing our Sappers to complete their work in a secure environment. With its wet and muddy terrain from March to April and its soaring temperatures in June and July, Helmand Province proved a tough location in which to undertake engineer works but, as a Squadron, we were fully-intergrated into the Battlegroup and every man made to feel like a true ‘Duke’.

NOMINAL ROLL
 8 ARMoured ENGINEER
 SQUADRON

Rank	Name
Maj	Stuart
Capt	Brown
Capt	Docker
Capt	Harmes
WO2	Biddulph
SSgt	Williamson
Sgt	Webber
Cpl	Hissey
Cpl	Mackenzie
LCpl	Bacon
LCpl	Gargate
LCpl	Goodacre
LCpl	Keogh
LCpl	Mitchell
LCpl	Morrow
LCpl	Whittall
Spr	Clutton
Spr	Clyne
Spr	Dunn
Spr	Goodwin
Spr	Holgate
Spr	Holloway
Spr	Kilcullen
Spr	Pike
Spr	Purnell
Spr	Rising
Spr	Smith
Spr	Staf
Spr	Stafford
Spr	Stewart
Spr	Witt

MASTIFF GROUP 1 ROYAL TANK REGIMENT

by Capt S Bee





■ *Kandak Comd, CO 3 YORKS and CO 40 Cdo with the Mastiff Group*

The build-up training we completed on a cold, wet, windy Salisbury Plain seemed a million miles away from the hot, arid conditions of Afghanistan. However, it was here that we had our first taste of what we could expect from being in a 3 YORKS Battlegroup (BG). From the off it was obvious that we were going to be among a group of well drilled soldiers, excellent Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and extremely competent subalterns (young officers). Perhaps most reassuring from my perspective was that the Ops and Planning Teams were dynamic and engaging with a keen eye for the detail. In short, I felt my soldiers and I would be in very safe hands. Indeed we were already forging close relationships with certain factions of the BG, which would prove to be very important in the testing environment of Afghanistan.

Upon arriving in theatre we were herded through the Reception Staging Onward Integration (RSOI) package,

all of us eager to finish and deploy to our new home for the next six months in Patrol Base (PB) 2. Little did we know the week that lay ahead was to be shared by our hostile new neighbours! On our first day after completing the take-over we received ICOM chatter warning us of a potential enemy ambush alongside the Nahr-e Bugra (NEB) Canal. The previously Rommel-esque proud standing out of the turret immediately reduced a little when everyone remembered their tank skills. It was not until day six of the tour that the situation became very real. After acting as the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for the entire day in the energy sapping heat we were suddenly required to pick up detainees that Burma Company had detained. En route, we took the first small arms round of the tour, which was a single shot engagement against my most inexperienced commander, who dealt with the situation admirably. We got to within just 400 metres of the detainees when Sgt Bathgate's vehicle struck an IED. In an instant all of our training



■ Mastiffs on patrol in the dashte



■ CO's Tac and BC with Afghan partners on Op DAAS 2c.

had become reality and it served to show me just how well prepared the training exercises had left us; we all instantly slotted into our individual roles. Whilst I reported on the net and found out the state of the crew, Cpl Boyd (in my rear vehicle) was busy identifying secondary firing points and hazards, Cpl Stuart was readying his crew to clear a safe lane to the rear of the stricken vehicle and the Ops Room Team under Capt Hammond and WO2 Roper had swung more ISTAR assets onto the area than I can list. Luckily everyone was okay but it gave everyone the warm feeling that if this tour was to continue in the same vein then we had a great team behind us who could deal with any situation.

Thankfully the rest of the tour was not like that and as a Mastiff Group our tour consisted of hard work and long hours on the ground but incidents such as those above were not everyday occurrences and when they did occur we were fortunate enough to have had the superb Mastiff vehicle to protect us. Indeed, our collective hats go off to the 3 YORKS and Welsh Guards Infantry within the BG who undoubtedly had a tougher deal than us in terms of physical exertion on the ground. We always tried to make life as easy and as comfortable as possible for them whenever we could, forging some close relationships in the process, particularly with Burma Coy, with whom we shared the PB. I would also like to take this opportunity to formally recognise all of the hard work which the Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers (REME) Light Aid Detachment (LAD) put in, often alongside our crews on their vehicles, working late into the night to ensure they were serviceable for the next day.

Finally, whilst we were fortunate enough to bring back the Troop relatively unscathed, some others were not so lucky and we will always remember our fallen brothers in arms on Op HERRICK 16 and those seriously injured. We will remember them.

KANDAK ADVISORY TEAM (KAT)

by Maj H Jellard





■ Advisor 20 on Op HERRICK 16

The Kandak (Afghan Battalion) Advisory Team (KAT), Call Sign Advisor 20, was responsible for advising 2/3/215 Kandak in Nahr-e Saraj South (NES (S)) and in Nad Ali (NDA) at Patrol Base 2 (PB2) alongside the 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment Battlegroup (BG). Advisor 20 consisted of 5 Tolay (Afghan Company) Advisory Teams (TATs), with two TATs located within NES (S). The KAT was led by Maj H Jellard, the Officer Commanding the FSP Company, the second in command, Capt Foster Vander Elst, and the Serjeant Major, WO2 Thomas. Rounding off the team of Advisors were a multitude of trades; Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Engineers, Royal Logistics Corps, Intelligence Corps and Royal Artillery, each responsible for advising their own

Afghan Nation Army (ANA) staff branch and forever being persecuted by the Serjeant Major for not being in 3 RIFLES. This conglomerate of cap badges and trades epitomised the “Team of Teams” approach of the BG.

The mission of Advisor 20 was to mentor, advise and train the ANA, guiding and influencing their development to ensure that the 2nd Kandak are a leading force to secure the future security of NES (S), particularly the security of the Nahr-e Bughra (NEB) Canal.

Leading Advisor 22 was Lt James Reaney and WO2 Watson. Both effectively advised the 2nd Tolay at PB1 alongside Alma Company providing in depth counter-IED training, Infantry skills, Medical training and



■ Lt Col Nizamudin delivering orders

followed up with constant patrolling into the Mary Dashte alongside other ISAF forces. Their advising culminated in the ANA independently planning and executing Tolay level operations, a huge development for the 2nd Tolay.

Heading up Advisor 25 at PB 2 was a humble Ghurkha called Capt Rai who developed an instant rapport with the Heavy Weapons (HW) Tolay, in particular the Commander Rahmat Jan. He was supported by Colour Sgt Dave George, who had endless amounts of staff work due to his constant e-blueys from his fiancée. Weekly weapons training, counter-IED training and Infantry

skills training further strengthened the HW Tolay capability. Both Capt Rai and Colour Serjeant George patrolled alongside the HW Tolay around PB 2. Special thanks must go to Burma Company who constantly offered up Force Protection Multiples, which enabled advisors to carry out their role. Their advice and support made the tour go very smoothly.

The HQ element of Advisor 20 advised the staff branches of the 2nd Kandak, and deployed on Brigade/Kandak level operations into the Bowri Dashte, the Upper Gereskh Valley and Yakchal. Maj H Jellard advised Lt Col Nizamudin several times a day, helping him to plan



■ Capt Rai with members of the Heavy Weapons Tolay

and execute operations. The role required the KAT to remain with Lt Col Nizamudin at all times so all the staff advisors frequently found themselves on the ground conducting dismounted patrols slightly outside their comfort zones. Mobility across the battlefield was critical, especially with the temperamental Husky vehicles. This mobility was provided by highly experienced drivers as well as the two REME mechanics, Corporal Bidgood and Corporal Cox, who successfully kept the Huskies in roadworthy condition. The technical knowledge baffled most individuals in the KAT; however they enabled Advisor 20 to constantly be on 40 minutes Notice to Move (NTM). Back at PB 2, and between major

operations, successful training courses and daily advising took place. Medical training, counter-IED training, signals training and intelligence training all continually enhanced the capability of the 2nd Kandak.

WO2 Willoughby and Lance Corporal 'Big Ron' Ashcroft led the development of the 2nd Kandak's Explosive Hazard Reduction Teams (EHRT) at PB2. This capability was soon tested after the students graduated, resulting in ANA operators defusing several IEDs on consecutive days, making the operator a Thursday night celebrity.



■ *The 2nd Kandak on parade awaiting the Afghan Brigade Commander*

Corporal Bex led with the development of the 2nd Kandak Medical Centre and the forming of structured sick parades. The ANA always waited for Corporal Bex to turn up, and commented that they missed him when he was unable to attend their sick parades. Intelligence courses run by Lance Corporal Kiernander helped develop what was a non-existent intelligence function into a further developing capability. They were particularly fond of the Dari linguist attached to the KAT, SAC(T) Barker, who built good relations with the Kandak Intelligence Sergeants due to his well groomed eyebrows. As the KAT prepared to hand over to 1 SCOTs, it reflected on what had been a successful six months, with success in counter-IED and medical

training being of particular note. All advisors established strong relationships with the ANA, based on mutual respect and friendship, which no doubt continued through Op HERRICK 17 with 1 SCOTs.

Many thanks must go to 3 YORKS who enabled Advisor 20 to conduct their mentoring and advising, ever ready to provide force protection and engage with the ANA. The ANA are very fond of 3 YORKS and their professionalism shown throughout Op HERRICK 16 and it is fitting that they were the last partnered force before progressing to a fully independent Kandak.



■ Lt Col Nizamudin alongside Maj Jellard

AFGHAN UNIFORMED POLICE MENTORING TEAM

by Lt M W S Dobson





■ *The high crops made situational awareness difficult*

Paind Kalay Police station was located 600 m to the East of Patrol Base (PB) 2 in Nahr-e Saraj (South) (NES(S)), home to the Headquarters of the 2nd Tolay (Malgir) Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) and their commander Mohammed Wali (TMW). Based in a corner of the police compound was a small detachment of the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards (Call Sign Silicon 26). This consisted of the Operational Co-Ordination Centre (OCC) and the Police Advisory Team (PAT). The OCC was responsible for several key areas: the institutional and tactical development of the AUP in Malgir, and the

co-ordination of AUP and Combined Force assets. This development was achieved by mentoring TMW and his key staff, as well as delivering sustainment training to the 10 Check Points in the Malgir Area of Operation (AO). The OCC was directly responsible for the development of TMW, whilst the Police Advisory Team (PAT) provided sustainment training to all the CPs as well as security for the ISAF corner of the Police Station. Development of the CPs frequently took the form of the two attached Royal Military Police Corporals teaching lessons, ranging from detainee handling to vehicle searches to basic patrol



■ Grudge matches were a regular fixture between ISAF and the AUP



■ Partnered patrolling



■ *Members of the AUP with one of the specialised Humvees*

skills. Each CP Commander was encouraged to use their own Non-Commissioned Officers to teach these lessons with the PAT's supervision. More often than not there was a certain amount of reluctance to do this.

The OCC was also responsible for monitoring and mentoring the S1 through to S7 (all military functional areas) chain, whether the AUP had problems with radios or they were missing pieces of kit for the winter, the specific mentors endeavoured to help them with these problems. Not an easy challenge as kit and equipment had to be provided by the AUP chain of command, with very limited resources this was made a very difficult job. The OCC also liaised with the ground holding companies when they required AUP for deliberate operations. This

meant that AUP patrolmen could be tasked through their own chain of command, rather than informing their chain of command that they were going on patrol with an ISAF call sign. Allowing these decisions to come from Tolay Headquarters and TMW meant that the AUP began to take more ownership of their job, rather than relying so heavily on ISAF.

As the tour progressed the PAT continued to develop the 10 CPs throughout the AO, whilst at the same time the OCC closed down, and those responsibilities moved to Gereshk. The PAT continued to live at Paind Kalay and, with the help of a 3 YORKS liaison officer, took on more of a mentoring role. This saw the PAT deploy with TMW and the majority of his Tolay on Multiple



■ **Afghan Planning.** AUP Comds brief the CO on a 'green zone' clearance operation.

Company minus level clearance operations in the more rural Kalays in NES(S). The period of Ramadan provided a significant roadblock in terms of AUP development as their appetite for learning and conducting any form of policing was understandably suppressed. Post Ramadan had seen the AUP take a step back and slowly slip into their old ways, so the last eight weeks of the tour were spent encouraging them back out of their shells.

The PAT and OCC saw a number of different faces move through the Police Station, with the closure of the OCC, the demands an R&R plot places on a small team and the introduction of seven soldiers from 3 YORKS to meet the mandate pushed out by Brigade, as well as regular visits from the Commanding Officer 3 YORKS to see TMW, the police station was a hive of activity. Many an evening was spent with TMW and his policemen watching the awful Indian soap operas and drinking chai. Although

not a kinetic tour by any stretch of the imagination, it was a very frustrating one at times, yet when it all came together, very rewarding. TMW was a character who would have violent mood swings, if he was not in the mood to send his men on a patrol, or did not want to hold a Shura, then he would not. Gently persuading and coaxing him in the right direction without over-stepping the mark was a difficult task in itself. Nothing would happen in the Tolay without his say so, which was a great hindrance at times, but it did mean that the AUP chain of command was employed.

The PAT and OCC worked very closely with the 3 YORKS Battlegroup, with us eventually moving into PB 2 with them and working as an Advisor Team Enabling Company (ATEC) with BURMA Company. We were incredibly well looked after and it was a pleasure to work with them.



NOMINAL ROLL

AFGHAN UNIFORMED POLICE MENTORING TEAM

Rank	Name
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Davies</i>
<i>Capt</i>	<i>Major</i>
<i>Lt</i>	<i>Dobson</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Connibear</i>
<i>Sgt</i>	<i>Trebarne</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Bell</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Jones</i>
<i>Cpl</i>	<i>Prewitt</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Austin</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Chard</i>
<i>LCpl</i>	<i>Lucas</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Cole</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Jones 74</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Moyo</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Retallick</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Rhisiarts</i>
<i>Gdsm</i>	<i>Woosnam</i>

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE (ALP)

by Capt I D Martin





■ Morning parade during the initial ALP training course

On 16 Aug 2010 the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MoI) formed the Afghan Local Police by Presidential Decree. This was an initiative to establish a force of up to 10,000 civilian 'guardians' in selected districts across Afghanistan.

The ALP initiative seeks to increase governance and development by being the face of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) at the rural level. In essence, the ALP initiative is a GIROA-led village-focussed defence programme. It aims to provide local security, mainly in the rural areas, within the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) bubble, where ANSF are present but in insufficient numbers to achieve full security. It is a key element of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counter insurgency (COIN) strategy and serves as a tool to expand the number of counter-insurgents. At the same time, as mentioned above, it aims to promote local governance and increase support for GIROA. The ALP, due to their local nature, when employed correctly are ISAF's best weapon for denying freedom of movement to the insurgents (INS). No one knows the ground better than the ALP and no one understands the complexities of who is who, who is local and the Human Terrain like the ALP.

The ALP are mostly illiterate with almost no formal educational experience, they are aged between 16 and 65. They joined variously because they were told to, because it was the only job opportunity, or because they hated the Taliban and were proud to fight against them for their country. Their commanders have an enormous influence on them and it is common that if a commander is lost then the remainder will leave. When genuinely local, they whole-heartedly want to protect their village and often prove exceptionally brave in doing so. Drug abuse in various forms does exist but was pretty much eradicated in NES(S). Whilst rarely overweight most are not, by our standards, physically fit.

ALP Commanders are generally no better educated but they have the ability to command and lead. Mostly this is due to their family ties and connections or down to respect earned from previous fighting in various militias. They take on the job, with all its associated personal risk, to gain an advantage in money or influence whilst at the same time maintaining a genuine desire to do the right thing for the local people.

The ALP received a basic three-week training course, which was run by Capt Martin (OC ALP) and Sjt



■ *Sjt Gibbons teaching weapon drills at the ranges*

Gibbons (2ic ALP). For these courses, of which two were run in NES(S) on HERRICK16 and a third started, two interpreters and two Brecon qualified Corporals from the Company, whose Area of Operations (AO) the ALP were going into, supplemented the training team. This helped to develop a bond and ensured that the ALP would see a familiar face when they occupied their Check Point (CP). These courses formed some of the highlights of the tour and involved a week of blue policing skills, a week of green Infantry skills and a live firing range week. Subject matter experts were used to deliver lessons such as CIED (counter-IED), first aid, vehicle maintenance and detention. Upon graduating the ALP were issued an AK47 personal weapon system with 100 rounds, 4 magazines and one set of ALP Uniform. For the CPs the ALP would also get a Ranger (on a ratio of 1:15 ALP), Motorbikes (1:6), a PKM (medium machine gun) (1:6)

and ICOM radios (1:6). On top of this the CF would throw in such things as cooking pots and utensils, glasses, bowls, mattresses and blankets.

5 RIFLES had done an outstanding job in establishing the ALP in NES(S) and had five ALP CPs up and running, with 33 ALP trained. Out of these five CPs, four were partnered with ISAF and one was independent. The aim on HERRICK 16 was to localise the ALP and bring them up to full manning within NES(S), which was up to 60 pax. The goal then was to get the ALP registered with the Ministry of Interior (MoI), which ran the ALP programme. This was important in many ways as it tied the ALP to the Government, and meant that the ALP were paid by GIROA and supplied by GIROA. If the ALP were not registered with the Government then a US Pay Team would come in every month to pay them.



■ Cpl Shaw teaching the ALP patrol techniques



■ *Linking the AUP to the ALP was key*

This caused issues as MoI pay and US pay differed due to both paying at the end of their respective calendar months, Islamic and Western. This gap, which widened throughout the tour, caused issues as some ALP were paid earlier than others. The acquisition of kit was also hard when the ALP were not registered with GIROA which again caused problems.

By the end of our tour the CF had trained 29 ALP and registered 34 with GIROA, meaning that 48 out of the now 54 ALP were accounted for, equipped and paid by the Government. Their capability was improved through the issuing of extra PKMs, ALP Rangers, and motorbikes. The ALP logistical chain had been improved greatly as the CF empowered the Afghan logistical chain

of command. The CF had handed over two partnered CPs to the ALP, leaving three independent ALP CPs, and had transferred the responsibility of initial training to the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). This was a particularly big step as it was binding the ALP from the start to the AUP, the District Chief of Police (DCoP) and GIROA. On leaving, there were 16 ALP being trained at the District Police Headquarters (DPHQ) in Gereshk, filling our allocation of 60 pax. The ALP had also become truly local which meant that the locals in the areas they operated in accepted them and the ALP knew the intimate details of each village. All of this did not happen smoothly though and there were some major setbacks along the way.

The first setback came the night before training was to commence for 10 potential ALP, on 03 Jun 2012, who were to go into a new CP. The ALP Commander of this CP was involved in a motorbike accident and was brought to PB2 following the incident but sadly died. This put back training by three weeks as it meant that a new commander and nine new men had to be found. This whole process is more complicated than it may seem as each ALP member can only be trained when he has the sponsorship from the prominent village elders and District Community Council members. Once this was achieved the course was run and the ALP graduated and then occupied the CP, joining their ISAF partners.

The CFs second major setback was a big one and a very complex situation incorporating land and tribal disputes. One of the ALP Rangers was involved in an IED strike on 15 Jul 2012, killing an AUP commander who was travelling in the vehicle along with some of the ALP. In the aftermath this commander's brother, also in the AUP, shot the man they believed was responsible in front of the ISAF soldiers who were treating the casualties. This, naturally, brought a lot of attention to the incident and the area. The AUP from Lashkar Gah came down and were looking for the perpetrator to arrest him along with others who were involved. The ALP commander of the local area, who had been investigated numerous



■ Sgt Gibbons enjoying a cup of Chai with the ALP



■ A 'Team of Teams', working together towards a better future

times and who had enemies within the AUP from the Districts bordering ours over land and tribal disputes, fled the following day with 3 other ALP, 5 x AKs and 1 x PKM. Later that day the CF received a phone call stating that he had joined the insurgency. The remaining 16 ALP who were under his command were removed from their position and their kit, equipment and weapons were collected in by the AUP. All of a sudden two ALP CPs were lost and, more importantly, there was a loss of confidence from the ALP sponsors in the ALP. This was

further compounded by the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) holding the ALP sponsors responsible and had a real impact on the CFs ability to reinstate new ALP in that area. This was a problem that endured and was only resolved at the end of Op HERRICK 16, with 16 of those left in training finally going back into that area once they graduated.

The third setback came on 03 Aug 2012. One of the ALP Troopers was walking home, in broad daylight, when

he was attacked by insurgents and brutally murdered. This shook up the ALP and required some good reassurance by the partnering callsign. This was extremely upsetting as the Trooper they had killed was a really strong member of the ALP who had impressed greatly throughout training and had continued to perform well whilst at the CP. Their resolve and determination to continue the fight against the insurgency was impressive and represented the bravery that the ALP showed throughout the tour.

Finally, the saddest and biggest incident of the tour came when one of the men we trained on HERRICK 16, who had been vetted by the ANSF, and who was liked by all turned and killed two 3 YORKS personnel, resulting in his own death, in one of the joint ISAF/ALP CPs on 15 Sept 2012. The men killed were Sgt Thursby and Pte Wroe, both great men who were a huge loss to their CP, their Company and the CF. This Green on Blue attack was totally unexpected. It threatened to derail the ALP programme within NES(S) but luckily the actions on the ground from all of those involved and the immediate actions of the CF HQ prevented this.

The ALP programme survived these setbacks and came out of it at the end of the tour in a much better position than at the start. It was quite a journey to get to where the CF did, with many bumps along the way, but at the end of it and with hindsight it was an incredibly interesting, at times highly frustrating, and rewarding experience. The relationships that were built up with the ALP and AUP Chain of Command meant that we were always on the move and had links and connections at various levels within the ANSF.

The ALP impressed us immensely during the two training courses that were run, what was seen of them on the ground and what was reported up from the mentoring callsigns. Their enthusiasm and basic skills were admirable and when they got into their respective CPs they added real value on the ground.

The CF witnessed how much the ALP improved in a relatively short space of time and one can only hope that this trend continued on HERRICK 17. The ALP are a force for good who, when invested in and used correctly, have a massive impact in their respective area. Connecting the ALP to GIRoA and getting GIRoA

to invest in them is absolutely key to enable transition that is both sustainable and viable. Creating the link between the ALP and the AUP draws them away from ISAF dependence and reinforces the concept of them working for a wider organisation. An organisation that incorporates the Afghan National Army (ANA), the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the AUP and the ALP. This was achieved on Op HERRICK 16 in NES(S) but it is a process that requires constant reinforcement and investment.

PHOTO MONTAGE OF BATTLEGROUP







Photo Montage of Battlegroup









Photo Montage of Battlegroup













Photo Montage of Battlegroup















A TECHNICAL OVERVIEW



Browning Pistol L9A1

The 9-mm Browning L9A1 is the general issue pistol for self-defence. The Browning is a self-loading pistol using the standard NATO 9-mm round. It has been in service since 1954 and has proven to be a reliable, accurate and robust weapon.



P226 SIG Pistol (L105A1, L105A2 and L106A1)

Variants of the P226 SIG Sauer pistol were procured as a replacement for the Browning pistol in some units and as an urgent operational requirement for use in Afghanistan.



Rifle 5.56 L85A2

The SA80 individual weapon system is from a British family of small arms rifles. It is a selective fire, magazine fed, gas-operated 5.56x45-mm assault rifle.



Sharpshooter Rifle (L129A1)

The L129A1 7.62x51-mm calibre, longer range (800 metres), semi-automatic rifle, replaced the bolt action Accuracy International L96 in the Sharpshooter role. 400 Sharpshooter rifles were bought as an urgent operational requirement.



Combat Shotgun (L128A1)

The Combat Shotgun is a semi-automatic, tubular magazine fed weapon, chambered for the 12 gauge cartridge. It has a capacity of eight rounds and a maximum effective range of 110 metres for solid shot and 40 metres for buckshot.



Minimi Light Machine Gun (L110A1)

The Minimi Light Machine Gun (LMG) is issued to the Infantry and some other units to improve their firepower over that provided by the L85 and L86. It is a 5.56x45-mm NATO calibre belt-fed machine gun. It is used primarily with its bipod to provide a level of sustained fire not possible with the LSW with its 30-round magazine.



General-Purpose Machine Gun (L7A2)

Often referred to as the 'gimpy' (GPMG), it can be fired from a bipod in the light role up to 800 metres or from a tripod in the Sustained Fire (SF) role up to 2,400 metres. It can also be attached to a variety of vehicles.



Heavy Machine Gun (L2A1)

The L2 Heavy Machine Gun (HMG) of the British Army is a version of the M2 Browning. It is a 12.7x99-mm NATO (.50 BMG) calibre weapon. It can be mounted on a tripod or on pedestal mounts on vehicles and is effective up to 2,200 metres.




Heckler & Koch 40-mm Grenade Machine Gun

The Heckler & Koch 40-mm Grenade Machine Gun (GMG) provides a high rate of fire combined with the fragmentation effect of a mortar. The GMG is usually mounted on a Jackal Mobility Weapon-Mounted Installation Kit (MWMIK) vehicles but can also be used from tripods and is effective up to 2,200 metres.



60-mm Mortar (M6-895)

The 60-mm Mortar can be fired in both the direct and indirect roles at a rate of 1–12 rounds a minute and can be operated in the hand-held mode. The 60-mm Mortar was procured as an urgent operational requirement to replace the 51-mm Mortar on current operations.



81-mm Mortar (L16)

The L16A2 81-mm mortar is a medium calibre weapon which is operated by a three-man team. It is often vehicle-borne.



FGM-148 Javelin

The FGM-148 Javelin is a US-made, man-portable, fire-and-forget anti-tank missile.



Light Anti-Structures Missile (L72A9)

Originally designated as the "Rocket 66-mm HEAT L1A1" M72 Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW), it has been replaced in the anti-tank role but has been modified for structural demolition purposes. The main difference is the warhead, the Light Anti-Structures Missile (LASM) contains about one kilogramme of an enhanced blast explosive, whereas the LAW contains about a third of a kilogramme.



Mk 7 Helmet

The Mk 7 helmet was introduced in June 2009 as an urgent operational requirement. It offers the same ballistic protection as the Mk 6A helmet, but its new shape allows a soldier to lie flat and shoot straight without the rear rim digging into his body armour and tipping the front rim over his eyes.



Osprey Body Armour

Since 2006 troops in Afghanistan have been issued with Osprey body armour. The newer 'Osprey Assault' body armour, provides the same ballistic protection, while improving the comfort of personnel on operations. It has the same stopping power as the current body armour but is closer fitting, less bulky and is easier to move in. It was specifically developed to meet the British Army's requirements.



Warrior

The Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) has the speed and performance to keep up with the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank over the most difficult terrain and the firepower and armour to support Infantry in the assault.



Jackal

The Jackal 4x4 wheel-drive is used for reconnaissance, rapid assault, fire support and convoy protection, whilst the Coyote (70 in service), a larger 6x6 wheeldrive variant, is used as a tactical support vehicle.



Mastiff

Mastiff (359 in service) is the 6x6 wheel-drive Infantry fighting vehicle variant of the Cougar vehicle. Wolfhound (125 in service) is an armoured tactical support variant of the Mastiff. It has a larger load-carrying ability, and will mainly operate in the logistical role, moving ammunition for light guns, or carrying bulky stores.



Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System

The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), nicknamed the '70Km Sniper', provides pinpoint accuracy delivering a 200lb high explosive warhead to its target, with twice the range of other artillery systems used by the British Army.



Husky

The Husky is an armoured tactical support vehicle providing commanders with a highly mobile and flexible load-carrying vehicle. It is equipped with a machine gun.



Warthog

Warthog is the British Army version of the ST Kinetics Bronco All Terrain Tracked Carrier (ATTC). It has added payload capacity and heavier protection. Purchased for urgent service in Afghanistan.



Apache

The Apache attack helicopter can operate in all weathers, day or night, and detect, classify and prioritise up to 256 potential targets in a matter of seconds. It carries a mix of weapons including rockets, Hellfire missiles and a 30-mm chain gun, as well as a state of the art fully-intergrated defensive aid suite.



Lynx Mk 9A

It is predominantly a battlefield utility helicopter although it has been used for anti-tank, reconnaissance and escort operations. The addition of an Aviation Crewman has allowed Lynx to operate in the very close air support role in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Boeing CH-47 Chinook

American twin-engine, tandem rotor heavy-lift helicopter. Its primary roles are troop movement, artillery emplacement and battlefield resupply.



Tornado GR4

The mainstay of the offensive support fleet is the Tornado GR4s.

These supersonic aircraft can carry a wide range of weaponry, including Storm Shadow cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs and the ALARM anti-radar missile.



Hercules C 130

Shorter range, tactical-airlift transport is provided by the Hercules. The fleet includes both older C-130K (Hercules C1/C3) and newer C-130J (Hercules C4/C5) variants.



Watchkeeper WK450

The Watchkeeper WK450 is an advanced ISTAR UAV with twin payloads that can operate in all weathers and can take off and land automatically.



Desert Hawk

Desert Hawk is a Mini Unmanned Air Vehicle (MUAV). It provides day and night coverage and has an extremely good record proven by supporting both 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade in Afghanistan.



■ Aerial view of NES(S) from a Chinook

HERRICK REFLECTIONS

by Sgt McConnell





■ Amber 50 Op HERRICK 7

Afghanistan has changed beyond recognition over my three tours. From the extremely kinetic groundbreaking tour of Op HERRICK 7, through Op HERRICK 10 to the relative calmness of Op HERRICK 16, these thoughts and reflections are of Sgt McConnell, Pl Sgt and Check Point (CP) 2ic in 3 YORKS.

Over the years Afghanistan has certainly changed and for all the right reasons. Without doubt the country is pulling itself together. I deployed on HERRICK 7 in the October of 2007 with 2 YORKS. Our Mission-Specific Training (MST) had gone well and this had put us in the right frame of mind for the task we were taking on. We were deploying as part of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) working alongside the ever growing Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in small groups of 7-10 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers with 30-40 ANSF. We moved

to a small CP south of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Arnhem in the Green Zone (GZ) of Helmand Province to meet our Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts. We had had lectures on counter insurgency (COIN) but it was not until we got onto the ground that we really understood and appreciated how important COIN was. Two of the main principles for me and my soldiers were unity of effort and securing the population. We simply had to develop a common bond in order to get to know them, who they were, where they had come from, where their family lived, what made them happy/sad and who were the real commanders and not just those wearing the rank. We needed to build trust and understanding. What impressed me most about the ANSF was how resourceful they were. 97% of them were doing it for their country and they wanted to make a difference, make the country safer, and a better place for their children to grow up.



■ A bird's eye view

Building empathy and rapport from day one was always my main effort, not just with the ANSF but with the Local Nationals (LN), particularly on the streets of the District Centre (DC) in MUSA QALA. The biggest ground operation of recent times was the re-taking of MUSA QALA by the ANSF in the winter of 2007. Shown on the news worldwide, the raising of the Afghan flag in the DC was seen all over the world and was truly a historic event. Although ISAF played a huge part in Op SNAKEBITE, it was the ANA who rightly placed the flag high and proud in the centre of the town. The whole operation was jointly planned by ANSF and ISAF, showing a unified team and one which was working together from the boots on the ground to the joint planning and co-ordination in the operations room.

Securing MUSA QALA quickly allowed the LN to return to their homes and within hours of ANSF/ISAF troops securing the DC they started to return. By the time I had left for my rest and recuperation (R&R, a two week return to the UK) in the new year of 07/08 thousands of locals had returned to the town. Shops and markets were being used daily and children were once again playing on the streets of the DC. Hearts and minds projects were being implemented all over the town, i.e. schools and mosques were re-built after being destroyed by the Taliban during their ruthless rule over the town. Local Nationals of all ages were clearly happy that they had their town back and were free to go about their daily life. The population had been secured, we had the support of the Local Nationals and Musa Qala was free again.

From the streets of Musa Qala and post R&R I returned to Afghanistan and deployed to the remote Kajaki Dam Area of Operations (AO). In Kajaki we settled down to a new AO and new team of ANA. The Kajaki AO was totally different to that of Musa Qala: it was a hugely kinetic AO with empty streets and very few LN, those that stayed behind were simply too old to leave. It was in Kajaki that the realisation of how inexperienced the ANA were and how much they relied on ISAF became apparent, in getting from A to B, and in how to protect themselves and others, particularly in a contact situation. Their battlefield situational awareness was non-existent and they were hesitant to move from the protective umbrella that ISAF provided them. My first priority was again to build on trust, particularly during patrols. This helped us understand the ANA and how they worked. We spent a lot of time once again drinking chai and building a relationship with our Afghan brothers and soon enough we were able to conduct basic but effective patrolling techniques such as hand signals and actions on. This was taught practically and revised, along with weapon training, IED training and the Afghan favourite of medical training. Training was organised between myself and the ANA commander and it was not long before the ANA in turn were teaching us their weapon systems and inviting us to play volleyball (at which they had great delight in smashing us every time) and drinking more chai. The partnership we forged with our ANA in Kajaki was outstanding; we trusted them and they trusted us. The training became easier and more frequent and their interest and eagerness to learn was typical of that of a unified team working in the hardest of conditions to achieve success.

The Afghanistan Uniform Police (AUP) was, on the other hand, a totally different kettle of fish. Although we did not have many dealings with the AUP they did man Check Points (CPs) along the main routes in the KAJAKI AO. They were typically unprofessional and many were corrupt, taxing LN who used the routes on a daily basis. It was the AUP who gave the ANSF a bad name and were not as respected by the locals as the ANA were. They worked more independently and were caught on regular occasions using drugs and incapable of manning their CPs. As a result they jeopardised the success we were having with the ANA and placed both our lives and their own in enormous danger. Op HERRICK 10 was, for us, an unexpected deployment to Afghanistan; we were given

very short notice. We were in our training cycle for our up and coming deployment to Iraq but were re-tasked and Burma Company 3 YORKS were told to provide 100 plus soldiers as Battlefield Casualty Replacements (BCRs) for the Op HERRICK 10 Battlegroups. Op PANCHI PALANG was drawing to an end, which had seen large areas of the GZ cleared of Taliban fighters and IEDs; this had resulted in a high number of casualties which needed to be replaced in order to allow ANSF/ISAF troops to hold and dominate ground previously held by the insurgents. We were a much welcomed boost and were inserted to reinforce Companies in various areas of the GZ in the Babaji/Nahr-e Saraj (S) district AO.

The hard work had undoubtedly been done during the operation and we were now tasked with securing the population. COIN again was to play a huge part in my Multiple's patrolling techniques. I knew 'the people were the prize' and after all, we wanted to provide peace and security and a better lifestyle, particularly for the younger generation of the Afghan population. We had to get amongst the locals, listen to them, talk to them and understand who they were. We ensured that we treated them with respect and dignity in order to gain and maintain popular support. This involved lots of patrols, meetings with local elders and key people within the AO, all the while drinking lots more chai. It was once again clear to see that the majority of the locals were pro ISAF and supportive of the ANSF. You could feel that the insurgent was never too far away, particularly when there was a change in the atmospherics and a once chatty person would ashamedly ignore you and walk on by, again something which initially was hard for my soldiers to understand. We moved around a lot during Op HERRICK 10 and finally settled in compounds approximately 800m south of Patrol Base (PB) 1. I quickly got to know my AO and the LN's who lived in the villages of CHAR KUTSA, ENEZY, AKHONZADA and MASIZAI and was on first name terms with the key elders in those areas.

I once again was partnered with the ANA who were living in compounds adjacent to PB1 and quickly formed a strong relationship with the ANA Commander known as 'Bobby Dazzler'! Again the partnered patrols were tough going to begin with, but once mutual respect had been formed and a main effort agreed, Bobby Dazzler briefed his men and the partnership went from strength



■ **Backloading stores**

to strength. We would do joint planning and patrolling and although the Afghan way was not always the smartest way, we would make it work, with understanding and trust, with the main effort of securing the population in order to bring peace and security to a once troubled AO. The ANA would routinely patrol down to our CP to conduct patrols. Again this was all down to the respect we had for each other and having the ANA initiate patrols with us was a huge stepping stone in our ability to partner with the ANA.

Contacts during our tour of Op HERRICK 10 were very infrequent and only happened on a handful of occasions and normally were aimed at other friendly forces call signs, mainly when they would push down to the south-west into the areas of AKHONZADA and DACTRAN where the LN's were not all supporters of ANSF/ISAF. The elders in particular had seen and heard it all before, foreign fighters in their country, promising the same things, peace, security and better futures for their children and families. Whilst I understand you should not promise things to the LN's, small hearts and minds victories are essential in gaining trust and respect and when you deliver that small wind-up radio or fleece blanket you find the LN's are more willing to communicate with you, they become friends and will undoubtedly look out for you and tell you where not to go and give information on insurgent activity.

We moved into what is now called CP KINGSHILL for the final two months of our tour and our relationship continued to build with the LN and with the ANA. When we left, Bobby Dazzler laid on an excellent feast for me and my soldiers which was cooked and prepared by his soldiers, again a true reflection of the relationship and respect we had gained from the ANA and friendships that had been built with our Afghan brothers. During Op HERRICK 10 the Battlegroup had definitely started preparing for the long term. Inevitably some CPs had to be moved for long term tactical reasons and planning. We were however holding ground, providing sustained security and dominating areas previously dominated by the Insurgent who was continuing to be neutralised within boundaries. CPs became established, PBs remained permanent locations and the understanding of the human terrain and those who lived there were all routes to success.

Our pre-deployment training for Op HERRICK 16 was excellent. It continued to improve, as had the kit and equipment we deployed with into theatre. I still believe the key skills we learnt in conventional training when commanders go through Section Commanders Battle Course (SCBC) and Platoon Sergeants Battle Course (PSBC) provide the basis of everything we should be doing in Afghanistan. The principles of patrolling at all levels are life saving drills and are a deterrent to a dogged enemy. By putting yourself constantly in the enemy's shoes and asking yourself, if I were the insurgent where

and how would I attack ANSF/ISAF, you will always be one step ahead of the insurgent or, at the very least, be prepared for what he has to throw at you. LN's are now even more on-side, particularly in areas where ANSF/ISAF dominate the ground. We know what the pattern of life should be like in particular areas and at what time of day. We understand the human terrain in our AO, who the key locals are, where they live, who their children are and what they do for a living. The locals know us by nicknames, as do the children, and vice versa. The locals, on more than one occasion, have gone out of their way to inform us of the whereabouts of IEDs in the area and Casual Contacts/Informants (CASCONs) are key to letting us know of insurgent activity both in our AO and cross boundary. Our partnering and understanding of our Afghan brothers must remain key to the success of the ISAF mission. Our ability to build relationships with the ANSF has encouraged them to help and understand ISAF. Their knowledge and understanding of the ground atmospherics and pattern of life linked with the support partnering/mentoring ensures we are continuing to head towards transition within all areas of Afghanistan. So where did we sit following Op HERRICK 16, and five years after my first tour with little over a year before combat troops withdraw from Afghanistan?

Over the years the British Army has had huge amounts of experience when it comes to COIN. Afghanistan is a hugely diverse country with lots of cultural differences and political issues and many international forces, including ours, have got it wrong in the past. We are now getting it right in so many ways. The ANA is getting bigger and stronger and are planning and executing their own operations in order to defeat the insurgency. The AUP is becoming less corrupt and with the help of the recently formed Afghan Local Police (ALP) LN's are now seeing these as a force for good. They too are conducting searches, removing IED component parts, planning and conducting Vehicle Check Points (VCPs) and making arrests under their own chain of command. This enables LN's to live as they want, being given the protection and security from the people who their Government has put into that position of authority and providing them with effective security. The ANSF are neutralising the insurgents in all aspects of COIN. They deny them freedom of movement, deny them economic support from the sale of opium, and arrest IED makers and facilitators. Gaining and maintaining popular support

with both LN and ANSF has and must remain key to the success of ISAF's mission in Afghanistan. We and our Afghan Warrior brothers are continuing to work towards a peaceful and lasting solution for the people of Afghanistan.

Honours and Awards Op HERRICK 16

■ **Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE)**

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Raymond Stenning MBE, The Yorkshire Regiment

■ **Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE)**

Major Edward Richard Hugh Colver, The Yorkshire Regiment

■ **Conspicuous Gallantry Cross (CGC)**

Captain Luke Timothy John Mason, The Yorkshire Regiment

■ **Queen's Commendation for Bravery (QCB)**

Private Lewis John Murphy, The Yorkshire Regiment

■ **Queen's Commendation for Valuable Service (QCVS)**

Captain John Kume-Davey, The Yorkshire Regiment

Warrant Officer Class 2 Eric Joseph Whitehouse, The Yorkshire Regiment

■ **Joint Commander's Commendation (JCC)**

Captain Ian David Martin, The Yorkshire Regiment

Lieutenant Thomas Michael Appleyard, The Yorkshire Regiment

Corporal Ryan Bishop, The Yorkshire Regiment

Lance Corporal Peter Jack Skidmore, The Yorkshire Regiment

■ **Brigade Commander's Commendation (BCC)**

Major Rob Driver, The Yorkshire Regiment

Major John Duncan, RACHD

Major Dan Holloway, The Yorkshire Regiment

Major Nick Walker, RAMC

Captain Alec Hammond, The Yorkshire Regiment

Captain Nick Ross, The Yorkshire Regiment

Captain Rob Townsend, The Yorkshire Regiment

Lieutenant Dan Brennan, The Yorkshire Regiment

Lieutenant Callum Cameron, The Yorkshire Regiment

Warrant Officer Class 2 Lee Garbutt, The Yorkshire Regiment

Sergeant Adrian Dixon, The Yorkshire Regiment

Corporal Matthew Lawton, The Yorkshire Regiment

Corporal Anthony Williams, The Yorkshire Regiment

Lance Corporal Lee Marshall, The Yorkshire Regiment

Lance Corporal Patrick Carton, The Yorkshire Regiment

Private Liam Fisher, The Yorkshire Regiment



Attached Arms' Honours and Awards Op HERRICK 16

■ **Queen's Commendation for Bravery (QCB)**

Lance Corporal Simon David Dent, Grenadier Guards

■ **Queen's Commendation for Valuable Service (QCVS)**

Major Edwin N Launders, Prince of Wales's Coy, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards

■ **Mention in Dispatches (MID)**

Serjeant James Watson, A Coy 3RIFLES

■ **Joint Commander's Commendation (JCC)**

Lieutenant James P Marsden, Prince of Wales's Coy, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards

Serjeant Daniel Long, A Coy 3Rifles

Lance Corporal Jason York, A Coy 3Rifles

Lance Corporal Craig Brown, Prince of Wales's Coy, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards

■ **Brigade Commander's Commendation (BCC)**

Corporal Robert Warenycia, The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Lance Corporal Samuel Bellas, The Intelligence Corps

THE HOMECOMING PARADES





■ *The Battlegroup Chief of Staff, Maj Rob Driver, and the Colours on the parade square during the Battalion Medals parade in Warminster*



■ The Duke of Wellington presenting 2Lt Ledger with his Op HERRICK campaign medal in Warminster



■ Battalion medals parade in Warminster, the Commanding Officer and the Duke of Wellington talk to those who were injured during the tour



■ Candles for the fallen at a Service in Warminster Minster



■ The Commanding Officer leading the Battalion through Halifax



■ The Battalion proudly marching through Halifax



■ Piece Hall, Halifax



■ The Colours on parade in the Piece Hall, Halifax



■ The Commanding Officer leading the Battalion past Clifford's Tower, York



■ The Corps of Drums marching through York City centre



■ *The Lord Mayor of York inspecting the guard outside York Minster*



■ *The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nicholas Houghton GCB CBE ADC, inspects the Battalion outside York Minster*




■ His Royal Highness The Duke of York KG at the altar in York Minster with Padre John Duncan to his right



■ The Colour Party leaving York Minster at the end of the service



■ His Royal Highness the Duke of York KG and Archbishop Sentamu in York Minster



■ Archbishop Sentamu, wearing a Yorkshire Regiment beret, being presented with a prayerbook by Lt Col David O'Kelly, the Regimental Secretary, in York Minster

OBITUARIES



Sergeant Nigel Coupe



*3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)*

Tuesday 6 March 2012

Sergeant Nigel Coupe was a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer from 1st Battalion The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment, who was attached to 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment as a Warrior Sergeant in 7 Platoon, Corunna Company.

Sergeant Coupe, 33, was from Lytham Saint Annes, Lancashire. He joined the Army in January 1996 and was enlisted into The Queen's Lancashire Regiment which subsequently became 1st Battalion The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment. For a period he was attached to The Duke of Wellington's Regiment, which later became 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment. He also completed a tour as an instructor at the Driving and Maintenance School in Bovington before deploying to Afghanistan with Corunna Company.

Sergeant Coupe was an integral part of both 7 Platoon and Corunna Company. His expertise was vital to ensuring the Company was fully prepared to deploy on operations. His kindness and devotion to the soldiers he led will leave an indelible mark on everyone who served with him. He will be sorely missed.

He leaves behind his beloved wife, Natalie, and two children, Ella and Jasmine, mother, Elaine, father, Alan, sister, Linda and grandfather, Roy. The thoughts and prayers of all those in his Battalion and Combined Force Lashkar Gah are with them at this most difficult time.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's), said:

"Sergeant Nigel Coupe was a polite, committed member of this family battalion. Throughout his distinguished career he proved loyal and gave dedicated service to those he led, whether that be in Kosovo, Iraq or Afghanistan. He was proud to be a Lancashire soldier in a Yorkshire battalion.

"Unassuming in nature but with real presence he was fiercely dedicated to his profession as an Armoured Infantryman. This dedication and potential marked him out amongst his peers and few, if any, could match his technical prowess on Armoured Vehicles. It is no surprise that he was one of the handful to be selected to be an Instructor at our prestigious Armoured Training Centre Bovington.

"Today we have lost one of our brothers who led, mentored and tutored those above and below him with true humility and compassion. Our thoughts and prayers in these difficult days rest with his family, Natalie, Ella and Jasmine."

Corporal Jake Hartley



**3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)**

Tuesday 6 March 2012

Corporal Jake Hartley, 20, was from Dewsbury, West Yorkshire. He joined the Battalion in December 2008 and his potential was immediately recognised. Corporal Hartley had a very bright future in the Army and he was already promoting well ahead of his years, which is testament to his soldiering ability. Perhaps more importantly, Corporal Hartley had an innate ability to inspire those around him and make them achieve more than they ever imagined was possible.

Corporal Hartley was very popular within the Platoon and the Company at large. He will be remembered as the life and soul of the party, a generous outgoing young man with an exceptionally bright future. He will be sorely missed.

He leaves behind him his mother and stepfather, Nathalie and Mark, brother Ethan and uncle and best friend, Luke. The thoughts and prayers of all those in his Battalion and Combined Force Lashkar Gah are very much with them at this most difficult time.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's), said:

"Corporal Jake Hartley was the ultimate Infantry soldier and naturally stood out from his peers. Fit, motivated, yet always understated, he was one of the best. His rise through the ranks had been swift and rightly so; he was a natural leader as exemplified by his top position on the gruelling Infantry Section Commanders Course.

"Corporal Hartley was immensely popular with officers and soldiers alike. He was a future star; Regimental Sergeant Major material for sure. We have lost today a selfless, dedicated leader. But our loss is nothing compared to that of his family and friends who have lost one of the most likeable men you could ever meet. Our thoughts and prayers are with them today."

Private Anthony Frampton



*3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)*

Tuesday 6 March 2012

Private Anthony 'Anton' Frampton, 20, was from Huddersfield. Prior to joining the Army, Private Frampton attended Royds Hall High School, Huddersfield. On leaving school he spent a period as an apprentice welder before deciding to join the Army.

Private Frampton joined the Army in January 2009 before passing out of training in August 2009 and joining the 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment in Warminster.

Private Frampton was initially employed in Alma Company as a Rifleman. In January 2010 he deployed to the Falkland Islands. On return, Private Frampton volunteered for the Drums Course in Catterick and on completion he joined the Light Platoon, Somme Company. It was here that he displayed his natural physical fitness and amazing character. Fit, robust and intelligent he soon completed training to use the Javelin missile system.

In September 2010, Private Frampton moved to the Javelin Platoon and it is here where he really began to shine. A true team player with an infectious sense of humour he possessed a real talent for Armoured Infantry gunnery. In May 2011, Private Frampton deployed on exercise with Javelin Platoon to Canada where he performed excellently, demonstrating determination in adversity and the highest levels of soldiering.

Private Frampton joined Corunna Company prior to deployment to Afghanistan and was employed as an Infantry Dismount and Warrior Gunner.

Private Frampton was an absolute character, hugely popular within Corunna and Somme Companies, but also the wider Battalion. Noticed by all for his carefree nature and love of life, Private Frampton will be missed by all who knew him and had the pleasure of serving alongside him.

He leaves behind him his mother and stepfather, Margaret and Martin, his father Gary, sisters, Gemma and Nicola, great uncle Pat and extended family. The thoughts and prayers of all those in his Battalion and Combined Force Lashkar Gah are very much with them at this most difficult time.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's), said:

"Private Anthony Frampton was a unique young man. Fit, carefree, and always the life and soul of his platoon, he was a true legend amongst his peers. A thoroughly likeable young man, he could motivate and encourage the entire Battalion with his cheekiness and smile.

"But behind this cheeky nature lay a truly dedicated Infantry soldier, who was committed and brave. This family Battalion has today lost one of its central characters. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family and friends at this difficult time.

Private Christopher Kershaw



*3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)*

Tuesday 6 March 2012

Private Christopher Kershaw, 19, was from Bradford. He joined the Battalion in September 2011 and was immediately put on a Warrior driving cadre. Private Kershaw thoroughly enjoyed working on the Warriors and his natural talent for the role became evident. Furthermore, Private Kershaw was an extremely effective Light Machine Gun gunner and was subsequently selected to fill this role on operations. He proved himself, in a very short time, to be an excellent soldier and a great friend to many in the Company.

Private Kershaw was a unique and likeable character who quickly made a name for himself in the Company. He was devoted to his peers and always delivered what was asked of him. He will be sorely missed.

He leaves behind his parents, Brian and Monica, and sister Sarah Louise. The thoughts and prayers of all those in his Battalion and Combined Force Lashkar Gah are very much with them at this most difficult time.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's), said:

"Private Christopher Kershaw was a fiercely fit young man who thrived on soldiering. His natural love of the outdoors shone through in his personal and professional life. Given this passion and his continuous desire to educate himself, he already stood out amongst his peers as a Corporal of the future. We have lost today a true Yorkshire Warrior. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family."

Private Gregg Stone



**3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)**

Sunday 3 June 2012

Private Gregg Thomas Stone deployed to Nahr-e Saraj (South), Helmand Province, on 13th May 2012, as part of 6 Platoon, Burma Company, the 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment. He was deployed to Check Point SHAPARAK.

In the early evening of Sunday 3rd June 2012 Private Stone was Killed in Action whilst deployed on a dynamic operation to apprehend a group of insurgents who had abducted an Afghan Uniformed Policeman from a local village. The insurgent group was tracked to a location on the southern banks of the River Helmand and, upon contact with the enemy, Private Stone received a fatal gunshot wound. The Afghan Policeman was safely recovered by ISAF forces.

Private Stone was born on 9th October 1991 in Hull, Yorkshire. He attended Hornsea Secondary School where he obtained six GCSEs. Private Stone was a keen football supporter and also enjoyed motocross. He was married to Samantha and lived with her in Warminster, Wiltshire. Private Stone joined the Army on 31st October 2009 and attended the Infantry Training Centre, Catterick. He passed out of training on 30th April 2010 and joined the 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment in Warminster. Private Stone was subsequently trained as a Light Machine Gunner and Sharpshooter within 6 Platoon, Burma Company. In 2011 Private Stone deployed to BATUS, Canada on an arduous training exercise. He then completed Mission-Specific Training in the UK before deploying to Afghanistan. Private Stone had ambitions to complete his Junior Non-Commissioned Officers' Course on return from Afghanistan.

Private Stone leaves behind his wife, Samantha, mother, Angela, father, Robert, brothers, Kallum, Jamie and Graeme, and sisters, Rosie and Jennie.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment, said:

"We have lost today Private Gregg Stone, a committed professional soldier and our brother in arms who died protecting the lives of others. Fit and determined, Gregg was a happy outgoing soldier whose energy always enthused those around him. He was respected and admired by his fellow soldiers as an individual who was totally selfless and who cared deeply for others. He was notable not only for his military skills but also his singing prowess and his achievements in motocross. His fellow soldiers and friends describe him simply and unequivocally as a 'legend' such was his outgoing and upbeat nature. His hard working attitude and eagerness to soldier, coupled with his friendliness and compassion, made him the perfect Yorkshire Infantry soldier and we are proud and honoured to have served with him. But our loss today is as nothing to that felt by his wife Samantha and their unborn child, his five brothers and sisters and his parents whom he loved so much. Our thoughts and prayers are firmly with them on this sad day."

Private Daniel Wade



**3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)**

Tuesday 6 March 2012

Private Daniel Wade, 20, was from Warrington. He joined the Army in January 2011 and arrived in the Battalion in July 2011. He was immediately placed onto a Warrior driving cadre, which he passed with flying colours. It did not take him long to establish himself as one of the best drivers in the Company. Furthermore, Private Wade was an excellent shot and he proved himself, in a very short time, to be an excellent soldier.

Private Wade was very popular within the Platoon and the Company at large. He committed himself fully to everything and always delivered what was asked of him. He will be remembered as a family man who was devoted to his fiancée Emma, with whom he is expecting a baby girl called Lexie. He will be sorely missed.

He leaves behind his mother, Lisa, his sister, Stacey, his beloved fiancée, Emma and unborn baby, Lexie. The thoughts and prayers of all those in his Battalion and Combined Force Lashkar Gah are very much with them at this most difficult time.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's), said:

"Private Daniel Wade was a new young soldier in this family Battalion. A Cheshire lad in a Yorkshire Regiment, Dan arrived keen and energetic and in only a very short period of time had made a real mark with Corunna Company.

"Quiet and unassuming, he was very committed in all that he did. It is to his credit that he completed his Warrior Driver course so successfully early in his career. His passion for motocross and Superbikes marked him out as a man who loved speed. We have lost today a young man who had so much to give in his life, both as a father, son, brother and as a soldier. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family."

Private Daniel Wilford



**3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)**

Tuesday 6 March 2012

Private Daniel Wilford, 21, was from Huddersfield. He joined 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment in April 2010. He deployed to Canada as a Warrior Gunner in June 2011 before deploying to Afghanistan in the same role in February 2012.

He was an extremely effective Warrior gunner and had a thorough knowledge of the vehicle and its weapon systems. Away from military life he enjoyed playing golf and darts with his friends. He was a truly sociable person.

Private Wilford was very popular within Corunna Company. He was always up for a laugh with the boys and was always willing to help his comrades. Private Wilford proved himself as a soldier and as a friend whilst in Corunna Company and his absence will be felt deeply by all that had the honour of serving with him. He will be missed.

He leaves behind his mother and stepfather, Diane and Paul, his brother, Alex, and his grandparents. The thoughts and prayers of all those in his Battalion and Combined Force Lashkar Gah are with them at this most difficult time.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's), said:

"Private Daniel Wilford was the archetypal Yorkshire Infantry soldier: quiet, unassuming but with bags of character. He was unique, happy-go-lucky and confident, his smile could light up a room. A thoroughly honest and dedicated Infantryman, his friends and colleagues trusted and respected him. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family on this difficult day."

Sergeant Gareth Thursby



*3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)*

Saturday 15 September 2012

Sergeant Gareth David Thursby was born on 21st September 1982. He attended South Craven School in Skipton before joining the British Army on 3rd August 1999. After completing his training in early 2000, he joined the 1st Battalion, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment. His first deployment was to Kosovo in 2003, followed by Iraq in 2005. He passed the Section Commanders' Battle Course to qualify for a posting to the Army Training Regiment in Pirbright as an instructor. Subsequently, he returned to the 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's) as a Section Commander. In October 2010 he was promoted to Sergeant and assumed his role as a Platoon Sergeant in Alma Company.

Sergeant Thursby was deeply respected by all who worked with him and all that knew him. His professionalism and strength of character were his hallmark, as was his commitment to his men. His unswerving loyalty, moral courage and sense of duty were an example to all. He was 29 years old and is survived by his wife, Louise, and two children, Joshua and Ruby.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's), said:

"We have lost one of our finest, Sergeant Gareth Thursby. His nickname 'Bull' epitomised everything; he was strong, confident and unbelievably robust. He was admired and deeply respected by his soldiers and peers for his soldiering skills, physical strength and forthright honesty. Utterly professional, his standards were legendary.

"Having been his Company Commander and now Commanding Officer, I know just how committed to soldiering he was. However, against the hard exterior there was a caring and most compassionate leader. I heard just a few weeks ago that he had told his Platoon to call him 'Dad' during the tour. That is how he saw himself: a father figure for 30 men and women involved in gruelling operations in Helmand. On the very few nights when he was not on patrol, but his men were, Sergeant Thursby would remain alert and awake until all his men returned safely.

"When there were dangerous moments, it was always Sergeant Thursby who could be found at the front, offering steadying words to his Platoon Commander and the young soldiers. Such dedication and indeed selfless love for his fellow soldiers is remarkable and testament to the qualities of this unique man.

"Our thoughts today, though, are firmly with his wife, Louise, and his two wonderful children, Joshua and Ruby, who I know he loved and cared so much for."

Private Thomas Wroe



*3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
(Duke Of Wellington's)*

Saturday 15 September 2012

Private Thomas James Wroe was born in Huddersfield on 27th June 1994. He joined the British Army on 5th September 2010 and attended the Army Foundation College at Harrogate. On 11 November 2011 he completed his training and joined 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's). He was assigned to 3 Platoon, Alma Company as a Rifleman and completed demanding pre-deployment training, including qualifying as a Team Medic. Private Wroe spent several weeks working and training with the Battalion Rear Operations Group in the United Kingdom until he turned 18, before deploying to join the rest of his Company on Operation Herrick 16.

Private Wroe was an outstanding example of a Yorkshire Regiment soldier. Even in the short time he had been with his Company he had shown himself to be enthusiastic, articulate and highly capable. He followed a strong family tradition of service in the Battalion and already had aspirations to attend a Junior Non-Commissioned Officers' cadre. His quick-witted sense of humour made him popular with all.

Private Wroe was 18 years old and is survived by his parents, Michael and Claire, and sister, Demi, from Holmfirth, West Yorkshire.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Stenning MBE, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment said:

"Private Tom Wroe had only been with us a few short months, but in this short period he had made a significant impression on his fellow soldiers and Commanders. Always eager and with unrelenting energy, he had pushed hard to join the Regiment in Afghanistan.

"Arriving only some two months ago, his energy and professionalism quickly earned him the respect of his fellow team members. But it was his humour and character that really stood out. Whenever anyone asked how he was, his consistent reply was 'always happy.' This phrase captured the young man Wroe was. On patrol his professional skills were impressively high given his relative inexperience. When back in the isolated checkpoint, his humour and vibrancy shone through and energised those around him.

"His quick wit, love of Huddersfield Town Football Club and board games and genuine 'can do' nature made him a popular member of the team. He already had that unique quality of command presence that an Army requires; people looked to him for leadership in dangerous and difficult moments. I have no doubt he would have attended and passed our Junior Leaders' Course, way ahead of his time.

"But today our thoughts are with his family, in particular his father, Michael, a fellow 'Duke' who has only just recently left our Battalion. Our thoughts and prayers are with him, his mother, Claire, sister, Demi and girlfriend Jessica, who we know he loved so much."



Kingsman Ryan Ward



*2nd Battalion,
The Duke Of Lancaster's Regiment*

Saturday 27 October 2012

Kingsman Ward joined the Army aged 16 into the Army Foundation College at Harrogate, where he was quick to make friends and developed into a recruit with great potential. At Harrogate he played rugby, a sport that suited his robust physique, and he was also awarded a prize for military studies, which is evidence of his potential.

Kingsman Ward graduated in 2009 to the Infantry Training Centre in Catterick, where he learned his core skills as an Infanter, passing out and joining his local Regiment The 2nd Battalion, The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment.

After a year living in Cyprus Kingsman Ward moved back with the Battalion to Weeton Barracks and subsequently volunteered to be part of the Battlefield Casualty Replacement Platoon for Afghanistan. He moved to Warminster, with Waterloo Platoon, where he trained with the 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment before deploying to Afghanistan in June 2012. Upon his arrival Kingsman Ward joined 3 Platoon, Alma Company, in Check Point Tora, where he lived and worked alongside the Afghan local police until returning to the UK in October 2012.

Lieutenant Colonel Neil Unsworth, the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment, said:

"The 2nd Battalion is shocked and saddened by the tragic death of Kingsman Ryan Ward. Our thoughts are with his family and close friends at this awful time."



■ *The Memorial in Warminster*



■ *The plaque on the Memorial Stone*





3rd BATTALION THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT
(DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S)
BATTLEGROUP

Operation HERRICK 16 (2012)
Combined Force Nahr-e Saraj (South)

Compiled by Terry Butterworth